Showing posts with label identity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label identity. Show all posts

Sunday, August 31, 2025

Is Trump Becoming Putin? | Robert Wright & Nikita Petrov PLUS Troubles with the nation-state as a primary anchor for identity

Nikita's remarks on the nation-state as primary anchor for identity (c. 1:01:45):

One of the ways I pitched it to you is uh we can we can frame it ambitiously. We can say that uh the prevalent identity forming force in the world today is the nation state. Uh so much so it's almost hard to imagine to not have an identity attached to uh your country l ike somebody's not Russian, not American, not anything.
And that is my my understanding is a pretty new phenomenon
like there was a time when just a few centuries ago when people thought of their religion maybe village or even loyalty to a king but a king is like a person. He has a family and not this like expansive uh you know millions of people together as your people.
uh and uh some people say that that that uh force is in crisis.
The nation state itself is in crisis or at least a bunch of them are struggling with their own identity.
And then on individual level, I mean I particularly, you know, I I have a connection to my country and to my people, but I'm outside of that country as many Russians are. Uh and the relationship is not an easy one.
I'm contemplating like visiting and then I don't know whether I should because I read the news and there's another person who got like eight years for donating 500 bucks to a Ukrainian foundation. Um. Mhm.
And I think there are a lot of people in different that who are in different ways alienated from their um country or society or have a complicated relationship with it. And there it's not written anywhere that there has to be just one of those that you you should consider yourself a part of this tribe to the exclusion of every other tribe.

And so my kind of pitch is like listen we are already uh some kind of network. We are connected. The people who uh listen to uh nonzero who read nonzero who exchange comments in the comment section have something in common. There's a sensibility worldview maybe even a sense of humor.
There are things uh that are not made very explicit that make uh that that that highlight some affinity between these people and they're all over the world. And uh and so why not see if we can build something more from that to to establish more of a relationship between these different members of the audience. And I say as I say like treat them less of an audience less as an audience and more as nodes in a network.

Timestamps for the whole conversation:

0:00 Bob welcomes Nikita back to the Nonzero team
6:17 WSJ's report on Trump's authoritarian drift
8:46 Three levers: streets, media, education system
12:58 Trump the businessman and Trump the politician
14:50 Why Putin was compelling in 1999, when Russia was a young democracy
22:37 Laws vs norms
29:05 Trump and lawfare: how independent is the US judiciary?
35:52 Partisanship among judges
38:28 Trump's view of the world as a game
42:44 Cynicism as a political brand
46:10 Nikita: Putin and Trump share a geopolitical worldview
49:46 The damage the US and Russia did to the international law
54:25 The evolution of Putin's understanding of geopolitics
59:22 Today's Overtime segment is open for everybody!
1:00:29 The crisis of the nation-state & NonZero's community building project
1:18:07 "Kremlin is not Russia": distinguishing between the nation and the state
1:19:35 Bob: We all need a tribe
1:24:32 What does it mean to be an American?
1:29:43 Nikita's Armenian propaganda: A legitimate reason to be proud of your nation

Wednesday, January 22, 2025

Piketty and Sandel on how the Left Went Astray [Claude summary]

New York Times Opinion, Two of the World’s Leading Thinkers on How the Left Went Astray, NYTimes, Jan. 28, 2025:

Thomas Piketty is one of the world’s leading economists, a socialist who has been studying the corrosive effects of inequality for decades. Last May, he sat down with Harvard’s Michael Sandel, one of the world’s most prominent political philosophers, for a talk at the Paris School of Economics about the moral limits of markets and the future of the left. They tussled over what liberals would have to do to counter a rising tide of nativism from Donald Trump and the other conservative politicians gaining traction around the globe.

In the months that followed, Mr. Piketty and Mr. Sandel kept talking over email, sparring over questions about identity and belonging: When do borders matter? How do you find a balance between nationalism and internationalism? What are our responsibilities to migrants, and how can we convince Americans that the system is fair?

Today, with Democrats struggling over how much of Mr. Trump’s immigration agenda to support as well as the future of their party, Times Opinion has adapted Mr. Piketty and Mr. Sandel’s conversations. Both men have long been critics of mainstream liberalism from the distinct perspectives of their respective fields — Mr. Piketty as an economist, Mr. Sandel as a philosopher. Their back-and-forth, edited for length and clarity, builds to a surprising conclusion: that the left must reclaim a form of identity politics.

I asked Claude 3.4 Sonata to summarize their discussion.

* * * * *

I’d like you to summarize the attached article. Be sure to attribute the arguments appropriately.

Sandel and Piketty agree that the left needs to reclaim a form of identity politics, though not the kind centered on ethnicity or religion. Their discussion reveals several key insights:

On immigration and borders, Piketty argues that while open borders should be the goal, they require proper funding mechanisms for public services. He criticizes Europe's current approach to migration, suggesting that the relatively small migrant flows are falsely blamed for broader economic problems.

Regarding voter behavior, Piketty emphasizes that support for politicians like Trump and Le Pen stems primarily from manufacturing job losses due to trade competition, not immigration. He argues that the left's failure to address trade and job issues has allowed the right to dominate the conversation about identity and belonging.

Sandel builds on this by suggesting that the left has ceded important political territory to the right, particularly around concepts of patriotism and community. He argues that economic and identity issues are deeply interconnected, pointing to how job losses in industrial towns affected not just wages but people's sense of dignity and recognition.

Both scholars criticize the Democratic Party's evolution into a party of educational and economic elites. Piketty suggests that Democrats should be willing to lose wealthy voters to pursue genuine redistributive policies. Sandel critiques the party's historical emphasis on college education as the path to success, noting that this alienates the majority of Americans who don't have university degrees.

Looking forward, they propose that Democrats need to:

  • Break with neoliberal globalization
  • Move beyond focusing solely on higher education as the solution to inequality
  • Develop policies that respect multiple forms of aspiration, including home ownership and small business development
  • Create a broader project of civic renewal that affirms the dignity of work
  • Give citizens more voice in shaping technological change and environmental policy

The conversation concludes with both scholars agreeing that socioeconomic issues and identity conflicts are deeply intertwined, suggesting that neglected economic aspirations can transform into entrenched identity conflicts.

Friday, May 31, 2024

Culture, Religion, and Identity: Can't We All Get Along? [Walter Benn Michaels on Diversity]

This is from the ancient days, at The Valve (now defunct). It's an extended footnote to: Politics Beyond the Personal: Diversity, Identitarian Rhetoric, and Equality.  If you take a dive into the WaybackMachine you can read this post in its original context, where it is followed by some comments.

* * * * *

Now that we're going hot and heavy on religion, I'd like to take another look at Michaels, who devotes his 6th and penultimate chapter (of The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality) to “Religion in Politics: The Good News.” The news is good because, Michaels says, at last he has found something that cannot be assimilated to the identity engine.

I don't have a well-formed argument in mind. I just want to raise some issues.

Religion vs. Culture

The first issue I want to raise is a rather pedantic one about the notion of culture that Michaels has been employing throughout the book. Consider this relatively early passage in the religion chapter. (p. 174):

Like ideological affiliation but more radically, religious identity is very different from racial or cultural identity. The big selling point of cultural identity (the selling point, really of the very idea of identity) is that cultures are essentially equal. That's what makes them different from classes, since classes are essentially unequal - they involve more or less money. And it makes them different from religions too, since if Christianity tells the truth, all other religions must be false.

I find this treatment of cultures and religions as different kinds of entities to be a bit odd. The oddity isn't quite of Michaels's own making - I do believe it to be inherent in the ideas Michaels is critiquing - but it is not clear to me why Michaels takes this at face value.

I would think that most professional social scientists and humanists regard religion as itself a cultural phenomenon - at least in large part, for there is a great deal of speculation these days about possible biological roots for religion. That is to say, from the point of view of these intellectual specialists “culture” is a category that subsumes religion and so cannot be in conceptual parallel with it, as Michaels treats it. I understand that Michaels is not analyzing the concepts of professional intellectual specialists, that he is analyzing politically active concepts, but the fact that he nowhere even acknowledges this somewhat different notion of culture, not even in a footnote, bothers me.

I note that, when intellectual professionals talk of culture in this way, so that religion is a facet of culture, they are also “standing outside” not only any particular culture, but outside of all cultures. Sometimes the stance of a hypothetical Martian anthropologist is invoked in this regard. I further note that, the concept of cultural relativism was originally an epistemological and methodological one. The idea was that you can't understand another culture in terms of your own; you must understand it on its own terms. In taking this stance the intellectual professional is not, of course, called on to adjudicate the truth claims made within various cultures and stated as universal truths.

Of course, the idea that professional intellectuals can “stand outside” has been called into doubt - an issue I've touched on in my earlier piece in this Michaels-fest. If you can't stand outside, then cultural relativism makes no sense as an epistemological principle. It simply collapses into an ontological notion, that all cultures are somehow equal.

So where is Michaels standing in The Trouble with Diversity? Is he attempting to stand outside the political field he is critiquing or is he critiquing it from within? It's not clear to me what kind of issue this is, whether it matters, and how it bears on Michaels's general treatment of religion. It's all a muddle.

Belief and Practice

Then there is the question that's arisen in the discussion Adam Roberts initiated on Dawkins and Eagleton: What is the relationship between statements of belief and religious practice? This is also at issue in Alan Wolfe's review in Slate:

Nor do all religions assign the same priority to belief as evangelical Christians do; observance, for some, is more important than belief, and so long as a society allows them to keep their strict observance, they can easily live together with others of different convictions. And even those who believe that Jesus is the way have come to accept that others can find God in other ways. Since Nostra Aetate (1965), the Vatican has worked assiduously to recognize the validity of Judaism to Jews, and the great bulk of American evangelicals, for all their talk of witnessing the faith, do not routinely tell their Hindu co-workers that they will burn in hell. In a world in which intermarriage is a fact of life and switching congregations hardly worthy of notice, religious diversity is an inescapable fact, not a logical impossibility.

It does seem to me that Michaels concentrates on doctrine. Consider this long paragraph (p. 180):

The problem, then, with thinking of religious diversity on the model of cultural diversity is that it turns what should be a debate about the validity of different religious beliefs into a consensus about their equal worth and thus obscures their relevance to public policy. It's precisely religion's claim to universality that makes what Neuhaus calls “religiously based public values” matter in American public life. By public, he means first that the religious component should not be privatized; can can't think of someone's faith the way Jefferson famously did when he remarked that “it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” If my neighbor's belief in God involves also, say, a belief that abortion is wrong, it does and it ought to affect me. It cannot be treated as a merely private fact about him, such as the fact tht he likes Chinese food or opera. And by public, Neuhaus also means that the religious arguments made in the public or political sphere should themselves be what he calls “transsubjective.” “Public decisions,” he says, “must be made by arguments that are public in character. A public argument is transsubjective. It is not derived from sources of revelation or disposition that are essentially private and arbitrary.” Identities can be private - it really does do me no injury if my neighbor is black. Identities are not transsubjective - the things that make me who I am need not make anybody else who she is. But beliefs, Neuhaus rightly insists, are neither.

It is one thing to point out that competing claims to universal truth cannot all be true. At most, only one claim can be true, though it is quite possible that none of the competing claims is true. That is one thing.

But it is not at all clear to me, given the kinds of examples that Wolfe has given, that the question of competing truth claims is the central political question. It is an issue, certainly, but it is not clear to me that it dominates the politics of religion. What are the practical limits of peoples willingness to accommodate competing beliefs and practices? I don't think they are unbounded, nor should they be, but I don't think we can determine those limits through logical examination of doctrine.

Fear of Fundies

Finally, let us consider the specific context in which Michaels is arguing. Though he tends to make his arguments in universal terms, i.e. about truth claims of any and all religions, he isn't arguing about politics in Japan or India or Brazil or France, for example. He's concerned about politics in the United States. In that context, the religious right is the focal point of religion in politics. That religious right consists largely of fundamentalist and evangelical Christians, mostly, but not entirely, Protestant.

I've got this vague impression that the fundamentalists and evangelists we (the progressive left) find so fearsome are, to some extent, a figment of our imaginations. For whatever reason, we prefer to demonize them rather than dialogue with them. This is not something I'm prepared to argue in detail, but . . .

Consider the following paragraphs from an article Malcolm Gladwell published last year:

Not long ago, the sociologist Christian Smith decided to find out what American evangelicals mean when they say that they believe in a "Christian America." The phrase seems to suggest that evangelicals intend to erode the separation of church and state. But when Smith asked a representative sample of evangelicals to explain the meaning of the phrase, the most frequent explanation was that America was founded by people who sought religious liberty and worked to establish religious freedom. The second most frequent explanation offered was that a majority of Americans of earlier generations were sincere Christians, which, as Smith points out, is empirically true. Others said what they meant by a Christian nation was that the basic laws of American government reflected Christian principles-which sounds potentially theocratic, except that when Smith asked his respondents to specify what they meant by basic laws they came up with representative government and the balance of powers.

"In other words," Smith writes, "the belief that America was once a Christian nation does not necessarily mean a commitment to making it a 'Christian' nation today, whatever that might mean. Some evangelicals do make this connection explicitly. But many discuss America's Christian heritage as a simple fact of history that they are not particularly interested in or optimistic about reclaiming. Further, some evangelicals think America never was a Christian nation; some think it still is; and others think it should not be a Christian nation, whether or not it was so in the past or is now."

As Smith explored one issue after another with the evangelicals-gender equality, education, pluralism, and politics-he found the same scattershot pattern. The Republican Party may have been adept at winning the support of evangelical voters, but that affinity appears to be as much cultural as anything; the Party has learned to speak the evangelical language. Scratch the surface, and the appearance of homogeneity and ideological consistency disappears. Evangelicals want children to have the right to pray in school, for example, and they vote for conservative Republicans who support that right. But what do they mean by prayer? The New Testament's most left-liberal text, the Lord's Prayer-which, it should be pointed out, begins with a call for utopian social restructuring ("Thy will be done, On earth as it is in Heaven"), then welfare relief ("Give us this day our daily bread"), and then income redistribution ("Forgive us our debts as we also have forgiven our debtors"). The evangelical movement isn't a movement, if you take movements to be characterized by a coherent philosophy, and that's hardly surprising when you think of the role that small groups have come to play in the evangelical religious experience. The answers that Smith got to his questions are the kind of answers you would expect from people who think most deeply about their faith and its implications on Tuesday night, or Wednesday, with five or six of their closest friends, and not Sunday morning, in the controlling hands of a pastor.

The entire article is worth reading. And you might want to take a look at some of the papers at Christian Smith's website.

Saturday, September 16, 2023

Politics Beyond the Personal: Diversity, Identitarian Rhetoric, and Equality

This post originally appeared in The Valve (now defunct) on October 6, 2006. It was part of a "book event," as it was known, in which a number of writers would give their views on the chosen book. Some of the writers were regular columnists at The Valve, and some weren't. Generally, a good time was had by all. This book event was devoted to Walter Benn Michaels, The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality. Diversity is an even more pressing issue back now than it was back then, when Bush II was President, which is why I'm posting my contribution here. You can find the whole book event here, in the trusty Wayback Machine. 

Caveat: Some of the links have probably rotted. I've not checked them nor attempted to repair them.

* * * * *

Prelude: Shantytowns

Back in April one Tyler Cowen published an article in Slate suggesting that shantytowns be constructed in post-Katrina New Orleans:

Since so many homes were destroyed, the natural inclination is to build safer or perhaps impregnable structures. But that is the wrong response. No one should or will rebuild or insure expensive homes on vulnerable ground, such as the devastated Ninth Ward. And it is impossible to make homes perfectly safe against every conceivable act of nature.

Instead, the city should help create cheap housing by reducing legal restrictions on building quality, building safety, and required insurance. This means the Ninth Ward need not remain empty. Once the current ruined structures are razed, governmental authorities should make it possible for entrepreneurs to put up less-expensive buildings. Many of these will be serviceable, but not all will be pretty. We could call them structures with expected lives of less than 50 years. Or we could call them shacks.

I haven't given the matter much thought but, on the face of it, the suggestion seems worth considering. Cowan made the curious mistake, however, of concluding that piece with this fairytale:

To be sure, the shantytowns could bring socioeconomic costs. Yet crime, lack of safety, and racial tension were all features of New Orleans ex ante. The city has long thrived as more dangerous than average, more multicultural than average, and more precarious than average for the United States. And people who decide the cheap housing isn't safe enough will be free to look elsewhere-or remain in Utah with their insurance checks.

Shantytowns might well be more creative than a dead city core. Some of the best Brazilian music came from the favelas of Salvador and Rio. The slums of Kingston, Jamaica, bred reggae. New Orleans experienced its greatest cultural blossoming in the early 20th century, when it was full of shanties. Low rents make it possible to live on a shoestring, while the population density blends cultural influences. Cheap real estate could make the city a desirable place for struggling artists to live. The cultural heyday of New Orleans lies in the past. Katrina rebuilding gives the city a chance to become an innovator once again.

While it is true that remarkable creative activity has managed to survive in unfortunate physical circumstances, I would think the proper view of this relationship is that creativity thus survived in spite of those circumstances, not because of them.

Cowan's disingenuous praise of creativity among the poor is an example of the kind of thinking that Walter Benn Michaels eviscerates in The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality. The cultural creativity that sometimes manages to flourish amid poverty is, in Cowan's view, somehow supposed to compensate for that poverty or to demonstrate somehow that poverty really isn't such a bad thing. In Michaels's view such thinking is self-serving rationalization. He is right to critique it.

However, I'm not going to concentrate on the book's main argument; I'll leave that to my fellow bloggers. I am concerned about the book's very odd conclusion, which is about Michaels himself. In some entirely reasonable scheme of things, that conclusion is irrelevant to the argument - Michaels himself says so - but still, it is there, 12 pages all about Walter Benn Michaels in a 203 page book. Why?

As Miss Piggy Says: Moi Moi Moi

Michaels begins his conclusion by climbing into the third person and telling us (p. 191):

Walter Benn Michaels teaches at the University of Illinois, Chicago. He makes $175,000 a year. But he wants more; one of his motives for writing this book was the cash advance offered him by his publishers.

As it happens, that paragraph is the first thing I saw when I opened the book. I wasn't intending to read the conclusion, the pages just happened to part there when I opened the book.

So I began reading that paragraph and promptly splattered myself on the ceiling in anger and disgust: “another narcissistic mea culpa from an opportunistic pomo critic.” That's what I was thinking. “And he's bragging about his salary too,” which is quite high for a humanities professor, though it's only martini money on Wall Street - something Michaels is at pains to point out.

Once I had scraped myself off the ceiling and gathered my wits about me, I was puzzled. I associate such self indulgence with identity theorists, who seem to believe that a frank acknowledgment of their own positionality will magically insulate them from misconstruing the thoughts and actions of the Others about whom they write. But Michaels is not such an identitarian; he's quite opposed to such thinking, and says so in this book (and others as well). Why is he making such a typically identitarian move? And, at 6% of the page count, in such an exaggerated form in such a prominent position, the end of the book?

One possibility, of course, is misplaced vanity. That seems to be what University Diarist thinks:

He ran out of things to say but he had a book contract, so he's filling up pages . . . with cultural self-flattery. In that particularly repellent mode UD calls KISS ME I'M HONEST. Says he's got an enormous household income but wants much more because he wants to be the super-rich he envies in the pages of the NYT ... that the homeless guy outside his house pisses him off rather than inspires him to become Albert Schweitzer ... that he thinks he has better taste than other people ...

When Michaels tells us, in a book about the economic greed, blindness, and insensitivity of American elites, that he himself is an invidious grasping sort, it doesn't humanize him or interestingly complicate the redistribution problem.... If indeed he “does not feel rich” even though he's hugely affluent, one can only conclude that it's because of people like Michaels that we're in the cruel winner-take-all fix he himself deplores.

I'm can't go along with that final comment, but I certainly resonate to the KISS ME I'M HONEST branding. Yet, while I am quite willing to believe that academic superstars, such as Michaels, are sometimes prey to vanity and self indulgence, I have been unable to convince myself that Michaels wrote those final pages out of nothing but vanity. There is something else going on.

Let us read a bit more (p. 191):

Some readers will be tempted to see a discrepancy between these facts and the arguments against economic inequality made in the preceding chapters. But they should remember that those arguments are true (if they are true) even if Michaels's motives are bad, and they would be false (if they were false) even if his motives were good. Not to put too fine a point on it, the validity of the arguments does not depend on the virtue of the person making them.

I quite agree. So why doesn't Michaels simply allow people to judge his ideas on their merits, free of any information about who he is, how much money he makes, that he is Jewish, or what he thinks about the homeless man he saw outside the window of his study? Why not simply present his arguments and be done with it?

Consider the following passage by sociologist Robert Merton, from a 1945 article on “The Sociology of Knowledge” which is reprinted in his collection, Social Theory and Social Structure (Free Press 1957, p. 457):

With increasing social conflict, differences in the values, attitudes and modes of thought of groups develop to the point where there orientation which these groups previously had in common is overshadowed by incompatible differences. Not only do there develop distinct universes of discourse, but the existence of any one universe challenges the validity and legitimacy of the others. The co-existence of these conflicting perspectives and interpretations within the same society leads to an active and reciprocal distrust between groups. Within a context of distrust, one no longer inquires into the content of beliefs and assertions to determine whether they are valid or not, one no longer confronts the assertions with relevant evidence, but introduces an entirely new question: how does it happen that these views are maintained? Thought becomes functionalized; it is interpreted in terms of its psychological or economic or social or racial sources and functions.

Thus knowledge of a thinker's position in society, his identity, will be used to discount the arguments he makes.

The conditions Merton described in that mid-century article are certainly true of current intellectual life in America, both in the academy and in the larger civic sphere. Difference and distrust are rampant and any and all ideas can be interpreted as deceptive moves in a struggle for power and domination of one sort or another. Thus throughout Michaels's career it has been common for literary scholars to discount arguments by reference to some hidden agenda of the person making the argument. This argument is capitalist, that one is paternalistic, that other one over there assumes white privilege, and so forth. These days psychoanalysis is anathema to one group of intellectual tribes while evolutionary psychology is anathema to another. Of intellectual cooties there is no end.

One move in such a game is for a writer openly to declare his identity, his position in the matrix of potential discounting factors, in the name of openness and honesty. Identitarians do this all the time, especially when they are considering the work of people whose identity is different from their own.

This is the context in which I wish to consider Michaels's conclusion. It bears on his argument, not in a rational-deductive way, but in a rhetorical way. Rationally, the conclusion is irrelevant to the arguments in the body of his book. But rhetorically, that's different. In the manner, however, of Laurence Sterne, I propose to progress through digression. Thus I will first consider, at some length, two examples of standard authorial positioning statements in identitarian contexts.

Other People's Culture

Let us begin with a casual example of authorial positioning, from an article in Krin Gabbard's anthology, Jazz Among the Discourses (1995), one of a pair of anthologies arguing that “jazz has entered the mainstreams of the American academy” (p. 1). The general purpose of the anthology is to help ensure that this new discipline is in harmony with the latest developments in postmodern humanities scholarship. One Steven Elworth contributed a paper examining the critical transformation of jazz into an art music: “Jazz in Crisis, 1948-1958: Ideology and Representation.”

In the course of his argument, Elworth offers this observation (p. 65):

The major paradox of all writing about culture is how to take seriously a culture not one's own without reducing it to an ineffable Other. I do not wish to argue, of course, that one can only write of one's own culture. In the contemporary moment of constant cultural transformation and commodification, even the definition of one's own culture is exceedingly contradictory and problematic.

While the entire passage is worthy of comment, I want to consider only the first sentence: Just what “culture not one's own” is Elworth talking about? Since this article is about jazz I assume that jazz culture is what he's talking about. While the jazz genealogy has strands extending variously to West Africa and Europe, has been and continues to be performed by Blacks and Whites, before audiences both Black and White - though, in the past, these have often been segmented into different venues, or different sections of the same venue - the music is conventionally considered to be Black. That convention is justified by the fact the music's major creators have been overwhelmingly Black. Thus it follows that jazz culture is, as these conventions go, Black culture.

That convention leads me to infer that Elworth is White. I do not have any hard evidence for this assumption; I've never met the man, I've seen no photographs, and the contributor's blurb certainly doesn't indicate race. But the same set of conventions that dictate that jazz is Black music also make it unlikely that any Black scholar would refer to jazz culture as “a culture not one's own.” It follows that Elworth is White, or, at any rate, not-Black.

Monday, March 29, 2021

Afterthoughts: Religion, Legitimacy, and Government in America @ 3QD

My latest at 3 Quarks Daily: Religion, Legitimacy, and Government in America, A Just-So Story. I DO like it, but I’m not (totally) pleased. It’s becomes a bit ragged toward the end; too many loose ends. It needs more work. Quite possibly more than I could have done within the compass of a 3QD piece. How much more, I don’t know.

What I like: the overall scope, the pieces (ideas, themes, concepts) I’ve set in place. It seems to me that the various things in the article (as posted), a no doubt a few others (see below), belong together and need to be understood together. What needs more work: they’re not as well connected as they should be (see below). Moreover, I’m not sure I know how to write the kind of piece I (think I’d) like to. I’m looking for a new mode, a new voice.

Some things the argument needs:

  • an explicit account of identity as fundamental purchase on reality – it’s a peculiar business when identity itself has become the focus of one’s identity
  • some remarks about the scope of the church and the state, as being explicitly different in 1776, and being overlapping and confused today
  • inequality, hierarchy and egalitarianism (Boehm), as in my post, Hierarchy and Equality: The Essential Tension in Human Nature,
  • Occupy Wall Street? – a protest against inequality that popularized the 1% vs. 99% and was itself absurdly flat

I suppose I could go on and on. For the moment it is enough that I've put them all in one place. And, these ARE themes & ideas I’ve been chewing on for awhile (the article itself is a somewhat revised version of one I wrote originally in 2004). I suppose I could write a book. But I don’t want to, not that book, not now.

We’ll see. More later.

Sunday, September 6, 2020

“White privilege” – The phrase is best understood as a rhetorical strategy rather than as an analytical assertion about race in society

The good people over at Crooked Timber are having a long and complex discussion about white privilege that is spread out over four posts:
I’ve glanced through the whole discussion, but not read it in detail. My impression is that the issue is mostly being argued in terms of how race and class function in society. That is an important and complicated discussion. But the discussion needs to be more sophisticated about language if it is to make sense of the notion of white privilege. Quiggin takes a look there, but not quite in the most illuminating way.

Rhetorically it seems to me white privilege functions like the notion of original sin in Christianity. One is born into original sin; there’s nothing you can do about. A Christian atones for original sin by being a good Christian. Similarly, the mere fact that one is white means that one has white privilege. Even if a white person commits no racist acts and utters no racist language, even if one actively supports anti-racist causes, that white person has white privilege. However, that person can atone for white privilege by becoming woke and making the appropriate statements.

How is it that the phrase so easily assumes that rhetorical function? I propose an analysis that begins like this: Racism is something that is directed outward from the racist to others. Privilege, however, is not. If it is directed anywhere, it is directed at the bearer of the privilege.

Consider these phrases:
1) white racism
2) aristocratic privilege
3) white privilege
The first does not explicitly assert that all white people are racist, nor does it even imply that – though the phrase may sometimes used in that way. It merely identifies racism that belongs to people who are, incidentally, white. It does not assume that whiteness is a property inherent in the definition of racism. In this context the mere fact that any given person is white implies little about the larger society in which they live. An individual may or may not be racist, but that is independent of their skin color.

Two is quite different. The notion of an aristocrat only makes sense in terms of larger social arrangements. You simply cannot have aristocrats without having commoners as well. In societies with those kinds of arrangements, however, aristocracy is assumed to inhere in individuals persons in the way that, say, height, or eye color, or skin color does. Aristocratic being and skin color are passed down through the genes. At least that was the belief, shared by aristocrats and commoners alike.

Rhetorically, 3 functions like 2, rather than 1. And it does so because, while privilege and racism both assume some kind of social context, the concepts function differently in that context. Racism is centripetally directed in the social context, from the racists toward others. Privilege really is not. It just ‘sits there’ if you will. So when privilege is paired with whiteness it, in effect, is attracted to, collapses into, that whiteness and becomes an inherent property of whiteness.

As such it would seemed to be passed down through the genes. Here, though, I think we run into trouble. I doubt that those who believe in white privilege would actually say such a thing. They'd likely recognize it as nonsense. And they’re likely to add something about “structural” racism, that white privilege is about structuralism. Yes, it is, and what the phrase does rhetorically is to extricate structural racism from social structure and lodge it in the individual. But the conversation never gets that far. White privilege is able to perform its rhetorical function only so long as we all keep quiet about what's going on.

So, if you’re white, you’re stuck with it. If you don’t like it, well, you can become woke and enter eternal atonement by uttering the appropriate ritual phrases. It would be nice if you also did something that improved people’s lives, but as long as you make the right attestations, that is, at best, a secondary matter. In this business professing the right faith is more important than doing good works. If fact, without right faith, even the best of works is without moral value.

Saturday, August 22, 2020

Saturday ramble: GPT-3, your AI companion, metaphysics, Instagram [& identity]

Yikes! But I’ve been busy. And it’s not going to stop.

GPT-3 update – GPT-X: The Star Trek computer and beyond

Back on August 5 I’d issued my first working paper in my GPT-3 project, GPT-3: Waterloo or Rubicon? Here be Dragons, but of course I continued thinking about those issues as well as making attempts to move on. Since then I’ve issued a number of further-thoughts posts and then a couple of days ago I decided that I needed to revise the middle of the paper, resulting in GPT-3: Waterloo or Rubicon? Here be Dragons, Version 2, which I uploaded on Wednesday (or was it Thursday?). Whenever it was, I’ve tweaked it twice since then. I think it’s now to the point where I can leave further thoughts to another paper, perhaps GPT-3: Bounding the Space, toward a theory of minds.

I’ve been making fitful progress on the GPT-3 future paper, which now has the working title, After GPT-X: The Star Trek computer, and beyond. The problem is figuring out just what I want to do. What I DON'T want to do is take on the future of all of AI and robotics. But how do I limit myself? My current scheme is to have an opening section that starts by pointing out that much of AI still seems gripped by the chess-thinking that dominated its founding. Just where I’ll go from there I don’t know, but I want to say something about what AI is good at and what it isn’t: closed worlds vs. open, abstract vs. concrete. That would lay the foundations for the next section, “AI as platform and beyond”.

That’s where I’ve been doing some work. I’ll start with Andreessen’s remarks on AI as platform, pointing out, however, that he’s clearly thinking of something like the Star Trek computer as the endgame here. That’s one possibility, but not the only one. I want to think along the lines I laid out in an old document, PowerPoint Assistant: Augmenting End-User Software through Natural Language Interaction. That’s easily transformed into the AI-as-platform architecture and it’s oriented “inward” toward the machine itself, rather than “outward” toward the external world. It’s thus oriented toward a relatively closed world, moreover, one that’s well suited to the machine’s capabilities; it doesn’t have to cope with the perceptual messiness of the physical world. This line of thinking leads to conceiving of the operating system as an AI. That, in turn leads to AIs interacting with other AIs.

Then we can take up Andreessen’s line of thought, which leads toward the Star Trek computer. I suppose I’ve got to reiterate just how difficult it is going to be to develop a cognitive model and a semantics of the external world, with common sense reasoning at its base. I suspect that may well require an ongoing cumulative and cooperative effort that will have to be public, and international, rather than a private effort, like GPT-3. It’s just too large. But then something like the Star Trek computer – if we’re really thinking in those terms – really should be a public resource, like water, electricity, and so forth. That’s a project that will take decades, if not generations.

Computer/AI as life-long companion

Then we can bring these two lines of development together – the inward move toward the operting system as AI and the outward move toward the Star Trek computer – in the notion of an AI as a life-long companion. A child will be given an artificial companion at a young age, say between 18 and 24 months or so, and will have that companion with it for the rest of its life. Just what that companion does and how it functions, that will change as the child matures, and so forth. I figure it could have various manifestations: an electro-mechanical pet, a hand-held device, a facility in the cloud, and so forth. It will variously be a tutor, a companion, a resource, perhaps an aide too. This raises a host of design issues, technical issures, and ethical issues.

What’s the time frame? I don’t know. Companion robots exist now, at least in Japan. I know they’re used for the elderly. And of course there’s the Tamagotchi, a small hand-held device that functions as a virtual pet. That’s the seed of such a companion. Add to that the smart phone…But a full-blown companion? I don’t know. It’s not at all an either/or thing. It will evolve by degrees. I suppose the critical point will be when every child is given one. Fifty years? Who will own this device? Will it be the private property of the child’s family until the child becomes and adult? Who will manufacture it? Private corporations, under license from the government? Regulation?

Off hand it’s not at all clear to me that such a capability is well served by the current division between public and private. It’s somewhere in between. I don’t think it can be private property, like a slave. But I don’t think it’ll be capable of fully autonomous human-like existence, and so entitled to citizen-hood. How will it fit into a new social order?

The metaphysical structure of the world – it’s lumpy

I am currently in the process of taking two posts and combining them into a single working paper with the provisional title, What economic growth and statistical semantics tell us about the structure of the world. One post is from August 13, Stagnation, Redux: It’s the way of the world [good ideas are not evenly distributed, no more so than diamonds], and is about economic growth. The other is from August 15, World, mind, and learnability: A note on the metaphysical structure of the cosmos, and takes its point of departure from my currenting thinking about GPT-3.

Both posts are grounded in the fact that the world is complex and irregular, chaotic, in the way David Hays and I argued in A Note on Why Natural Selection Leads to Complexity (1990). The world isn’t “smooth”; it’s “lumpy” – terms I’ll be explicating the working paper. This lumpiness is not fundamentally physical ¬– though it may be so in some cases, think, for example, of the distribution of diamonds, or oil, or whales – but is rather metaphysical, a function of the relationship between our capacities and the world we live in.

It is because the world is lumpy that we can perceive and more around in it effectively. That is, it is learnable. And that’s what makes GPT-3 and similar engines possible. This lumpiness exists at all scales.

But lumpiness underlies the phenomenon of economic stagnation as well. That, in effect, is what I argued last year in Stagnation and Beyond: Economic growth and the cost of knowledge in a complex world. There I argued that the increasing cost of drug discovery, on the one hand, and developing ever smaller chip components for computation (Moore’s law), on the other, reflected the lost of learning more about the world. In a lumpy world, we start by exploiting things that are near to us and then move toward things that are more distant. Effort increases with distance.

Thus understood, this metaphysical structure of course must be extended to animals and to plants as well – the relationship between their capacities and the world. These capacities – for all of us, plants, animals, humans – change over time. Thus the metaphysical structure of the world is not fixed, but it doesn’t wander chaotically either. It evolves.

Hello, Instagram!

I’ve had an Instagram account for some time now, but only on my laptop, not my smart phone. I’ve only been using my smart phone to make phone calls and sent text messages. But I’ve recently started running it through wifi, and that gives me access to the internet. So I’ve downloaded the Instagram app and have been uploading photos to it for that last few days.

Oh, I’ve been taking photos with the phone’s camera, but I’ve mostly been uploading photos from my laptop. I email them to my Google account and then save them to the phone. From there it’s easy to post them to Instagram. I’ve been getting a lot of “likes”.

What fun.

Identity

And I’ve still got a post about cultural and social identity on my plate. It’s been hanging around since my interview with Hollis Robbins. I plan to cover four cases:
  • a white academic writing about jazz (“a culture not one’s own”)
  • A Black poet writing sonnets (“received European form”)
  • Japanese and baseball
  • Arabic numbers in the West
What will come out of the cross-comparison? Perhaps cultural and social identity are not the same thing.

Friday, May 15, 2020

What’s Up? Alternative Hollywood History [Media Notes 32]

I watched Netflix’s Hollywood a week ago and enjoyed it; lots of fun, though draggy here and there, and a bit soapy, too, if you catch my drift. It attracted a lot of commentary, much around its alternative history premise. As you may know, it’s set in Hollywood in the late 1940s and includes (versions of) real people (e.g. Anna May Wong, Rock Hudson, and Hattie McDaniels) amid mostly fictional characters. This is a world in which a gay black screen writer gets his script made into a film directed by a half-Filipino director and with a black star. Not only that, but the movie’s a hit, takes home some Oscars, and the gay screenwriter and Rock Hudson hold hands on the red carpet in front of all the cameras. What fun.

Some of the commentary was not at all happy with this alternative version of our world, such as this piece in the New York Post, Netflix’s ‘Hollywood’ is a reality-altering, potentially dangerous TV series, but I think Aisha Harris gets things right in The New York Times, In Netflix’s ‘Hollywood,’ One Movie Fixes Racism. Hooray! – clever title, that; I wonder who wrote it. She’s quite aware of Hollywood’s history on these matters, and ours as well. Given all the reservations, all the work yet to be done:
... There is something to be said for the show’s fluffy confection of ahistoricism when it’s not indulging in myths of racial reconciliation and movies-as-changemakers.

The happy resolutions conjured up by message films from the “Hollywood” era almost always benefited straight white people and no one else. Here is a fantasy set in the past where women, people of color and queer characters ultimately win, too.

Yes, the Avises of the world are able to pat themselves on the backs for doing the right thing. But Archie, Camille and Anna May also get to pursue their dreams and see their success open doors for others. They survive, they flourish, they are happy.

A part of me can’t ignore what it feels like to see this Technicolor spectacle populated by these faces and experiences, to see the 1940s depicted through a 2020 lens — browner, less sexually repressed, more women calling the shots. “Movies don’t just show us how the world is, they show us how the world can be,” says one character in “Hollywood.” [...]
The show is willfully naïve and laughably self-satisfied. But as far as dreams go, it’s also progress.
I conclude that the series presupposes an audience with some sophistication in these matters, an audience that knows things weren’t at all like that back in the day, and that we’ve still got a ways to go. But that doesn’t mean we can’t have fun, does it?

* * * * *


Thursday, January 9, 2020

Reading Mark Moffett’s The Human Swarm

Another working paper. Title above, abstract, contents, and introduction below. Download at: Academica.edu: https://www.academia.edu/41576252/Reading_Mark_Moffett_s_The_Human_Swarm
Abstract: Moffett surveys a wide literature on human and non-human society and produces a useful synthesis of the literature. While written for general readers, this book will repay academic specialists of various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Moffett is interested in what constitutes society: how do we differentiate between insiders and outsiders? He surveys the animal world and the follows the insider/outsider distinction in the evolution of human societies from hunter-gatherer groups to the current day.
Contents

I could go on and on about The Human Swarm, but I won’t. Time to move on. 3
Of ants and humans: Some principles of social organization 5
Hunter-Gatherers and the Plant Trap 10
The importance of scale in social structure 16
A digression about an image with an application to human cultural evolution 21
Summer camp and beyond – another digression [F2F group & society] 24
Night-time action and brain-to-brain coupling [Shazam!!] 26
The Great Chain of Being 28
The book so far – Nine things that are important 30
What about the USA? 33
Some notes about neural foundations 36
 
I could go on and on about The Human Swarm, but I won’t. Time to move on.

In review:
Mark W. Moffett. The Human Swarm: How Our Societies Arise, Thrive, and Fall. Basic Books 2019.
Back in the days when I was an undergraduate, when I was first learning how to think with some rigor, I sometimes found that it was only after I had finished a term paper that I realized what I was after. That is, I treated my initial idea, not as a conclusion to be justified by the paper, but as the starting point of an exploration. And so things have gone ever since.

Yes, it is nice to put things in order in the course of writing a paper. But you also want to go somewhere And so it is.

When I had originally planned this series of notes about Mark Moffett’s The Human Swarm I intended to conclude the exercise with a formal review of the book in 3 Quarks Daily. I could then wrap the posts and review into a single document and post it as a working paper.

The review is done and posted, but shortly after I had posted the review I was struck by after thoughts: Kaboom! I made plans to write one more post – after the review – and then wrap it up. Monday, then Tuesday, and Wednesday passed and I’d still not written that post. It’s now Thursday and I’ve decided not to write it after all. Could I write one? Sure. But then if one, why not a second, and a third? The book IS that rich. I could continue posting about to for awhile.

No, it’s time to move on. I’ve got other interests, other projects, I must nurture. For the record, the impulse that prompted this delay is simple: What of economics? That is, in my review I had listed ten principles operative in, ten propositions about, social organization, but none of them said anything about economics. That seemed a bit bothersome. But only a bit. Biology is inherently about economics and economic issues are central to society. But that wasn’t Moffett’s topic, though you can see in on the page if you look for it – especially in discussions of fission-fusion societies. Rather, he was interested in the issue of identity, how that defines our social structures. So let’s leave things there.

What’s in the rest of this document? First comes my review and then we have the nine blog posts I wrote during the two months it took me to read the book. Looking over them I realize that a number of these posts serve as bridges from Moffett’s book to other things:

Of ants and humans: Some principles of social organization: This is the formal review. It reprises some material from the posts, especially the “nine things” post, but frames things a bit differently.

Hunter-Gatherers and the Plant Trap: I started the book at the very end and then moved to the middle, as I often do. I use many short quote here. If you’re looking for economics, this is the place to find it.

The importance of scale in social structure: We start with ants, bonobos, and chimps to introduce the notion of scale. Ants live in societies numbering millions of individuals. Humans have come to do so as well. Bonobos and chimps, our close biological relatives, never have and never will life in such societies. And then I reprise some material about the size of musical groups that I’d developed in Beethoven’s Anvil (2001).

A digression about an image with an application to human cultural evolution: And here we take an excursion into the evolution of 19th century Anglophone literary culture with a diagram that could be a map of the nest of a large ant colony...but isn’t.

Summer camp and beyond – another digression [F2F group & society]: In which I suggest that the practice of sending children away to summer camp is a way of helping them live in a society that is necessarily much larger than any face-to-face group they live with.

Night-time action and brain-to-brain coupling [Shazam!!]: I ride a pair current hobby horses, one is about sleep habits the other is about intersubjectivity and patterns of neural activity.

The Great Chain of Being: Another hobby horse, this one is about conceptual organization, which, Moffett shows, maps on to social structure.

The book so far – Nine things that are important: By this time I’d read most, but not all, of the book. I realized that certain themes kept coming up time and again. So I listed them here, with a bit of commentary. I added one to the list and made at the central section of my review.

What about the USA? Using concepts from the book I take a quick look at the evolution of social structure and identity in the United States. Is the nation falling apart?

Some notes about neural foundations: Here I derive some of Moffett’s core observations and assertions from some basic properties of the brain.

Friday, January 3, 2020

Reading the Human Swarm 9: What about the brain?

There is at least one place where Moffett mentions the brain, in the beginning of Chapter 12, “Sensing Others”, where he mentions the work of Uri Hasson, a neuroscientist who investigates neural activity of people intereacting with one another through conversation; in this case, they were watching a film and chatting together. When that happens their brain activity becomes synchronized.

I’d like to introduce some comments on the brain on a different theme: The brain is built from the inside? By thinking that through we can appreciate the (conjectural) neural underpinnings of some findings Moffett has introduced: societies are more likely to form through fission rather than merger; the development of factions; and the distinction between group and society.

Brains are built from the inside

First, what does that mean: the brain is built from the “inside”? Automobiles, for example, aren’t built from the inside. They are designed by engineers and then constructed, to design, by teams of workers, from the “outside”. The same is true of computers. We design them and then build them. Software is like that as well. In these cases, and many more, what is being designed and constructed is one thing, over there, if you will, while the team doing the designing and constructing is another thing, over here.

Brains aren’t like that. Brains and nervous systems are embedded in animals and the process through which an animal comes into being is a biological process of development and growth that starts with a single fertilized cell. There is no separation between a design-build team and the thing being constructed. They are one and the same. It is in that sense that I am asserting the brains are built from the inside. There is no external agent doing the constructing.

While it is common to use computing as a source of metaphors for mind and brain (brain as wetware, mind as software), much of that usage doesn’t hold beyond casual conversation. It is easy to give a computer new capacities by loading a new software package, but nothing like that is possible for humans. We can learn new skills, but that takes time, hours, months, years, depending on the skill. In contrast, a software upload takes whatever time is required for the installation, seconds, minutes, maybe hours; but once the software is installed, the new capacity if fully there and ready to use. Conversely, software can be quickly uninstalled, or simply erased, without damage to the computer itself; but no such thing is possible for knowledge and skills a person has learned. Once the knowledge or skill has been acquired it is more or less permanent, though it may degrade over time if not used.

Implications

Let’s begin with the observation that new societies rarely arise from the merger of existing ones (pp. 283-285). Rather, they arise from the fissioning of existing societies. Thus the members of the societies that result after the split already know one another. They’d grown up together and lived with one another for years. When any one of them was maturing, and thus their brain was developing, the other members of the society where automatically incorporated into their neural representation of the world.

Similarly, as societies become larger, the scope of individual contacts relative to membership in the society as a whole becomes smaller, making internal cohesion more difficult. We can conjecture that this is a function of the capacity of single brains to maintain highly detailed individualized (“face-to-face”) representations of others. Factions develop, Moffett argues (243 ff.). At first they’re amicable, in time, though, that frays. The society must then split in order to maintain peace, peace in two new societies.

Then we have the distinction Moffett makes between a group and a society. Members of groups recognize one another as individuals and interact with one another in individualized ways. Societies do not. Societies divide between the world into US (members of a society) and THEM (non-members). Ants do not recognized one another as individuals, but they do recognize other members of their society (coloney); they do so by scent. Humans typically live in societies consisting of multiple (face-to-face) grounds and use markers of various kinds – hair styles, body markings, clothing, language – to recognize and interact with society members who are not in their local group. They interact with non-group society members through stereotyped social roles. The neural requirements (again, my conjecture) of interaction governed by markers and roles are lower than those governed by detailed individual knowledge. The existence of markers and roles thus allows people to form societies that are larger than face-to-face groups without making burdensome neural requirements.

A concluding note on identity is a different sense

Identity is an important theme in the book where it is about an individual’s link to their group and society. There’s another aspect of identity which Moffett doesn’t deal with and which I’d like to link to the brain, but that would require more of an argument than I can undertake here.

The argument that needs to be made is that our nervous system affords us open-ended awareness of the world. I suspect that’s a joint product of the active nature of the nervous system and the emergence of language. On that active nature, the nervous system doesn’t passively take the world in, but rather actively probes the world through continuously projecting expectations – think, for example, of the model William Powers developed almost a half century ago in Behavior: The Control of Perception (1973). Thus perception is a process of verifying those projections (or, to use a more current language, updating Baysian priors).

The emergence of language leads to an endless curiosity about everything: What’s that? How does it work? Where’d it come from? Living becomes thus becomes a dialog with the world. And the question, Where did WE come from? will arise in that process. The answer initially takes the form of myth, of stories about origins. And those stories, in effect, establish the link between a society and world. That too is a matter of identity.

Sunday, December 8, 2019

Reading The Human Swarm 7: The book so far – Nine things that are important

Frankly, I’d hoped to have a full review written by this time, or was that a month ago? But...things...you know. I’ve got a lot on my plate, on the one hand, and, on the other, this is an interesting book, very interesting. So I can’t just read it though and get on with a review. I find myself take notes as I go along, some of which have made it into these posts, and transcribing bits and pieces of the book into these notes. And thinking about it.

Anyhow, I thought I’d write a “where I’m at now” post. Most concretely I’m on page 296 in a book with 362 pages of text, plus pile of endnotes and bibliography. That’s a couple pages into chapter 23, “Building and Breaking of Nations” out of a total of 26 chapter. I’ve also read the conclusion, “Identities Shift and Societies Shatter (pp. 355-362); in fact that’s where I started reading. After all, this isn’t a mystery novel where figuring out how it ends is 3/4s of the fun. In sweeping nonfiction books like The Human Swarm I find it useful to know where the argument leads before I begin; that helps me sift and weigh things as I read through the text.

I’ve got one thing in mind for this post: a list of propositions or ideas I’ve ‘extracted’ from the text as I’ve read through it. At the moment the list has nine items on it, as follows.

* * * * *

The list is subject to revision, of course. I’m likely to add an item or two before I finish the book and perhaps revise the items currently on the list.

1. Scale: Taken one by one, handful by handful, humans and ants are very different. Taken by the million, we are alike. Moffett, as you know, is an expert on insects, ants in particular. They’re so very different from us that one can reasonably wonder what they have to teach us. Moffet’s point is that, yes, individual humans are very different from individual ants, but when the numbers grow, to thousands, tens of thousands or millions or more, large groups of humans face problems similar to those faced by large groups of ants, and arrive at similar solutions: specialization and division of labor, even the use of slaves.

When I put my philosopher’s hat on – and when you read this book, you’re a philosopher willy-nilly – I’d think about the structure of the world at large. Whatever the spatial spread of an ant society, which can be miles and miles, their world is limited in scope, thus, for example, the proximal sense of smell is HUGE. The world of even the smallest hunter gatherer band is, by contrast, much wider and more differentiated, with the distance senses of sight and hearing being very important.

And so on.

Scale will come into play as human societies become larger and larger, necessitating social invention of various kinds.

2. Group vs. Society: Group members recognize one another as individuals. Mammals live in such groups; ants do not. But ants do recognize society, which divides the world in to US and THEM, as do all animals and humans. Ants demark social boundaries by scent: do you smell like us or not? Humans develop various ways of distinguishing between us and them. As societies grow in size, the variety of markers (see below) increases.

3. Fission/fusion: This is a big one. Many animal societies, including humans societies, are of a fission fusion type. Individuals spend most of their time living in groups where each individual recognizes each other individual. The groups in a society, in both animals and humans, will however gather together on a occasion for whatever reason – hang out, find makes, a collective hunt. There is relatively little aggression between members of different groups within the same society. Where individuals are in different societies, that’s a different and more dangerous matter.

Moffett has various remarks indicating that fission/fusion dynamics are likely very important in the emergence of societies of proto humans from societies of very clever apes. We know that apes, and other animals as well, have some form of culture. The idea is that fission/fusion dynamics pushes cultural invention over a tipping point so that apes become human, more or less. What’s being invented are markers.

4. Markers delimit societies: Markers delimit societies. Each society has it own marker or set of markers. Markers are almost exclusively human, though Moffet argues that certain pant-hoot cries among chimpanzees seem to serve this sort of function, as does some bird song. Humans, on the other hand, develop a wide variety of markers, not the least of which is language. Tattoos, hair styles, clothing, all can assume marker status. Among hunter gatherers the markers may be society-wide. In larger and more complex human societies one set of markers delimit sub-societies and groups within the larger society while another set of markers delimits the larger society from other such societies.

5. Drift: As societies become larger, the relative scope of individual contacts becomes smaller and smaller. This makes cohesion among groups within a society more and more difficult. Factions develop. At first they’re amicable, but as the society grows...

6. Othering: At some point in the growth of a society factions drift too far apart. Conflicts multiply and factions will no longer consider one another as part of the same society. They have become Othered. At this point the society will fission into two (or more) separate societies. This can be a violent process.

Perhaps 5 and 6 should be subordinated to a more comprehensive concept. Later.

7. No merging of societies: In both animals and humans it is not at all unusual for growing societies to splinter, giving birth to new societies (in the sense of the term that Moffett had developed). But it is very rare for separate societies in the same species to merge into a larger society. For the most part we’re concerned with human societies here.

On the one hand, this seems obvious. For separate societies to merge on equal terms they have to negotiate a common language and a common set of values, attitudes, etc. That’s very very difficult. It’s much easier for a more powerful society to annex a less powerful one (conquest) in a subordinate role. Thus empires are born. Etc.

This needs to be explicated at the neural level. This is not the place for me to even sketch it out. I note that Beethoven’s Anvil, my book on music, has conceptual equipment that would be useful here, and that his matter is closely related to the evolution of humans that I alluded to in my remarks about fission/fusion societies in 3 above.

8. Chiefdoms and conquest: We’re now exclusively focused on human societies. The issue concerns the governance of ever larger societies. The emergence of chiefdoms, where particularly powerful individuals have influence over several villages within a society, allows for conquest. It’s one thing to engage in war with another society which you then obliterate. It’s another thing to conquer a society and assimilate it’s people into your own society. The emergence of chiefdoms allows for this.

9. Delegation: For a society to expand beyond the scope afforded by chiefdoms requires means of delegating authority. In a chiefdom the paramount chief has direct authority over the chiefs that rule other villages. It is very difficult to extend that authority beyond the distance one can travel in a day or so. To do so requires means of delegation: laws, hierarchy, taxes, bureaucracy, long distance communication, and so forth.

I’m thinking that perhaps eight and nine should be subordinate to more comprehensive concept, following from it as specific theorems in a mathematical system.

More later.

* * * * *

But, you know, I probably need some explicit statement about identity at this level of conceptualization. And it probably needs to be stated in neural terms.

Next time.

Tuesday, October 1, 2019

Reading The Human Swarm 1: Hunter-Gatherers and the Plant Trap

I’ve been reading Mark Moffett’s new book:
Mark W. Moffett. The Human Swarm: How Our Societies Arise, Thrive, and Fall. Basic Books 2019.
It is at heart a work of natural philosophy, an old term not in much use anymore. Moffett is interested in what constitutes society: our do we differentiate between insiders and outsiders? To do so he surveys the animal world and the follows the distinction in the evolution of human societies from hunter-gatherer groups to the current day.

In this post I offer a few excepts and some occasional comments on them.

Conclusion

As is often the case, I didn’t start at the beginning. I started with the conclusion, from which I offer these excerpts:

357:
Markers are essential components in all societies of more than a few hundred individuals, whether mighty human or mere insect. At a certain point of growth, however, markers alone are insufficient to hold a society of humans together.
359:
As we look to the future, it may be illuminating to reframe the discussion around an idea cherished by people everywhere, and which I have brought up only I passing thus far: their freedom.
362:
Our misfortune has been, and will be always, that societies don’t eliminate discontent; they simply redirect it toward outsiders–which paradoxically can include the ethnic groups within them.
And then it was off to Chapters 8, “Band Societies”, 9, “The Nomadic Life”, and 10, “Settling Down”. I offer some excerpts and a few comments of my own.

Band Societies

103:
There are shelves of articles and books by anthropologists who write about hunter-gatherers based solely on what happened in bands, while ignoring how hunter-gatherer bands identified with a broader society.

Because the members of human band societies, as well as chimpanzee societies, rarely come together, finding out where a society stops and the next starts can be tough, but sharp separation in the memberships of societies are in place just the same. Numerous accounts tell how hunter-gathers of recent centuries felt secure in the presence of their “own kind.”
And I’ve read a few of those books and articles, so this was news to me. I’d thought that they just wandered about all year, spending weeks or perhaps months in one place and then moving on, the same little band. But no it isn’t unusual for a number of bands to gather together and participate in a single activity. Thus a bit latter he’ll mention that “every Autumn in North America, bands of certain tribes gathered to frighten herds of bison over cliffs” (125), something I’d read about when I was young.

This behavior motivates a distinction that is central to the book, that between a group and a society. In this case the group is the band of people who live and travel together year-round. The society, on the other hand, is the large collectivity, consisting of all those groups of individuals who recognize one another as being of the same people. The may not and generally will not know everyone in the society very well, but they recognize rights and obligations with respect to one another that they do not recognize with respect to those outside the society.

106:
Among the Bushmen, bands of the same society occupied contiguous spaces, whereas a no-man’s land lay between different societies. Similar unoccupied gaps separate the societies of other species, too–communities of chimpanzees, packs of wolves, and colonies of fire ants.
109:
For hunter-gatherers the signage of daily existence was understated. Each nuance about the natural world and the people in it filled their senses. Distinctions between their neighbors that to us would be slight would have stood out as plainly as grass blades bent by a passing antelope.
111:
After all, given the low density of most hunter-gatherers in antiquity, people would have encountered an infinitesimal fraction of the outsiders most of us are familiar with today.
And this, I might add, underlines one of the central themes of the book. We now live in societies where we are constantly meeting and interacting with people we do not know. We think nothing of it. And yet, in a broad context, it is very odd. How do we manage to do it?

The Nomadic Life

Moffett likens a hunter-gather band to a small factory. Everyone works, 112: "Few tasks in a band factory demanded multiple players."

113:
The rhythm of expeditions orchestrated by sex added a layer of complexity beyond that of the movements of almost all other animals.
That is, to a first approximation, with allowances from some differences between male and female worlds, every adult in such a society knows everything there is to know. With the exception of a ritual/medical specialist, a medicine man or shaman, there are no occupational specialists. Everyone must make everything they need for daily life and perform every necessary task.

114:
An upside of this factory life was that people weren’t occupied with raising crops or struggling to take in excess food. They ended up with leisure time–a commodity that earned these nomads the moniker “the original affluent society.” [...]

That, and the bare-bones nature of ownership, meant everything about their nomadic way of life pretty much had to fit inside each member’s head, even if peers, and especially the elderly, were useful at reinforcing what was correct. [...]

Otherwise the sole specialized line of work in a band was a medicine man. Even then, Aboriginal healers, whose training in that role could take years, were still expected to carry out life’s mundane tasks themselves.
I find that last very interesting and extraordinarily important. It isn’t hunters or weavers or cooks and so forth who are specialists, but medicine men, who are, in that role, story tellers and ritualists as well. Of course medicine is fundamental – we in the United States devote enormous resources to it ourselves (not always very wisely or effectively either) – but in simple hunter-gather societies the telling of mythic stories and the enactment of ritual was a part, indeed much of, the healing process. The medicine man was, in effect, in charge of the mythic worldview by which the society understands itself in the world.

I’m thus reminded of Shelley’s assertion: “Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.” Has it always been thus? Of course the medicine man doesn’t think of themselves as originator of the stories. They’re only passing on the stories as they’ve been handed down to them, ultimately from supernatural creatures.

115:
Still, evincing one’s talents was a delicate matter. Because of the intimacy of life around camps, band societies rarely tolerated a showoff. [...]

So without specialists or jobs, band societies offered opportunities for dexterous toolmakers, dazzling storytellers, skilled mediators of social conflicts, and thoughtful decision makers.
116:
Among other indications that life in the society completely expressed their worldview, the bands didn’t distinguish sacred beliefs (usually relating directly to nature) from other aspects of life. Likewise, rituals, entertainment, and education–all matters except family matters were part and parcel of their relationship to the society as a whole.
121:
In contrast to the rapport afforded by a band, the societies that hunter-gatherers belonged to were about identities–inclusion and exclusion. Even though each band carried out its quotidian chores alone, the society offered a security blanket, supporting reliable market and marriage relations beyond the local fireplace.