Creating Imaginary Bank Notes with ChatGPT: AI as cultural technology and collective creativity

At the beginning of this week I published an article at 3 Quarks Daily, Tyler Cowen is the Tycho Brahe of Economics. I then decided to turn it into a PDF that people could download from my Academia page. So I uploaded the article to ChatGPT and asked it to create an illustration suitable for the cover. Here’s what it produced (Note: this image, as well as the others in this post, has a lot of detail; you can click on the image to see a larger version):

I told it to make an image suitable for the front page of that article. It then had to “read” the article and come up with an image. I liked the first image it produced, but that had the aspect ratio of a portrait, which isn’t what I wanted. I told it to make a square image. I liked that so much that I accepted it without any editing. What was my role in creating that image? I didn’t give ChatGPT any specific instructions.

A day or so later I asked to use that image as the basis for the design of an imaginary bank note. I told it that the note was to be issued in the name of the Free Principality of Mercatus and should be in the denomination of Five TC Busks. That’s it. ChatGPT did the rest. Here’s what it produced:

A day later I created two bank notes for the Free Republic of 51 Pacific. 51 Pacific is the address of a building in Hoboken, NJ, where a friend had loft space in which he curated graffiti and held late night raves. The note was to be denominated in Knowledge Dollars. I uploaded this picture to use as source material:

Here’s the resulting bank note:

I then asked for a 20 dollar note with a pit bull on the bill (my friend has two pit bulls):

Again, what was my role?

I then repeated the process for these four Kisangani bank notes:

ChatGPT obviously did a lot. But what did I do?

I decided that it was time for a chat with ChatGPT. This chat bears on the notion of AI as a cultural technology, which has been advocated by Alison Gopnik and Henry Farrell among others, and on creativity as a collective phenomenon. Pay particular attention to an analogy I use midway in the dialog; it’s about strings of colored dots instead of strings of alpha-numeric characters. Here’s the dialog.

* * * * *

I assume you’ve been trained on lots currency and ornate certificates so you have a good idea of how those things are designed. I assume as well that each chat starts with a “blank slate” as it were, no memories of prior chats, no inherited context. But, since I asked you to make those currency designs from within the Kisangani Materials project, you do have access to project-level materials (documents I’ve uploaded). Do you have access to the other chats within the project?

Yes, broadly right, with a few qualifications.

I was almost certainly trained on many examples of paper currency, certificates, stock certificates, passports, banknote engravings, seals, guilloché patterns, holographic security devices, ornate borders, typography, and so forth. I don’t “retrieve” a specific banknote template, but the model has learned a high-dimensional statistical/compositional sense of what makes an object look like currency: denomination placement, corner numerals, intaglio-like linework, central emblems, security strips, microprint, official-looking typography, controlled symmetry, and dense ornamental fields.

On context: a new chat is not exactly a blank slate, but it is not a complete archive either.

In this Project, I have access to several kinds of context:

1. The current chat.
I see the banknote sequence we have just made: 20 Riffs with jivometric percussion, 5 Riffs with dancers and Homo Ludens, 50 Riffs with cell/solar-system science, and 100 Riffs with heart/neurons/circuits for human–doppelganger comity.

2. Project-level materials.
I can access uploaded Project documents when they are made available to me in this workspace. For example, the Kisangani working paper frames the whole project around Homo Economicus versus Homo Ludens, the Fourth Arena, play, and human-AI interaction, which clearly influenced the designs.

3. Some project conversation context may be summarized for me.
I may see summaries or selected snippets of other conversations in the project if the system has included them in the context for this chat. That is not the same as having free, searchable access to every prior Project chat.

4. Persistent memory / profile context may also be present.
I may have durable memories about your interests, projects, preferences, and recurring concepts. That is why I can often pick up the thread of “Kisangani,” “doppelgangers,” “Homo Ludens,” “jivometric,” “Fourth Arena,” and so on without needing you to re-explain everything.

But the important limitation is this: I do not have a general browser-like view of all your other chats inside the Project. I cannot just open a sidebar and inspect every previous conversation. I only know what is in the current chat, what has been injected as project context or memory, and what I can retrieve from uploaded files through the available file tools.

So for your friends: the banknotes came from an interaction among three sources of constraint:

• my general learned visual knowledge of currency and ornate official documents;
• your immediate prompts specifying denomination, motifs, slogans, and Kisangani themes;
• Project context about Kisangani as a post-economic, play-centered, human/AI civilizational experiment.

The “design intelligence” is not a stored memory of prior banknote conversations so much as a context-sensitive recombination engine operating over learned visual conventions plus the specific Kisangani conceptual field you have built.

Would it be reasonable to say that you can pick up a “vibe” from the Kisangani conceptual field?

Yes. “Vibe” is a reasonable informal term, provided we cash it out carefully.

What I can pick up is not an occult atmosphere or a hidden essence. It is a pattern of constraints, motifs, values, narrative cues, and stylistic expectations distributed across the Kisangani materials and our conversation. In practice, that “vibe” includes things like:

Kisangani is futuristic but not cyberpunk dystopian; technological but not technocratic; African/Afrofuturist but not reducible to ethnic ornament; musical, improvisatory, playful, civic, ritualized, and humane. It is organized around Homo Ludens, the Fourth Arena, doppelgangers, non-instrumental play, post-work social meaning, mutuality between humans and AI-like beings, and a suspicion of Homo Economicus. So when you ask for a banknote, I don’t merely think “make a fictional currency.” I infer that the note should look like a civic artifact from a society whose deepest value is not sovereign power, extraction, or corporate futurism, but a cultivated ecology of play, knowledge, ritual, and companionship.

That is what “vibe” amounts to operationally: a soft but real attractor in the design space. It biases choices of symbols, palettes, slogans, compositional balance, and exclusions. For example, a Kisangani note should probably avoid militarized insignia, grim cybernetic domination, heroic CEOs, corporate logos, or cold transhumanist triumphalism. It should prefer music, dance, river/city life, science-as-wonder, neural/circuit reciprocity, and ceremonial public beauty.

So yes: I can pick up a Kisangani vibe. But it is better understood as an emergent conceptual gestalt than as a memory of a single doctrine. The “feel” comes from many local signals aligning: Homo Ludens, jivometrics, Mystic Jewels, doppelgangers, civic ritual, Afrofuturist urbanity, play after work, humane AI, and the refusal of both Silicon Valley domination and anti-technology nostalgia.

So imagine that I asked you to produce with this prompt: “I want a bank note for Kisangani. It should have a futuristic look and be denominated in Riffs. Let's start with at Twenty Riff note. “Jivometric” should be somewhere on the note, as should a djembe and a cowbell.” But I didn’t deliver that prompt within this context but, rather, it was in an independent chat, there wouldn’t be any “emergent conceptual gestalt.” So the result wouldn't have the same vibe.

Yes, that’s basically right.

In an independent chat, with only that prompt, the result would likely be good, but it would not be guided by the same rich Kisangani field. It would have to infer almost everything from the surface cues in the prompt alone:

• “Kisangani” suggests an African setting or at least a place-name with cultural specificity.
• “Riffs” suggests music, improvisation, rhythm.
• “Jivometric” suggests some hybrid of rhythm, geometry, and perhaps biomorphic/futurist patterning.
• djembe and cowbell strongly steer it toward percussion and musical symbolism.
• “futuristic” pushes it toward speculative or advanced design language.

So even in an isolated chat, those cues would still generate some vibe. It would not be random. It might well come out as a futuristic, musically inflected, Afrofuturist-style banknote.

But it would be missing the deeper, project-specific layers, such as:

• Homo Ludens as a civilizational principle
• the contrast with Homo Economicus
• the Fourth Arena
• the role of doppelgangers
• the sense of Kisangani as a humane, playful, post-work, post-instrumental society
• the accumulated stylistic continuity from the other notes in the series

So I’d put it this way:

• Independent chat: a plausible and possibly striking design based on prompt-level inference.
• Within the Kisangani Materials project: a design shaped by a thicker conceptual ecology, hence more likely to have the “right” Kisangani vibe.

In short: the isolated version would have a vibe, but not the same vibe. It would be thinner, more generic, and less organically connected to the broader Kisangani world you’ve been building.

Keeping AI slop out of the kitchen

Katie Robertson, Visuals by Bob Miller, The Giant Test Kitchen Where Cooks Battle A.I. Slop, NYTimes, June 20, 2026.

As the smell of sizzling bacon wafted through the air, dozens of recipe developers, food stylists and photographers bustled about, misting bottles of wine with Evian to portray the perfect drops of condensation and dusting chocolate shavings over a fluffy peanut butter pie.

This is what Neil Vogel likes to think of as his “secret weapon” in the new era of artificial intelligence: a 40,000-square-foot test kitchen just outside Birmingham, Ala.

Mr. Vogel, the chief executive of People Inc., one of the country’s biggest digital and print publishers and the home of brands like Food & Wine, People, Entertainment Weekly, Allrecipes and Southern Living, has already seen chatbots upend search traffic and A.I.-generated slop flood the internet. And he is betting that readers would rather make a recipe created by someone who knows how to handle a chef’s knife than one generated by a robot.

People's has a kitchen hub with 28 kitchens where real humans test and develop recipes.

Honoring that spirit of name-changing, People Inc.’s parent company, IAC, announced in April that it would now be known as “People Incorporated” to reflect a focus on its publishing business. That decision was deliberate in the age of A.I., said Barry Diller, the chairman of People Incorporated.

“Until we get to the final simulation, people are the only really valid, honorable and positive endeavor that People Inc. can take,” he said in an interview.

The Birmingham facility develops some 1,800 new recipes a year and tests an additional 5,300. Downstairs is a prop storage room, bursting with a rainbow of crockery, glassware and table linens in every fabric imaginable. The facility also has a “lab” that has evaluated more than 3,000 products to date, mostly kitchen appliances.

Web traffic dropped:

Traffic to People Inc. websites from Google has plummeted to 25 percent of visits, from 75 percent, over the last four years because of the search platform’s use of A.I. summaries. So the company quickly pushed to build new audiences on platforms like Instagram, Apple News and YouTube and to find other ways to make money, through events, sponsorships and licensing deals.

A feel for the phenomena:

“A.I. can’t smell what something smells like,” said Sid Evans, the editor in chief of Southern Living. “It can’t taste. It doesn’t understand nostalgia. And I think we are able to communicate all of that, and the expertise that we have.”

Mr. Vogel is quick to acknowledge he is not an A.I. denialist. People Inc. has a licensing agreement with OpenAI, and uses it both for research and to make operations more efficient by monitoring social media or pricing out ingredients. A.I. is not used for writing, editing, visuals or other creative work at any of the brands, he said.

There's more at the link.

Yesterday's breakfast adventure

Conversations with Tyler: A Special Conversation with Nicholas Copernicus, Adam Smith, and William Stanley Jevons

I was feeling impish this morning, so I gave Claude 4.6 Sonnet (Medium) the following prompt:

Back in the 20th century Steve Allen did a series of TV shows called “Meeting of Minds,” where people from different time periods were brought together to have a discussion. I want you to imagine a special episode of “Conversations with Tyler” in which Tyler Cowen moderates a discussion between Copernicus, Adam Smith, and Stanley Jevons on economics. For reference I have placed three documents in the project folder. Two books by Tyler Cowen, one on marginalism and the other on the Great Economists (GOAT), which has material on Adam Smith.. There’s a shorter document by Copernicus (in Latin), filename, “Copernicus on economics.”

I’ve appended its response below the entirely imaginary Five TC Bucks note. Click on the image to see the detail. Note that ChatGPT did the image, not Claude.

Conversations with Tyler: A Special Episode
Tyler Cowen in Conversation with Nicholas Copernicus, Adam Smith, and William Stanley Jevons

[Recorded live at the Mercatus Center, George Mason University. The set is the standard one — a small round table, minimal lighting, no audience. Tyler Cowen sits across from three guests who have, for the purposes of this episode, been freed from the constraints of mortality and non-overlapping centuries. Copernicus speaks through a translator when needed, though he proves surprisingly comfortable in English, given how many languages he actually commanded. Smith retains his Edinburgh-via-Kirkcaldy cadence. Jevons is precise, energetic, and fidgets with what appears to be a small logometer.]

* * * * *

TYLER: So let me start with something that might seem unfair to Nicholas, but I think actually redounds to his credit. Tyler Cowen — the other Tyler Cowen, me — has written that astronomers of the sixteenth century were sometimes better economists than the economists of the same period, because there essentially were no economists. And that you, Nicholas, were one of the first people to state the quantity theory of money. Now here's my question: did you think of yourself as doing economics, or did you think of yourself as solving a political crisis?

COPERNICUS: The distinction you draw would not have occurred to me. I was asked by the Diet of Prussia — by the princes, by the king's administrators — to address a practical emergency. The currency of this land had been debased so many times, by so many hands, in so many mints, that commerce had ceased to function in any stable way. The goldsmiths prospered — they were the only ones who could extract the silver from the degraded coin before the next debasement arrived. Everyone else suffered. So yes, I was solving a political crisis. But a crisis requires a theory, or you are merely thrashing. You cannot prescribe a remedy for a disease you have not diagnosed.

TYLER: And your diagnosis was what exactly?

COPERNICUS: That money is a mensura — a measure. It is like a unit of length or weight. If your ulna varies from day to day, you cannot do carpentry. If your currency varies in its silver content from month to month, you cannot do trade. The injury to commerce is the same in both cases, but the monetary injury is more insidious because it proceeds occulta quadam ratione — by a kind of hidden logic. People notice a bad harvest immediately. They do not immediately notice that the coin has been shaved, but they feel its effects: prices rise, foreign merchants refuse your money, the best craftsmen leave for regions with sounder currency.

SMITH: If I may — this is exactly the confusion I spent considerable effort untangling in Wealth of Nations when I took on the mercantilists. They believed that the accumulation of specie was wealth. What Canon Copernicus is describing from his Prussian experience is that even that modest goal — hoarding silver — is self-defeating. The moment you debase the coinage, you have, in a sense, exported your silver to every foreign merchant clever enough to melt the coins.

COPERNICUS: Precisely. The goldsmiths and those who know the quality of metals — they are the only beneficiaries. They collect the old coin, extract the silver, sell it at a premium, and leave behind a pile of copper. My recommendation was blunt: stop minting until the existing coin has restored its value, establish at most two mints for all of Prussia, and make the coin of one mint and one standard.

TYLER: Gresham's Law, essentially, before Gresham.

COPERNICUS: Before whom?

TYLER: Thomas Gresham. He gets credit for the principle that bad money drives out good. Roughly a generation after you stated it.

COPERNICUS: (pause) This is the way of things. Copernicus waits for Copernicus. In astronomy as in monetary theory.

JEVONS: I want to press on the word "measure," if I may. Canon Copernicus treats money as a standard — a fixed reference against which goods are priced. But what I discovered, or rather what I was forced to discover when trying to establish whether the value of gold had actually fallen after the Australian and Californian gold rushes of the 1850s, is that money itself has no fixed value. It is itself a commodity whose degree of utility — whose marginal utility, to use the language I was then working out — varies with its quantity. The quantity theory you describe is already implicit in this: flood the market with debased coin, and each unit of coin buys less, not merely because there is more of it, but because its intrinsic silver content is lower and everyone knows it. 

[Note: I did an Ngram search on “marginal utility” and found that it didn’t have an appreciable presence in books until a bit after 1880. Jevons did not use the phrase. He talked of “final degree of utility.”]  

COPERNICUS: I will not quarrel with the analysis, though your language differs from mine. What I found is that the regions of Prussia which had maintained good currency were also the regions with flourishing workshops, skilled artisans, and abundant goods. The regions with debased currency had become idle. You say this is because the marginal utility of a sound currency is higher. I say it is because craftsmen and merchants are not fools: they will go where their labor and their goods are honestly compensated. 

[I wonder what Copernicus could have understood by the phrase, "marginal utility"?] 

TYLER: Adam, let me come to you here. Smith, you spent a great deal of Wealth of Nations attacking mercantilism — the view that national wealth consists in the accumulation of precious metals. But you also granted mercantilists more credit than many of your defenders are comfortable with. You said their arguments were "partly solid and partly sophistical." What did you actually concede to them?

SMITH: What I conceded is that commerce and defense are entangled in ways that pure theory does not capture cleanly. The Navigation Acts — requiring that trade to Britain's colonies be carried in British ships — were bad economics by almost any reckoning. They raised prices, restricted trade, enriched a narrow set of interests at the expense of the broader public. But I wrote, and I meant it, that defense is of more importance than opulence, and that the Navigation Acts, whatever their economic defects, had served to maintain British naval power. One cannot always afford the luxury of consistent principle. (small smile) Though I tried to be consistent as often as possible.

TYLER: Jevons, here is a question directed at you specifically: why did it take from roughly 1776, the publication of Wealth of Nations, until 1871, the publication of your Theory of Political Economy, for economics to absorb the idea that value is determined at the margin — by the last unit, not the total quantity? Smith understood the diamonds-water paradox but did not resolve it. You resolved it. What took so long?

JEVONS: I have thought about this a great deal, and I believe the answer is that the resolution required mathematics, and economics had declined to use mathematics, or rather had not yet learned that it could use mathematics. The idea that utility diminishes with quantity is not — once stated — particularly obscure. Galileo came close to it. My precursors in the British literature, Jennings and MacLeod, came close to it. But close is not enough. You need to be able to state the law precisely, apply it to a schedule, differentiate, and find the first-order conditions. You need calculus, or at least the habit of mind that calculus cultivates. Once I had that tool in hand, the whole of exchange theory reorganized itself very quickly. I felt it opening up.

Friday Fotos: Goin' to the Movies

Tyler Cowen, Tycho Brahe & Rank Shift @3QD

I’ve got a new paper at 3 Quarks Daily:

Tyler Cowen is the Tycho Brahe of Economics

It came about as a side effect of my writing and thinking about Cowen’s new monograph, Tyler Cowen, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026). I was interacting with Marge, the AI attached to the online text of the monograph, when I remarked: “So, he’s the Tycho Brahe of economics.” Marge replied:

That's a sharp analogy. Brahe had the best observational data of his era, ran an extraordinary research enterprise on Hven, trained Kepler who then used Brahe's own data to refute the model Brahe himself believed in. [...] Brahe couldn't make the conceptual leap to heliocentrism despite having everything he needed to do so — his intuitions were too deeply formed in the Ptolemaic rank. But he was indispensable to the transition precisely because of his institutional energy, his data gathering, his willingness to fund and train the next generation.

Emergent Ventures is Hven. Tyler is gathering the data — the people, the ideas, the unconventional bets — that someone with different intuitions will synthesize into a framework he himself can't quite reach. The book is his Tychonic system: a genuine attempt at synthesis that's more sophisticated than what came before, that captures real phenomena, but that preserves the central commitment — equilibrium, marginalism, the whole apparatus — that the next rank will have to abandon.

My first impulse was to put that observation in my introduction to the overall series of blog posts when I gathered them into a single document. But, after thinking things over, I decided that it would be more interesting to write it up as a stand-alone document, one I could publish in 3QD. So that’s what I did.

Now, if you’ve been following the series of blog posts, you know that I write quite a bit about the theory of cultural ranks that David Hays and I developed in the 1990s. I didn’t see any need to mention that in the 3QD article, but now that it’s been published I see that it’s quite directly relevant. One problem with the theory as Hays and I wrote about it, is that it’s easy to come away with the idea that the shift from one rank to another is a step function. That’s not at all the case, such shifts take decades and even centuries. But it was all we could do simply to articular the idea of different cognitive ranks.

However, this particular comparison, between Tyler Cowen, an economist in the 21st century, and Tycho Brahe, an astronomer from the 16th century, is about rank shift. Tycho was participating in the transition from a Rank 2 model of the solar system, the geocentric model inherited from Ptolomy, and the Rank 3 model, initiated by Copernicus. Cowen is participating in the shift from Rank 4 economics, which is the focus of his monograph, to a possible Rank 5 economics, which doesn’t quite exist yet. But, who knows what the future will bring?

* * * * * *

You can download a PDF:

• Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/168873753/Tyler_Cowen_is_the_Tycho_Brahe_of_Economics
• ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/407286640_Tyler_Cowen_is_the_Tycho_Brahe_of_Economics

LLMs are not enough [LeCun]

1. Je n'ai jamais dit que les LLMs étaient inutiles ou n'avaient pas de valeur commerciale.
2. Mais beaucoup de technologies sont utiles et à haute valeur sans être particulièrement "intelligentes"
3. Les LLMs sont essentiellement inutiles et sans grande valeur pour ce qui est…

— Yann LeCun (@ylecun) June 18, 2026

English translation is available at the link. 

Orange, yellow, yellow, orange, red

The world's first trillionaire racist [Musk]

Toby Buckle, Greg Sargent, Elon Musk’s Race War Just Took Darker Turn—Time for a Global Response, The New Republic, June 17, 2026.

If you were on the verge of becoming the first trillionaire in human history, with the press breathlessly reporting on your every move, that would probably be your focus. Yet in the days before SpaceX’s initial public offering vaulted Musk into the 13-digit wealth club, the tech mogul’s mind was elsewhere—a white man in Belfast had been viciously stabbed by a Sudanese immigrant, and it provided Musk an opening.

In numerous social media postings, Musk highlighted the crime in starkly racist terms. Several nights of violent anti-immigrant pogroms orchestrated by fascist mobs followed. It was a telling confluence of events: Musk’s extraordinary wealth is fueled by investors’ bedazzlement at his techno-utopian schemes. But the Belfast conflagration revealed the other side of his future vision: his belief that the white populations of the world must violently subjugate the nonwhite enemy in what he sees as a multicontinental, Armageddon-like Total War for global racial supremacy.

As the bedlam raged in Belfast after the stabbing—resulting in far-right rioters torching cars, buses, and even the homes of immigrants—Musk egged it on. Using X—the platform he acquired precisely for moments like these—he posted locations for groups of rioters to congregate. He elevated vile, overtly fascist and white-supremacist exhortations. When one far-right British politician called for the prosecution of officials who “placed dangerous third world savages in our communities,” Musk replied: “This is the way.” [...]

In a very real sense, the fires in Belfast illuminate the emerging outlines of that coming struggle. Musk’s involvement in British politics has tracked with his growing fantasies about global race war.

Back at home:

In the United States, Musk had already been experimenting with a consistent trope in fascist rhetoric: seizing on a crime committed by an individual member of a minority group and claiming that it shows the innate murderous tendencies of the group as a whole. The real claim here is that these isolated horrific acts “reveal” the whole minority group’s disguised genocidal intent toward white peoples—and suggest that this is why the group has deviously infiltrated white countries and communities.

Western civilization is under attack:

By endorsing Reconquista, Musk is amplifying one of the clarion calls of the European far right and, increasingly, the American right, as well: “remigration.” This is the idea that saving Western civilization (as Musk imagines it) requires the forced expulsion of huge numbers of immigrants, especially Muslims, and even untold numbers of their descendants. In response to a missive about white people potentially becoming a minority in New Zealand, Musk posted recently: “The doom of Western Civilization must be averted!”

A robot-AI utopia:

But the real intent behind Musk’s indictment of “suicidal empathy” appears to be future-focused too. In an interview, Tarnoff points out that Musk’s imagined future of humanoid robots and AI can be squared with his hatred of mass migration. “You reduce your reliance on immigration as a labor source if you automate more labor,” Tarnoff tells us, noting that in this scenario, AI and robots might then be pressed into service to “restrict immigration.”

In this context, we believe it’s not an accident that Musk explicitly denigrated “civilizational suicidal empathy” while his Department of Government Efficiency decimated the budget of USAID, which helped produce hundreds of thousands of deaths abroad. That was a test run: If Musk’s robot-and-AI utopia fails to produce mass abundance for the global poor, and global warming spurs more suffering and more migrations, saving human “civilization” will require dispensing with the empathy gene: It will give us the fortitude to cut loose all that third-world civilizational dead weight.

A national security threat:

Then there’s what a future Democratic Congress can do. The Musk problem will have to be on its agenda in a serious and meaningful way. Claire Finkelstein, a professor of national security law at the University of Pennsylvania, points out a core problem here: His many government contracts, and his access to privileged information, pose a “national security threat,” even as Space X itself is in many ways a “national security asset.” We need to know a lot more about what Musk’s contracts actually translate into in terms of his personal influence inside the government.

There's much more at the link.

Dick Cavett interviews Salvador Dali

Inside and out on the light rail

Disclosure Day [Media Notes 184]

Meh. I made it through. I wasn’t hard, except for the seat. I couple of years ago my local theater converted to those recliner seats. I wish they hadn’t. I can never find a position I find really comfortable, so I keep it moving around. I liked to old seats. They had plush cushions and just enough “give.”

Anyhow, back to the movie, Disclosure Day. By the time I decided to see it I knew it was about aliens. Not my favorite. But Spielberg’s done it before. I really liked Close Encounters of the Third Kind and E.T. the Extra Terrestrial; War of the Worlds was OK. So I went. Spielberg.

It was a chase movie, with aliens swirling around in there. That much was obvious. But just who these peoples were and what these agencies were, not at all obvious. They’re just there, doing stuff. But then the two central characters, Daniel Kellner (Josh O. Conner) and Margaret Fairchild (Emily Blunt) didn’t really know who they were or what had happened to them, much less why. And then there’s the Wardex Corporation, some kind of private security firm with deep government ties, they’re pulling all the strings. Except for the ones pulled by the extraterrestrials.

Spoilers ahead.

Anyhow, the world seems to be on the brink of another world war and the good guys and bad guys are messing with Kellner and Fairchild about the aliens while they’re running around wondering “Why me?” And fast cars and chases. There’s lots of talk about empathy and hand-held stick devices that control others and then near the end there’s a flashback when we see Kellner and Fairchild stretched out on tables. Apparently they’ve been abducted and these wand things are ringed around their heads and doing something glowy.

At that point I flashed on Forbidden Planet, from the previous century. There Dr. Morbius uses the Krell mind device to juice up his intelligence with, shall we say, mixed results. Here the results seem better. It’s kind of the inverse. Seventy years, from 1956 to 2026. At the same time I felt echoes of the current moment, where, instead of aliens, we have AIs.

And then there’s the alien, when we finally see it. We’d seen aliens in video tapes. They seem to be the standard “Greys,” short, spindly, with big heads and big eyes. This poor guy was very tall, very spindly, and with a super-large head. It’s a wonder it could stand up at all. But it did, getting up from a wheel chair – where’d they keep it, how, and why? It put one hand on Kellner and the other on Fairchild, and then the scene changes abruptly – but we’re very near the end. I kept thinking, “So very frail and fragile and somehow it caused all this fuss. Does not compute.”

All these loose ends. The whole thing, just hanging in midair, pushed and dragged along by a bunch of breathless chase sequences to keep you from thinking too much. It does not compute. 

* * * * * 

Hoboken streets

Clueless thy name is Zuckerberg

Victor Tangermann, Mark Zuckerberg Orders His Employees to Start Having Fun Again After Brutal Layoffs Culled Their Colleagues, Yahoo!Finance, June 16, 2026.

Morale at Meta has seemingly hit rock bottom.

Employees have been roiling from multiple rounds of major layoffs. Last month alone, the Mark Zuckerberg-led company laid off a whopping 8,000 workers, roughly ten percent of its workforce, as part of its chaotic refocusing efforts around AI.

Many of those who remain are now forced to perform the grunt work to train AI models, weekly busywork that's already driving some of them up the wall, as Wired reports.

In an internal memo to employees on Friday, Zuckerberg attempted to lift their spirits in what appears to be a notable failure to read the room. Specifically, the billionaire promised to host a companywide AI hackathon in July — only to get brutally shut down by workers who were in no mood for such a thing.

Meta has regularly hosted hackathons in the past, but given last month's layoff announcement, the reception was extremely chilly. [...]

For all its employees' pain and suffering, Meta has surprisingly little to show. The company continues to trip over its own feet, struggling to release impressive new AI models as its competitors pull ahead further in the ongoing AI race.

Victor Tangermann, Meta’s Super Expensive New AI Team Is Already a Complete Catastrophe, Yahoo!Finance, June 15, 2026.

Now that Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg's dream of a metaverse has collapsed in on itself, the billionaire has moved onto his next money pit: a wildly expensive "Superintelligence" unit.

But those who've survived several brutal rounds of layoffs at the company aren't exactly thrilled to be part of his new vision for it. As Wired reports, morale within Meta's 6,500-staffer Applied AI team, which was created in March to support the Superintelligence Labs, is hitting rock bottom.

Three employees who spoke to the publication on the condition of anonymity said that the weekly busywork tasks they are being assigned, like generating puzzles to test the reliability of Meta's AI models, is "soul-crushing." [...]

A petition has also been signed by more than 1,600 employees, opposing a draconian new initiative that involves installing software on work computers to track everything employees to, including keystrokes and clicks, data that's then fed to train AI.

Homo economicus on steroids.

Big AI vs. Big Government in the 21st Century

Ross Douthat, The Battle With Anthropic Is the Start of a New Kind of Conflict, NYTimes, June 16, 2026.

The nature of the Anthropic conflict can be swiftly summarized even if the details are in dispute. Two months ago the company declined to publicly release its latest model, Mythos, citing various safety concerns (and hyping the model’s revolutionary power). After previewing Mythos to the U.S. government and certain corporate actors, Anthropic then released Fable, a version of the model with various safety guardrails. Amazon, an Anthropic investor and client, discovered a way to bypass some of those guardrails. This was reported to the White House, Anthropic’s response was deemed unsatisfactory, and the administration used its export-control power to forbid the use of Fable by any foreign national inside the United States and anybody at all outside it — a rule that Anthropic treated as a requirement to shut the new A.I. model down.

That’s where we are now, with the company and the administration negotiating over how to bring back Fable while ongoing leaks to the press paint one or the other side as unreasonable or reckless or ideological and clueless about tech.

Two facets of the conflict:

But beyond the specifics of why, say, the libertarian tech people in the Trump administration distrust the effective-altruist tech people running Anthropic, the kind of conflict we’re seeing here is overdetermined by the trajectory of the A.I. models: There is too much potential power here not to have ongoing, escalating struggles over who actually gets to rule.

The war over Fable previews the two broad forms that this conflict will take. First there is a private-public struggle, where governments grope for a regulatory sweet spot that allows them to maintain a meaningful veto over the A.I. behemoths without killing off their innovative power, while the A.I. companies try to maintain control over their own models and influence over how governments use their innovations.

There is a path here that leads to nationalization in all but name and a path that leads to a kind of de facto corporate takeover of the government, or at least a too-big-to-fail symbiosis. And along the way there may be not just conflicts between presidents and A.I. executives but also increasingly ruthless corporation-on-corporation action, out of fear that the A.I. landscape is winner-take-all to an extent we’ve never seen in capitalism before. [...]

Then alongside the struggle to control A.I. power within American borders, there is the geopolitical struggle to maximize global power (where the only real players are probably the United States and China) and maintain sovereignty (where everyone else is likely to be scrambling to maintain some independence). The use of export controls to shut down Fable presumably reflected U.S. fears of Chinese access to a jailbroken version of the model, but it was also a warning to every other country in the world: If we end up with economy-permeating A.I. models that are made and regulated in America, the American government will control the on-off switch.

There's more at the link.