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Saturday, April 13, 2024

Dario Amodei on "AGI" and the exponential curve [Beware the intellectual monoculture]

Ezra Klein, What if Dario Amodei Is Right About A.I.?NYTimes, Apr. 12, 2024.

AGI

Let's skip over a lot of stuff to get to AGI:

EZRA KLEIN: You don’t love the framing of artificial general intelligence, what gets called A.G.I. Typically, this is all described as a race to A.G.I., a race to this system that can do kind of whatever a human can do, but better. What do you understand A.G.I. to mean, when people say it? And why don’t you like it? Why is it not your framework?

DARIO AMODEI: So it’s actually a term I used to use a lot 10 years ago. And that’s because the situation 10 years ago was very different. 10 years ago, everyone was building these very specialized systems, right? Here’s a cat detector. You run it on a picture, and it’ll tell you whether a cat is in it or not. And so I was a proponent all the way back then of like, no, we should be thinking generally. Humans are general. The human brain appears to be general. It appears to get a lot of mileage by generalizing. You should go in that direction.

And I think back then, I kind of even imagined that that was like a discrete thing that we would reach at one point. But it’s a little like, if you look at a city on the horizon and you’re like, we’re going to Chicago, once you get to Chicago, you stop talking in terms of Chicago. You’re like, well, what neighborhood am I going to? What street am I on?

And I feel that way about A.G.I. We have very general systems now. In some ways, they’re better than humans. In some ways, they’re worse. There’s a number of things they can’t do at all. And there’s much improvement still to be gotten. So what I believe in is this thing that I say like a broken record, which is the exponential curve. And so, that general tide is going to increase with every generation of models.

And there’s no one point that’s meaningful. I think there’s just a smooth curve. But there may be points which are societally meaningful, right? We’re already working with, say, drug discovery scientists, companies like Pfizer or Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, on helping with biomedical diagnosis, drug discovery. There’s going to be some point where the models are better at that than the median human drug discovery scientists. I think we’re just going to get to a part of the exponential where things are really interesting.

Just like the chat bots got interesting at a certain stage of the exponential, even though the improvement was smooth, I think at some point, biologists are going to sit up and take notice, much more than they already have, and say, oh, my God, now our field is moving three times as fast as it did before. And now it’s moving 10 times as fast as it did before. And again, when that moment happens, great things are going to happen.

And we’ve already seen little hints of that with things like AlphaFold, which I have great respect for. I was inspired by AlphaFold, right? A direct use of A.I. to advance biological science, which it’ll advance basic science. In the long run, that will advance curing all kinds of diseases. But I think what we need is like 100 different AlphaFolds. And I think the way we’ll ultimately get that is by making the models smarter and putting them in a position where they can design the next AlphaFold.

I like the cities analogy. And, while he doesn't say much about that exponential curve here, he has earlier. 

Scaling

As far as I can tell he thinks scaling will take us "to infinity and beyond," to quote Buzz Lightyear. Color me skeptical. I think scaling will top out at some point in the next decade or two. Just what range of behaviors AI will represent at that point, I don't know. Scaling up machine learning has taken us to a new region of the space, but I don't see any reason to believe that it exhausts the space.

Here's what bothers me, the belief in scaling (from earlier in the dialog):

DARIO AMODEI: Yes, we’re going to have to make bigger models that use more compute per iteration. We’re going to have to run them for longer by feeding more data into them. And that number of chips times the amount of time that we run things on chips is essentially dollar value because these chips are — you rent them by the hour. That’s the most common model for it. And so, today’s models cost of order $100 million to train, plus or minus factor two or three.

The models that are in training now and that will come out at various times later this year or early next year are closer in cost to $1 billion. So that’s already happening. And then I think in 2025 and 2026, we’ll get more towards $5 or $10 billion.

EZRA KLEIN: So we’re moving very quickly towards a world where the only players who can afford to do this are either giant corporations, companies hooked up to giant corporations — you all are getting billions of dollars from Amazon. OpenAI is getting billions of dollars from Microsoft. Google obviously makes its own.

You can imagine governments — though I don’t know of too many governments doing it directly, though some, like the Saudis, are creating big funds to invest in the space. When we’re talking about the model’s going to cost near to $1 billion, then you imagine a year or two out from that, if you see the same increase, that would be $10-ish billion. Then is it going to be $100 billion? I mean, very quickly, the financial artillery you need to create one of these is going to wall out anyone but the biggest players.

DARIO AMODEI: I basically do agree with you. I think it’s the intellectually honest thing to say that building the big, large scale models, the core foundation model engineering, it is getting more and more expensive. And anyone who wants to build one is going to need to find some way to finance it. And you’ve named most of the ways, right? You can be a large company. You can have some kind of partnership of various kinds with a large company. Or governments would be the other source.

I think one way that it’s not correct is, we’re always going to have a thriving ecosystem of experimentation on small models. For example, the open source community working to make models that are as small and as efficient as possible that are optimized for a particular use case. And also downstream usage of the models. I mean, there’s a blooming ecosystem of startups there that don’t need to train these models from scratch. They just need to consume them and maybe modify them a bit.

$100 (Klein's number, not Amodei's) to train one model? That's a lot of money, and at the moment those decisions are being made by a relatively small group of people who ideas are dominated by the bigger-is-better-Foundation-model culture that dominates A.I. these days. That makes me very uncomfortable.

Too much power

Judging from some remarks Amodei makes later in the dialog, it makes him uncomfortable as well:

DARIO AMODEI: ...if these predictions on the exponential trend are right, and we should be humble — and I don’t know if they’re right or not. My only evidence is that they appear to have been correct for the last few years. And so, I’m just expecting by induction that they continue to be correct. I don’t know that they will, but let’s say they are. The power of these models is going to be really quite incredible.

And as a private actor in charge of one of the companies developing these models, I’m kind of uncomfortable with the amount of power that that entails. I think that it potentially exceeds the power of, say, the social media companies maybe by a lot.

You know, occasionally, in the more science fictiony world of A.I. and the people who think about A.I. risk, someone will ask me like, OK, let’s say you build the A.G.I. What are you going to do with it? Will you cure the diseases? Will you create this kind of society?

And I’m like, who do you think you’re talking to? Like a king? I just find that to be a really, really disturbing way of conceptualizing running an A.I. company. And I hope there are no companies whose C.E.O.s actually think about things that way.

I mean, the whole technology, not just the regulation, but the oversight of the technology, like the wielding of it, it feels a little bit wrong for it to ultimately be in the hands — maybe I think it’s fine at this stage, but to ultimately be in the hands of private actors. There’s something undemocratic about that much power concentration.

EZRA KLEIN: I have now, I think, heard some version of this from the head of most of, maybe all of, the A.I. companies, in one way or another. And it has a quality to me of, Lord, grant me chastity but not yet.

Which is to say that I don’t know what it means to say that we’re going to invent something so powerful that we don’t trust ourselves to wield it. I mean, Amazon just gave you guys $2.75 billion. They don’t want to see that investment nationalized.

No matter how good-hearted you think OpenAI is, Microsoft doesn’t want GPT-7, all of a sudden, the government is like, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. We’re taking this over for the public interest, or the U.N. is going to handle it in some weird world or whatever it might be. I mean, Google doesn’t want that.

And this is a thing that makes me a little skeptical of the responsible scaling laws or the other iterative versions of that I’ve seen in other companies or seen or heard talked about by them, which is that it’s imagining this moment that is going to come later, when the money around these models is even bigger than it is now, the power, the possibility, the economic uses, the social dependence, the celebrity of the founders. It’s all worked out. We’ve maintained our pace on the exponential curve. We’re 10 years in the future.

Interpretability

DARIO AMODEI: And one of the things we and others have found is that, sometimes, there are specific neurons, specific statistical indicators inside the model, not necessarily in its external responses, that can tell you when the model is lying or when it’s telling the truth.

And so at some level, sometimes, not in all circumstances, the models seem to know when they’re saying something false and when they’re saying something true. I wouldn’t say that the models are being intentionally deceptive, right? I wouldn’t ascribe agency or motivation to them, at least in this stage in where we are with A.I. systems. But there does seem to be something going on where the models do seem to need to have a picture of the world and make a distinction between things that are true and things that are not true.

If you think of how the models are trained, they read a bunch of stuff on the internet. A lot of it’s true. Some of it, more than we’d like, is false. And when you’re training the model, it has to model all of it. And so, I think it’s parsimonious, I think it’s useful to the models picture of the world for it to know when things are true and for it to know when things are false.

And then the hope is, can we amplify that signal? Can we either use our internal understanding of the model as an indicator for when the model is lying, or can we use that as a hook for further training? And there are at least hooks. There are at least beginnings of how to try to address this problem.

EZRA KLEIN: So I try as best I can, as somebody not well-versed in the technology here, to follow this work on what you’re describing, which I think, broadly speaking, is interpretability, right? Can we know what is happening inside the model? And over the past year, there have been some much hyped breakthroughs in interpretability.

And when I look at those breakthroughs, they are getting the vaguest possible idea of some relationships happening inside the statistical architecture of very toy models built at a fraction of a fraction of a fraction of a fraction of a fraction of the complexity of Claude 1 or GPT-1, to say nothing of Claude 2, to say nothing of Claude 3, to say nothing of Claude Opus, to say nothing of Claude 4, which will come whenever Claude 4 comes.

We have this quality of like maybe we can imagine a pathway to interpreting a model that has a cognitive complexity of an inchworm. And meanwhile, we’re trying to create a superintelligence. How do you feel about that? How should I feel about that? How do you think about that?

DARIO AMODEI: I think, first, on interpretability, we are seeing substantial progress on being able to characterize, I would say, maybe the generation of models from six months ago. I think it’s not hopeless, and we do see a path. That said, I share your concern that the field is progressing very quickly relative to that.

And we’re trying to put as many resources into interpretability as possible. We’ve had one of our co-founders basically founded the field of interpretability. But also, we have to keep up with the market. So all of it’s very much a dilemma, right? Even if we stopped, then there’s all these other companies in the U.S.. And even if some law stopped all the companies in the U.S., there’s a whole world of this.

There's much more in the discussion. Persuasion is one (scary) topic. Energy usage is another. Copyright and economic displacement too.

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