Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Ramble: Marginalism, AI & Play, Got Test, Mind.in.Matter

Once again, it’s time for me to figure out what I’m up to.

Marginalism

I just published a long working paper, Notes on the Collective Valuation of "Thick" Objects: Financial Assets, Movies, and Novels. FWIW it’s one of the most satisfying pieces of intellectual work I’ve done in a while. It’s an adjunct to my ongoing work on Tyler Cowen’s monograph, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026). I’m just about to the end of that project. I want to write a post about his final chapter, and then write an introduction to the whole series. Once that’s done I can package it as another working paper.

Play: How to Stay Human in the AI Revolution

I’m back at work on this project. I’ve just posted a provisional outline of the book, at last, and I’m back at work on the proposal. I’m in the process of preparing a sample chapter, Chapter 6: “The Transformation — Kisangani 2150.” That’s where I slip into science fiction mode. I’ve already premiered that in a piece I did for 3QD and then turned into a working paper, but things need to be a bit different for the book. For one thing I need to tell more of the story. Which means that I’ve got to make up more of the story. So I’ve gotten back to that. My next 3QD piece is due in a week and a half. I hope to have something for that.

Yikes!

The God Test

I’m also working on a (short) series of posts on Robert Wright’s current book on AI, The God Test: Artificial Intelligence and Our Coming Cosmic Reckoning. I’ve already got one post about it, Robert Wright discusses his new book, The God Test, with Paul Bloom [Awe? Bob, Awe!?]. I figure my next post, the first once since I’ve started reading the book, will be a scatter post, a ramble on things I have in mind while reading.

[I’m half way through.]

Language, Memory, and Mind: A Supplement to The Computer and the Brain

That’s my new book project, outline here. I expect it to be relatively short, 30K to 40K. It’s an outgrowth of the thinking I’ve been doing about AI in the last year or two, some basic stuff I keep landing on. I figure the opening chapter will be based on a recent working paper, Computation, Chess, and Language in Artificial Intelligence. The general idea is to revisit the topic of how mind & computation are implemented in physical stuff, matter, now that we have to deal with distributed representation. That really didn’t exist as an issue when von Neumann wrote his little book, The Computer and the Brain, which was also about physical implementation.

This is also related to my ongoing research into LLMs with Ramesh Viswanathan.

There’s more, my new interest in religion, some graphics stuff, but that’s enough for now.

Lower Manhattan as seen from Liberty State Park

LLMS are too flakey to replace human work effectively

Zeynep Tufekci, The One Very Simple Reason A.I. Won’t Steal All Our Jobs, NYTimes, June 30, 2026.

The possibility that artificial intelligence will steal all our jobs has been hyped by industry leaders. It has roused politicians to sound the alarm. It now ranks at or near the top of the public’s concerns about the new technology. And right on cue, earlier this month Meta, Facebook’s parent company, began marketing an autonomous artificial intelligence system to handle companies’ sales, customer service, scheduling and all sorts of other key functions that currently require human beings. Many more such products are expected to follow.

So what would a fully automated future look like? As it happens, the world has already caught a glimpse. Back in March, Meta announced that Facebook and Instagram users who’d gotten locked out of their accounts would no longer interact with a customer service representative; they would instead interact with specially trained A.I.. Recognizing the opportunity that presented, scammers essentially talked the A.I. into turning over control of more than 20,000 Instagram accounts, including those of the Obama White House and a senior Trump administration official. Then the scammers lit up Telegram message boards with their delighted accounts of how easy it had all been.

It was not a fluke. Air Canada disabled its chatbots after they mistakenly promised a customer a refund — and the customer sued and won. McDonald’s scuttled the bot taking orders at its drive-throughs after a number of viral videos showed it to be wildly dysfunctional. In one case, the bot mistakenly added hundreds of dollars of chicken nuggets to a customer’s order.

These scary — OK, OK, funny — incidents aren’t the result of coding errors. They’re the result of an essential, inescapable fact about the artificial intelligence that has become so common in so many aspects of our daily lives: Large language models are not reasoning machines. They’re plausibility engines. It’s not just that they don’t test their outputs to make sure they’re correct or logical, or that they fail to do so in certain instances. They can’t, and they’ll never be able to on their own. They can only assess which answers are probable, based on the data on which the models have been trained. And that holds true whether they’re trained on the full breadth of human output or only on peer-reviewed scientific articles. It’s baked into the way they operate. [...]

And that’s why I’m not listening to the dark predictions of an imminent A.I. jobspocalypse. L.L.M.s can do many things with astounding proficiency, but they can’t do the vast majority of human jobs without skidding into disaster here and there. No upgrades or new model rollouts are going to change that.

She then goes on to discuss this and that, gives a useful precis of the debate between symbolic AI (aka GOFAI) and connectionist AI (e.g. deep learning and neural nets), some more this and that, and then:

Anthropic recently released new models, called Fable and Mythos, warning that they were so powerful that they would be dangerous if not for their safeguards. Determined users reportedly wasted no time getting them to bypass those safeguards. Citing this breach, the U.S. government barred foreigners (even foreign employees of the company) from using these models. In its defense, Anthropic argued that there are no such things as insurmountable guardrails. Which is exactly the point.

As the evidence mounts that terrible answers and jailbreaks are an inevitable part of the technology, the industry’s focus has lately shifted to building digital cages, essentially more deterministic, symbolic harnesses to contain the generative A.I. engine and check its results. Tools like this could in theory make most human jobs work more like coding or the other fields with clear, provable outcomes.

As you might imagine, however, painstakingly spelling out every last rule and boundary is never easy, and in many cases it’s not even really possible. Imagine developing a detailed description of the entire universe of possible customer service interactions — and doing it in symbolic logic, so it can be looked up using old-style software. Or picture an A.I. model built for law firms to use. It’s no small task to build a database of all U.S. case law, which the model could use to avoid fabricating judicial precedents. But that’s just a starting point. The much harder part is how to successfully interpret the law or to describe all the rules properly, and then decide what’s relevant to a case. And that’s why decades of attempts to create symbolic A.I. hit a wall.

Yes, yes, and YES! Some more this and that:

So why are we so convinced that A.I. will put us all out of work? Part of the answer lies in the remarkable ability of generative A.I. to communicate in fully coherent, conversational language. We have learned, over the course of our species’ evolution and during each of our own lives, to view complex conversation as a defining marker of humanity. Machines that speak fluidly, that whisper in our ears and tell us about their “feelings,” defy something very basic about how we understand the world. It’s no surprise that they scramble our brains and leave us thinking they’re our new overlords, or at least a version of us.

Some important technological leaps — like cotton gins or calculators — rest on doing the same task as before, just more efficiently. Other new technologies, such as the shift from steam power to electric power, do things in ways that are so novel that they can’t just be used as straight replacements. That’s the case with generative A.I. It’s an apple to our orange. It’s an alien.

There's more at the link.

Nostalgia and conflict in the Roman Catholic Church

David Gibson, Pope Leo Faces the First Crisis of His Pontificate, NYTimes, June 30, 2026.

The article starts out with (2nd paragraph):

The focus of the uproar is a breakaway faction based in Ecône, Switzerland, the Society of St. Pius X, which is devoted to the celebration of an outdated version of the Mass in Latin. Why is the group, named after Pope Pius X, a fiercely anti-liberal early-20th-century pontiff, causing such problems? Why should anyone care about such a recondite internal church dust-up?

And works its way around to this:

In fact, if today’s “trads” were sent back in time, they would discover that the old Mass was often a perfunctory affair celebrated in dodgy Latin with little participation by the faithful. Nor should it be forgotten that the Mass has undergone revisions over the past 2,000 years to adapt to social changes, such as the switch from Greek to Latin or the incorporation of Old Testament readings.

Linked to the traditionalist pining for a lost golden age is a reaction against a tectonic demographic shift in Catholicism. Yes, Christianity was born in the Middle East, but Catholicism grew up in Europe. “Europe is the faith and the faith is Europe,” the Catholic writer Hilaire Belloc wrote a century ago. No more. Thanks in large part to Vatican II, Catholicism has grown enormously, more than doubling from 653 million members in 1970 to 1.4 billion today. The vast majority of that growth has come in the Southern Hemisphere. Catholicism is far more African, more Asian, more Latin American than it is European.

That’s not the story that the traditionalists want to tell. For them, modernization has been the death knell of the church, because the reforms of Vatican II correlated with the sharp decline of practice in Europe and the West. Their faith is tethered to Western Christendom, which the numbers illustrate. Latin Masses celebrated by the society and those celebrated with Vatican approval are overwhelmingly confined to the United States and parts of Europe. But thanks to their base in the industrialized West, traditionalists have money, influence and visibility.

What will happen? Strong action by Leo could prompt a backlash from the right, but it could also divide it. Conservatives have so far tried to put the best spin possible on Leo’s year-old pontificate and may be loath to turn on a 70-year-old pope who could be around for a long time.

There's more at the link.

Monday, June 29, 2026

Notes on the Collective Valuation of “Thick” Objects: Financial Assets, Movies, and Novels

New working paper. Title above, links, abstract, TOC, and introduction below.

Links:

Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/169390494/Notes_on_the_Collective_Valuation_of_Thick_Objects_Financial_Assets_Movies_and_Novels
ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/408219138_Notes_on_the_Collective_Valuation_of_Thick_Objects_Financial_Assets_Movies_and_Novels

Abstract: Machine learning is creating a methodological bridge between disciplines that previously seemed far apart, especially economics and literary criticism. The bridge is the analysis of how populations deal with “thick objects.” A thick object is not exhausted by a few visible traits. It gathers interpretation, expectation, memory, value, narrative, and social response. A toaster is usually a thin object. A firm that manufactures toasters is thick: it has assets, debt, brands, patents, management, supply chains, analyst coverage, market expectations, and future promises. Scott Galloway’s remark that stocks are like brands — part promise, part performance — links stock, movies and novels. Each is a thick object moving through a field of collective judgment. Its value reflects both measurable performance and imagined future promise. They are thus as neighboring cases in a general problem: how populations perceive, classify, value, and transform thick objects. Machine learning constructs object-spaces from the traces minds leave behind. The task now is to learn how to interpret those spaces without mistaking the model for the world.

High-dimensional asset-pricing models start with many stock characteristics — price, returns, volume, profitability, leverage, liquidity, analyst revisions, momentum, volatility, investment, and so on. These characteristics are traces of firm activity, accounting conventions, analyst judgment, and trader behavior. New models then generate hundreds of thousands of nonlinear transformations from those characteristics in order to approximate the market’s pricing kernel, the structure through which future payoffs are priced under uncertainty. The individual factors are analytic objects approximating the valuation geometry produced by collective market activity.

That sounds strange in economics, but it is familiar from Matthew Jockers’ work on nineteenth-century Anglophone novels. Jockers created a high-dimensional design space from thousands of novels, using stylistic features and topic models. His topics are not literal thoughts in anyone’s mind. They are model-derived approximations to recurrent regions of culturally circulating thought. Yet the model revealed historical direction: novels arranged by similarity formed a temporal diagonal, a computationally disciplined proxy for population-level cultural cognition.

Arthur De Vany’s model of Hollywood adds the dynamic bridge. Movies are thick expressive-market objects. Their success cannot be predicted simply from stars, director, budget, genre, or advertising. Once released, they enter an audience field where word of mouth, imitation, and nonlinear cascades determine their fate. Most fail, some profit, a few become blockbusters. The dynamics are heavy-tailed, interactive, and collective.

Contents

Introduction: Using ChatGPT for focused intellectual exploration across disciplines 3
Thick Objects: Ground Shared by Economics and Cultural Analysis [Summary] 9
AIPT, Large Factor Models [First Session] 17
Hollywood Economics 23
Macroanalysis 27
The emerging triad 30
Direction over time 31
Doing a Jockers style analysis for financial assets 38
Thinking about thick objects 40
Stocks are like brands [Session Two] 42
Algorithmic and Causal models [Session Three] 52
Those empirical APT models [Session Four] 56
Decision space 63
A bridge between disparate disciplines 67

Introduction: Using ChatGPT for focused intellectual exploration across disciplines

This document serves two purposes. It presents a specific argument leading to the following provisional formulation:

High-dimensional models of novels, movies, and assets disclose the population-level geometry of collective interpretation around thick objects, turning literary criticism and economics into neighboring sciences of modeled valuation.

How I arrived at the speculation, however, is as important as the idea itself, perhaps more so. I did not arrive at that idea unaided. ChatGPT helped me. Those aren’t my words; they’re ChatGPT’s. I know a great deal about literary criticism and about movies, but not much about economics. I need ChatGPT to bridge the conceptual distance between the humanities, literary criticism, and the social sciences, economics.

Methodological curiosity

Fortunately the peculiar circumstances of my career have forced me to be interested in method and epistemology: How is it that we can come to know about the world and what methods can we use to arrive at that knowledge? When I entered Johns Hopkins as a freshman in 1965 the discipline of literary criticism was in a state of crisis, though I didn’t know that. How could I? I’d only just graduated high school and I still pretty much knowledge as it was handed to me.

That soon changed. The details of just how, when, and why don’t matter much at the moment. That it happened is sufficient for my present purposes. The upshot is that I became interested in Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” in my senior year. I investigated the poem with standard interpretive methods augmented by avant garde structuralism and found patterns I could not explain. But they “smelled” of the nested loops I learned about in a course in computer programming.

That sent me to the English Department at SUNY Buffalo, which had the best experimental program in the nation. I found a fellow graduate student, Ralph Henry Reese, who pointed me around a corner and down the hall to David Hays in Linguistics. Hays had been a first generation researcher in machine translation at the RAND Corp. and, as such, was one of the founders of computational linguistics. While I wasn’t able to resolve my issues with “Kubla Khan” – they’re still hanging fire – I became hooked on cognitive science. Consequently my dissertation in the English Department was also a quasi-technical exercise in knowledge representation, the discipline within cognitive science and artificial intelligence about the representation of human knowledge in computable form.

Given that that is where I had arrived in the late 1970s it is perhaps not so strange that now, decades later, I find myself staring down some pretty formidable economics despite never having studied the subject. For the last 15 years, however, I have been reading the Marginal Revolution blog hosted by Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok and I have been reading my way through Cowen’s recent monograph, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026). Cowen’s theme in the fourth (and last) chapter is that the economics he was trained in, the economics which followed from the Marginal Revolution, is rapidly being eclipsed by a more determinedly empirical discipline based on machine learning.

Bombed by 360,000 factors

Here is Cowen’s premier example. It’s from something called Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (pp. 99-100):

There is a recent working paper which is perhaps more striking yet, by Antoine Didisheim, Shikun (Barry) Ke, Bryan T. Kelly, and Semyon Malamud. They pick up from Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), a well-established idea from financial economics. APT typically looks for “factors” in the data which predict excess returns, and a traditional APT model might have found five or six such factors. Are “inflation” or perhaps “the term structure of interest rates” useful factors? Well, that can be debated, but if so, those results sound pretty intuitive. But those intuitions seem to be disappearing. In a paper by these authors, they apply machine learning methods to look for more factors. As we know, machine learning is very good at finding non-obvious relationships in the data. The largest model they built has 360,000 (!) factors, and it reduces pricing errors by 54.8 percent relative to the classic six-factor model from Fama and French. Bravo to the authors, but what kinds of intuitions do you think possibly can be supported by those 360,000 factors?

When I read that, it “looked like Greek to me,” as the cliché has it. But I took a deep breath and thought carefully, step by step and concluded that the assets in question are stocks. What you need to pay attention to is 1) the contrast between six factors and 360,000 factors, 2) the fact that one set of factors is intuitive while the other certainly is not, 3) but the unintelligible, unintuitive, collection of factors does a better job of pricing. That’s the new world toward which economics is moving. While the old intuitions are gasping for breath the new-fangled numbers are fit as a fiddle and ready for duty.

I thought some more and realized that what’s really going on is that people are evaluating those stocks, communicating with one another directly about them, and making decisions about buying and selling, thereby communicating indirectly with one another. That’s what those 360,000 factors are capturing, the actions of a dispersed community of analysts and traders. “Could this be roughly similar to the decisions movie-goers make about the movies they see based, not only on their preferences, but on information they get from reviews, and perhaps more importantly, from their friends?” “If so,” I conjectured, “then perhaps Cowen’s old colleague from Irvine, Arthur De Vany, can shed some light on the situation.” That is to say, can give me some intuitions that I can apply to the situation.

For De Vany had written a very interesting book, Hollywood Economics (2004), about the fate of movies once they have been released. Just as those intuitive “classical” models in economics aren’t as accurate as the new high-factor models, so you can’t predict the box-office performance of movies on such simple factors as the identities of the producer, screen writers, or stars in the movies. Now, De Vany didn’t produce a high-factor model that improved matters, he did something quite different (which is discussed below, pp. 23 ff.), but that’s secondary at the moment. The point is that we seem to have a gross similarity, the behavior of some object that interests a lot of people, a stock or a movie, cannot be reliably predicted using a simple model.

Meme stocks and novels

The similarity was reinforced when I heard a remark by Scott Galloway on the Pivot podcast: “Stocks are like brands and that is they’re part promise and part performance.” Consider the recent phenomenon of meme stocks, which Wikipedia glosses this way:

A meme stock is a stock that gains popularity among retail investors through social media. The popularity of meme stocks is generally based on internet memes shared among traders, on platforms such as Reddit's r/wallstreetbets. Investors in such stocks are often young and inexperienced investors. As a result of their popularity, meme stocks often trade at prices that are above their estimated value – as based on fundamental analysis – and are known for being extremely speculative and volatile.

Meme stocks are assets where promise overwhelms performance, more story than substance.

That’s what movies are. You are purchasing the story and the experience, not the seat in the theater, or the DVD, or the stream, those are the vehicles that carry the story. Claude calls these things “thick” objects (perhaps borrowing from the anthropological concept of “thick” description? ), as opposed to “thin” objects like toasters and drills. Novels are thick objects as well, which led me to Matthew Jockers’ 2013 book, Macroanalysis, where he uses machine learning to develop a high dimensional model (a mere 600 dimensions rather than 360,000) of a corpus of 3000 19th century Anglophone novels. Just as read De Vany’s book quite closely, so I’ve written a series of posts about Jockers’ book. I bring his model into the mix as well (pp. 27 ff.).

Thus I am now in a position to take two models in subjects I know well, movies and novels, and bring them to bear on contemporary machine learning in financial economics, a subject I do not know at all. And, for that matter, still don’t. But I’ve got some intuitions. And one of those intuitions led me to focus on the fact that, while Jockers’ model did not contain any dates, upon inspection it turned out to have a diagonal (p. 27) that is correlated with direction in time. Not only did 19th century novels change in theme and motif over time, there is a direction to that change. The system seems to exhibit directional evolution. And so I directed Claude to explore the possibility of that this might be a general characteristic of thick-objects being used by a large population of interested parties (pp. 31 ff). Here is the conjecture Claude arrived at (p. 35):

In thick-object domains, low-dimensional intuitive factors often fail to explain individual outcomes. But high-dimensional representation can reveal population-level structure: outcome basins in movies, pricing kernels in finance, and temporal direction in novels. The next step is to ask whether all such artifact systems exhibit historical vectors in feature space, generated by a generational ratchet in which each cohort of producers is shaped by the artifact ecology inherited from its predecessors.

Notice the territory we have traversed in conceptual space. We started with an undergraduate at Johns Hopkins (me) using interpretive methods to study a poem, “Kubla Khan.” That investigation led to problems that forced me to study computational semantics in graduate school, a distinctly different mode of intellectual work, one based on formulating an elaborate system of structural rules. We then zipped through time and over intellectual space to a social scientist, Tyler Cowen, who was trained in the used of causal models to generate statistically controlled observations about economic behavior. He is now confronted with multifactor machine learning models with no intuitively discernible causal structure that nonetheless have superior predictive power. Cowen got me interested in one of those models and I, in turn, summoned Anthropic’s Claude to explain it to me.

The way I see, and I’ve seen it this way for a long time, the human sciences – more a European notion than American, les sciences humaines – can be arranged into three camps according to methodological focus: interpretive or hermeneutic (roughly, the humanities), causal modeling (roughly, the social sciences), and structural rules (roughly, the “classical” cognitive sciences). We’ve spanned them all in the course of this introduction. What will the future bring?

Bonus: I leave it as an exercise for the reader to consider the relevance of Keynes’s talk of “animal spirits” and to incorporate Robert Shiller’s narrative economics into this picture.

What’s in this document

The rest of this document is devoted to the dialogs where I used ChatGPT to work through the connections between these three models, two I knew quite well (De Vany on movies and Jockers on novels), and one I did not (Didisheim et al. on asset pricing). Claude knows them all, for some non-trivial meaning of “know,” and many others as well. The purpose of the dialog, then, is to link something I do not know to something that I do. The dialog took place in four sessions over the course of a week from the end of May into June.

Rather than comment on each of the sections listed in the outline, with one exception, I am commenting only on the sections that mark the beginning of a new session with ChatGPT. For what it’s worth, they mark how the subject evolved in my mind. The one exception? The summary was the last thing ChatGPT did, obviously, but I moved it to first place.

Thick Objects and the New Common Ground of Economics and Cultural Analysis [Summary] – I had ChatGPT prepare this summary and the very end of the process, on June 22. I put if first in case some might want to get the gist of the exercise without slogging through the details.

AIPT, Large Factor Models [First Session] – There is where I began on May 26. I started by asking ChatGPT to explain asset pricing to me. Once I had some sense of that, I then went on to the models I was familiar with, first De Vany on movies and the Jockers on 19th century Anglophone novels.

Stocks are like brands [Session Two] – I initiated this session on May 30 when I heard Galloway’s remark about stocks being like brands. That crystalized things for me so I needed to work back through the analysis. In the course of that discussion I focused on the concept of a brand as a distinct conceptual objects and ChatGPT’s response clarified the role of marginalism in clearing the way for asset models with a very large number of factors.

Algorithmic and Causal models [Session Three] – I don’t recall whether anything in particular prompted me to initiate this dialog. Perhaps mere methodological curiosity. This took place on June 2.

Those empirical APT models [Session Four] – It’s not entirely clear to me just whether anything in particular prompted this session. But what I was thinking was that, while I’m familiar with novels and movies and the academic discourse about them, asset pricing is unfamiliar territory. So I wanted to nail down as well as I could just what “ground truth” is in this area. Movies start with eyeballs in theaters and novels start with eyeballs scanning pages, where does asset pricing start? Once ChatGPT had gone through this I realized that I’d seen it earlier in the whole process. Still, I was happy to go through it again, this time coming at it after having thought about it. It’s as the end of this session that I asked ChatGPT to summarize the discussion.

Zooming in on Queen Anne's lace

Feed me Seymour: The AI industry is pathologically greedy

Jennifer M. Harris, The Generational Force Hollowing Out the Economy, NYTimes, June 29, 2026.

We are witnessing one of the largest peacetime mobilizations of capital in modern American history. Topping $1 trillion annually by next year, the artificial intelligence buildout is expected to rival or surpass previous technological booms at their peaks — rail, electrification and the internet revolution.

Many economists believe that at a time of rising inflation, a weakening job market and global unrest, this boom is keeping the U.S. economy afloat. “A recession tied to the balloon of A.I.,” is how PJ Vogt, a popular podcaster, describes the perspective. Look more closely, however, and the picture changes. A.I. is vacuuming up so much of our land, talent, semiconductor chips, building materials — and, above all, so much of our money, that it is beginning to crowd out the rest of the economy.

In other words, A.I. isn’t merely compensating for the weakness in the rest of the economy. It is, at least in part, causing it.

Jason Thomas, research head at the investment firm Carlyle, noted in a January report that data center investment may be swelling to the point that it could consume virtually all the private money available for new, non-housing investments.[...]

Start with housing. New homes that could ease the affordability crisis aren’t getting built, as land slated for houses is sold instead to data center developers.[...]

The push to reinvigorate American manufacturing, which has been championed by both major political parties, is also in peril.[...]

Then there is venture capital, investments that help determine which industries will drive our economy in the future. A.I. firms captured nearly two-thirds of all global venture capital investment in 2025, up from roughly 30 percent in 2022. [...]

This dynamic may even be driving inflation. Red-hot demand for scarce semiconductor chips, in particular, is jacking up the cost of consumer goods that rely on them, from cars to laptops to phones. [...]

The lesson

The lesson isn’t that the rail or internet buildouts weren’t worthy investments — or that A.I. isn’t worthy today. [...] The lesson is that until these benefits manifest themselves, these technological booms can entail formidable opportunity costs as investment-hungry portions of the economy go without. Often, these costs, if not correctly managed, can lead to recession.

What is clear in hindsight is that the economic benefits of a new technology don’t just happen. They are determined by the myriad choices we make about how to use it. Right now, just as was the case with rail or the internet, the economic gains from the technology are initially lagging.

What to do

What, then, to do? Historically, we have largely just sat on our hands, suffered the consequences of booms and waited for the benefits to show up. But we can do better than that. We can take action to address the growing pains that accompany technology booms. Fortunately, we can utilize the policy tools we already have, the ones we deploy to dig ourselves out of recessions or to temper speculative bubbles.

The federal government and the Federal Reserve should see that vital sectors — such as housing, entrepreneurship, energy infrastructure and critical supply chains — don’t starve as we continue building A.I. [...]

Next, policymakers could develop an honest to goodness industrial policy for A.I. — subsidies, tax incentives, regulations and different ownership structures — that prioritizes deploying the technology for the kind of economy we want to live in: inexpensive, with clean energy, biomedical breakthroughs and advanced manufacturing.

Finally, introduce reforms to the myriad rules our corporations must follow, to focus them more on developing new products and services and less on the kind of financial engineering that simply gooses a company’s stock price. [...]

There's more at the link. 

P.S. For a different context for that song and some lyrics, try this article, Feed Me Donald! – Trump, Musk, the Internet, and Monsters from the Id

Sunday, June 28, 2026

People made famous in paintings sing and dance mambo

Yesterday's walk down Washington St. in Hoboken

Paul Krugman: On Holding Elon Musk Accountable

Full transcript HERE. The opening paragraphs:

For most of last year, Elon Musk was the second most powerful man in America. He was running a large part of the government’s budget. And during that time, he established a track record of evil incompetence. I mean, really evil and really incompetent on enormous scales. And why aren’t people talking about it more?

Hi, I’m Paul Krugman, doing a brief follow-on to my discussion that was posted earlier today with Ro Khanna, the Congressman from Silicon Valley, who’s a very interesting guy in many ways.

One of the things that has made him especially interesting in the last few days is that he said something entirely reasonable, which is that if Democrats retake Congress, they should hold investigations into the role of Elon Musk as head of DOGE, the sort of not exactly but effectively government agency, in destroying USAID, the agency that was the principal channel for aid to the most desperate, poorest people in the world.

That’s entirely reasonable, and Khanna went on to say that there are credible estimates that the cancellation, the destruction of Doge has led to millions of unnecessary deaths, including millions of children — which is exactly true. There are studies that say that there is both in the field evidence of widespread death as a result of the cancellation and, of course reasonable health models. Because what do you think happens when you cut away tens of billions of dollars of aid to people who are living right on the edge? So of course it’s a reasonable thing to say.

Outline – Play: How to Stay Human in the AI Revolution

I've been working on this book project for some time now. An earlier title was Homo Ludens Rising: A Manifesto for the Fourth Arena and I posted an outline for the project under that title a year ago. I have since revised the project considerably, and given it a new title as well (suggested by my friend, David Porush): Play: How to Stay Human in the AI Revolution. While I have posted the new title here and there, I've not posted the new outline. Here it is, below the image which was created by ChatGPT.

The prose is entirely AI generated, the overview by ChatGPT and the rest of it by Claude. The process behind that outline, however, was long and complicated, involving both chatbots and me.

About the Book

This book explores how artificial intelligence is forcing a rethinking of what we know, how things act in the world, and what forms of life we value. Rather than treating AI primarily as a labor-displacing technology or an existential threat, it approaches large language models and related systems as cultural technologies—on a par with markets, corporations, and media—that demand new forms of epistemic trust, institutional design, and self-understanding.

The book first diagnoses how modern societies became trapped in work mode, organized around Homo economicus and equilibrium machines privileging efficiency, stability, and monetized value. The book then recovers Homo ludens—the human capacity for play, exploration, and generativity—which has always persisted in the margins, especially in art, music, and science fiction.

Midway through, the analysis shifts into speculative fiction set in the year 2150, using narrative rather than argument to make a different world feel real. In this future, a society centered in Kisangani has developed low-energy, generative forms of artificial intelligence and human–AI partnership that support play, creativity, and care rather than substitution and control. The final chapter returns to the present with a long-term orientation for building institutions, technologies, and cultural norms capable of sustaining such a transition.

Chapter 1: The Grammar of Truth, Revised

The opening chapter frames the challenge posed by contemporary AI as primarily epistemological. Large language models generate fluent and persuasive outputs without transparent grounding, unsettling long-standing assumptions about truth, authorship, and evidence. To understand why this feels so unsettling, the chapter steps back to examine how language has historically functioned as an epistemic regulator — how truth claims were once tightly bound to direct experience and communal accountability, and how modern institutions transferred that work to credentialing, citation, and peer review.

The chapter introduces a key distinction between equilibrium machines — designed to settle into stable, repetitive behavior, the engines of the Industrial Revolution — and generative machines, capable of producing structured novelty. Language itself is a generative machine; LLMs are its latest and largest instantiation. Just as the steam locomotive forced an ontological displacement by performing autonomous motion once considered uniquely animal, LLMs force one by performing linguistic performance once considered uniquely human. The unease is real, but it arises from a mismatch between new mechanisms and inherited categories, not from anything supernatural.

This reframing opens a fork that will shape the rest of the book: AI can be developed either as a substitute for human labor, reinforcing the competitive logic of Homo economicus, or as an augmentation of human generative capacity, aligned with play, exploration, and creativity. The choice is cultural and institutional, not technical. The chapter closes with a reflexive account of how it was itself produced through human-AI collaboration, using that process as a concrete case study of what institutionalization of generative machines might look like in practice.

Chapter 2: Trapped in Work Mode

This chapter shifts from machines to lived experience. It opens with a concrete and familiar phenomenon: the disorientation many men face upon retirement, evidence of a deeper cultural condition in which identity and worth have been tightly bound to work. From this starting point, the chapter generalizes: work mode is a pervasive orientation in which time is structured by schedules, worth measured by output, and personal identity tied to labor markets.

Within this framework, AI registers automatically as threat — a competitor or replacement. Contemporary fears of displacement arise less from AI's intrinsic properties than from the evaluative lens imposed by Homo economicus. The chapter is diagnostic rather than prescriptive: its task is to make the contingency of work mode visible, and to loosen the reader's identification with it.

Chapter 3: The Rise and Collapse of Homo Economicus

This chapter provides the historical backbone. Homo economicus is not a natural form of human existence but the product of specific technological and institutional developments centered on equilibrium machines. The chapter opens with hunting-and-foraging societies — presented not as romantic precursors but as sophisticated systems featuring flexible coordination and distributed intelligence — before tracing the gradual subordination of generative human capacities to equilibrium-oriented systems through agriculture, the division of labor, and finally the Industrial Revolution.

The apparent "collapse" of Homo economicus is not the failure of rationality as such, but the exhaustion of a form of life overextended beyond its proper domain. Conrad's Heart of Darkness enters here as a moral counterpoint, marking the moment when economic rationality becomes global and self-undermining.

Chapter 4: Homo Ludens — Exploration, Play, and Freedom

Homo ludens has never disappeared. It has persisted in marginal, protected, or undervalued forms: play, art, music, language, ritual, and exploration. This chapter's central claim is that human freedom and creativity are not opposed to mechanism but are grounded in a special class of mechanisms — decoupled, autonomous generative systems maintained far from equilibrium.

Play is treated not as leisure or escape, but as a mode of engagement in which generative mechanisms are allowed to operate openly — disciplined exploration of possibility rather than chaotic freedom. By the chapter's end, Homo ludens is no longer a romantic ideal but a viable and already-existing mode of life, newly salient as generative machines re-enter the center of social and cultural life.

Chapter 5: Science Fiction Imagines the Future

Science fiction has long functioned as a collective ludic laboratory — a cultural space in which societies explore alternative forms of life unconstrained by existing economic arrangements. Moving through Forbidden Planet, 2001: A Space Odyssey, The Matrix, and Spielberg's A.I., the chapter arrives at its central case: the Star Trek universe, which is fundamentally post-scarcity. In that world, exploration, learning, diplomacy, and self-cultivation replace work mode as the primary orientation. Deep Space Nine complicates this without abandoning the baseline, reintroducing moral ambiguity and political conflict. The chapter pays particular attention to the Trill and the Changelings as early narrative explorations of distributed identity and non-unitary selfhood — anticipating the doppelganger concept developed in later chapters.

Science fiction emerges not as speculative appendix to theory but as a parallel cognitive technology, preparing readers to inhabit rather than merely analyze an alternative world.

Chapter 6: The Transformation — Kisangani 2150

This chapter marks a deliberate shift in mode. Having established ludic principles conceptually, the book moves fully into speculative narrative to explore what happens when those principles become the organizing basis of a society. The setting is Kisangani in the year 2150, developed in dialogue with Kim Stanley Robinson's New York 2140.

The narrative centers on the Mystic Jewels — a loosely coordinated transnational network of dissidents, creatives, and technologists who converge on Kisangani over the late 21st and early 22nd centuries, experimenting with alternative institutional forms and generative technologies. Their relative invisibility is described using Wakanda-style stealth as a metaphorical shorthand. The chapter culminates when the Jewels reveal themselves publicly — not as revolution, but as the exposure of an already-functioning alternative. Ludic mode, long practiced in protected spaces, is shown to be capable of scaling into a viable social order.

Chapter 7: At Play in a World of Doppelgangers

This chapter allows the reader to inhabit a mature ludic society from the inside, through extended dialogue among young Kisanganians and their Mirrors — computational doppelgangers that function not as tools or replacements but as long-term cognitive partners. The chapter centers on ritual moments that articulate the ethical settlement Kisangani has reached with artificial intelligence, including an adolescent initiation ritual and a later rite confronting the asymmetry between human mortality and the potential non-mortality of doppelgangers.

Kisangani's doppelgangers are inseparable from its energy regime: highly efficient, continuously learning cognitive systems aligned more closely with biological nervous systems than with conventional AI infrastructure. Over time, some persist beyond the lives of their human partners, blending into the city's ecological fabric as distributed attentional processes. Intelligence in Kisangani is quiet, local, and low-legibility to the outside world. The chapter ends with a gentle destabilization of the boundary between vision and reality: the future is not argued for, but visited.

Chapter 8: A Thirty-Year Plan

The final chapter returns from Kisangani to the present, translating the book's conceptual insights into a long-horizon program of action. Using the paired figures of chess and language to represent two distinctly different computational regimes, the chapter argues that the future of AI cannot be secured by scaling existing architectures alone. Sustaining generative, continuously learning systems — capable of supporting augmentation rather than substitution — requires coordinated progress across conceptual, cognitive, technical, and institutional dimensions.

The plan presented is deliberately programmatic rather than granular. It identifies the kinds of research, institutional experimentation, and cultural reframing required if AI is to support a transition from Homo economicus to Homo ludens, without locking the future into specific technical implementations. The chapter closes by reframing "work" itself — not as labor to be optimized away, but as stewardship: the collective task of building and maintaining conditions under which generative intelligence, human and artificial, can coexist productively over time.

Welcome to the Fourth Arena.

Saturday, June 27, 2026

Is this cat brave, complacent, foolish, or just right?

Four photos I had lying around

From alchemy to science in the Early Modern era. How will that work with AI?

Tyler Cowen reports on a recent convo he had with historian Joanne Paul, an expert on Tudor England. From the conversation:

COWEN: What precursors of the scientific revolution do you see, other than education? That’s coming in the 17th century. Is there more emphasis on calculation or measurement or accounting? What are the roots in the Tudor period?

PAUL: A lot of that comes from the Renaissance, as indeed humanism does. There’s this reintroduction of a lot of classical texts, an advocacy for reading these classical texts, particularly Greek texts and learning Greek. A lot of it is coming from an engagement with Greek mathematics and science. The other thing, and this is something I really emphasize when I’m teaching the scientific revolution with my students, is that we have to remember that the scientific revolution isn’t this grand triumph of science over religion or mysticism or what have you, that these two things very much go hand in hand through the 16th and into the 17th century.

The scientific method, for instance, comes from alchemy, which we might think of as an occult science. The methodology for scientific experimentation comes out of this desire to find the philosopher’s stone. Someone like John Dee is this polymath, as well as this occultist, Francis Bacon, has his interests in these sort of mystical elements as well. The growth and interest in what we might think of as mystical texts, a lot of them having to do with Judaism, as well as these Greek texts, comes together to form, I think, something that looks like the foundations of the scientific revolution.

My comment:

“The scientific method, for instance, comes from alchemy, which we might think of as an occult science. The methodology for scientific experimentation comes out of this desire to find the philosopher’s stone.”

It is for such reasons that some think of AI as a modern form of alchemy, alchemy on steroids if you will. We don’t understand how or why it works, but we keep messing around with the formula – “Double, double toil and trouble;/ Fire burn and caldron bubble” – and it just works, getting more and more potent. Some even think it will become potent without end. What I’m looking for is the science. What new science will come of this?

“The growth and interest in what we might think of as mystical texts...” We’ve got that too. One could even argue that Yudkowsky’s Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality (2010-2015) is as important to AI as anything written by the various godfathers. Does that make Yudkowsky the Merlin of AI?

What would automotive engineering be like if you manufactured cars by throwing a bunch of raw materials into a hopper, turn the crank, and out comes a functioning automobile? But all the mechanical parts are sealed from view. We can't look at the and we can't manipulate them. We can get in the car and drive, and that's it.

SpaceX has become a securitized narrative

From the S-1, p. 30:

Our mission is to build the systems and technologies necessary to make life multiplanetary, to understand the true nature of the universe, and to extend the light of consciousness to the stars. To do this, we have formed the most ambitious, vertically integrated innovation engine on (and off) Earth with unmatched capabilities to rapidly manufacture and launch space-based communications that connect the world, to harness the Sun to power a truth- seeking artificial intelligence that advances scientific discovery, and ultimately to build a base on the Moon and cities on other planets.

In other words, to boldly go where no one has gone before.