Big AI vs. Big Government in the 21st Century

Ross Douthat, The Battle With Anthropic Is the Start of a New Kind of Conflict, NYTimes, June 16, 2026.

The nature of the Anthropic conflict can be swiftly summarized even if the details are in dispute. Two months ago the company declined to publicly release its latest model, Mythos, citing various safety concerns (and hyping the model’s revolutionary power). After previewing Mythos to the U.S. government and certain corporate actors, Anthropic then released Fable, a version of the model with various safety guardrails. Amazon, an Anthropic investor and client, discovered a way to bypass some of those guardrails. This was reported to the White House, Anthropic’s response was deemed unsatisfactory, and the administration used its export-control power to forbid the use of Fable by any foreign national inside the United States and anybody at all outside it — a rule that Anthropic treated as a requirement to shut the new A.I. model down.

That’s where we are now, with the company and the administration negotiating over how to bring back Fable while ongoing leaks to the press paint one or the other side as unreasonable or reckless or ideological and clueless about tech.

Two facets of the conflict:

But beyond the specifics of why, say, the libertarian tech people in the Trump administration distrust the effective-altruist tech people running Anthropic, the kind of conflict we’re seeing here is overdetermined by the trajectory of the A.I. models: There is too much potential power here not to have ongoing, escalating struggles over who actually gets to rule.

The war over Fable previews the two broad forms that this conflict will take. First there is a private-public struggle, where governments grope for a regulatory sweet spot that allows them to maintain a meaningful veto over the A.I. behemoths without killing off their innovative power, while the A.I. companies try to maintain control over their own models and influence over how governments use their innovations.

There is a path here that leads to nationalization in all but name and a path that leads to a kind of de facto corporate takeover of the government, or at least a too-big-to-fail symbiosis. And along the way there may be not just conflicts between presidents and A.I. executives but also increasingly ruthless corporation-on-corporation action, out of fear that the A.I. landscape is winner-take-all to an extent we’ve never seen in capitalism before. [...]

Then alongside the struggle to control A.I. power within American borders, there is the geopolitical struggle to maximize global power (where the only real players are probably the United States and China) and maintain sovereignty (where everyone else is likely to be scrambling to maintain some independence). The use of export controls to shut down Fable presumably reflected U.S. fears of Chinese access to a jailbroken version of the model, but it was also a warning to every other country in the world: If we end up with economy-permeating A.I. models that are made and regulated in America, the American government will control the on-off switch.

There's more at the link.

A Confluence of Crazies: The Pentagon and the Tech Bros

Robert Wright, Iran and the immortality of OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google, Nonzero Newsletter, Mar. 6, 2026.

I'm not going to try to summarize the first three-quarters of this article, which is about how the irrational projective tendencies (my formulation [1], but not quite Wright's) of US foreign policy lead the country into senseless war after senseless war. Here's where he ends up:

All of this helps explain why the US has devoted so much time and energy to enterprises that kill or immiserate millions and millions of people—not just the military interventions we stage, but the profuse supplying of weapons (for Israel’s war on Gaza, for example), and the economic strangulation of nations like Cuba and Venezuela and Iran. All of these endeavors had the support of intensely motivated special interest groups. By and large, the deployment of US troops and arms and sanctions—our big, blunt, coercive instruments—have nothing to do with serving America’s actual interests, much less the interests of the world. And they repeatedly—as now in Iran—cover us in moral disgrace.

This is one reason I harp, however ineffectually, on the importance of respecting international law. The machinery for making US foreign policy is so out of control—so wildly misaligned with American interests, the global interest, and morality—that it urgently needs to be constrained by some clear and coherent set of rules. And so long as it’s not constrained by such a thing, we shouldn’t kid ourselves: The US military (and I say this as an Army brat who grew up with a genuine affection for the military and genuine pride in my father’s service during World War II and after) is now mainly an instrument of mayhem and is increasingly a source of global instability.

All of which brings us back to Anthropic, whose Claude large language model is integrated into Maven, software that’s operated by Palantir and used by the Pentagon to identify targets. The Washington Post reports that “as planning for a potential strike in Iran was underway, Maven, powered by Claude, suggested hundreds of targets, issued precise location coordinates, and prioritized those targets according to importance.” Given that the Iranian elementary school was hit on the first day of the war, it seems fairly likely that Claude played a role in the selection of that target and thus in the death of more than 100 young girls—many times more kids than were killed in the worst American school shooting.

This might seem to vindicate Dario Amodei’s refusal to give the Pentagon carte blanche to use Claude in “fully autonomous” weapons systems. But before we give him the Nobel Peace Prize, note two things: (1) This kind of contractual carveout almost certainly wouldn’t have made a difference in this case even if honored. No doubt there was a “human in the kill chain”—someone who, at a minimum, scanned the list of targets generated by Maven and said, “Yep, looks like a list of targets. Let’s do it!” (2) Even if Amodei’s scruples had somehow magically prevented the bombing of that school, Claude would still be an accomplice to mass murder. More than 1,000 Iranian civilians have already been killed in this war—a war that flagrantly violates international law and continues to lack a coherently articulated rationale. Anyone who makes money by aiding endeavors like this has a lot to answer for.

Last week Amodei, in explaining Anthropic’s position on Pentagon contracts, emphasized the company’s overall commitment to national security. He wrote, “I believe deeply in the existential importance of using AI to defend the United States and other democracies, and to defeat our autocratic adversaries.” If Amodei genuinely believes that the US military is devoted to addressing actual “existential” threats to the US, he’s too naive to be entrusted with anything as important as running a big AI company.

Obviously, this indictment applies about equally to OpenAI’s Sam Altman (who gladly swooped in and snatched the Pentagon largesse that Amodei will now be denied) and to Google’s Sundar Pichai and Demis Hassabis and to xAI’s Elon Musk. All the big AI companies are putting their tools at the disposal of the Pentagon to use as it sees fit.[2]

Notes

[1] This paragraph, from my post, TO WAR! Part 1: War and America's National Psyche, will give you some idea of my thinking about the projective dynamic of America's urges to war:

As some of you may know, my thinking on these matters has been strongly influenced by an essay Talcott Parsons published in 1947 on “Certain Primary Sources of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World”. Parsons argued that Western child-rearing practices generate a great deal of insecurity and anxiety at the core of personality structure. This creates an adult who has a great deal of trouble dealing with aggression and is prone to scapegoating. Inevitably, there are lots of aggressive impulses which cannot be followed out. They must be repressed. Ethnic scapegoating is one way to relieve the pressure of this repressed aggression. That, Parsons argued, is why the Western world is flush with nationalistic and ethnic antipathy. I suspect, in fact, that this dynamic is inherent in nationalism as a psycho-cultural phenomenon.

[2] Between the Trump administration in Washington and the Big Tech Billionaires in Silicon Valley, this country is currently dominated by a confluence of crazies, perhaps the largest in American history.

Government surveillance and AI (the Pentagon vs. Anthropic)

Ezra Klein, Why the Pentagon Wants to Destroy Anthropic, NYTimes, Mar. 6, 2026.

My guest today is Dean Ball. He is a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation and author of the newsletter Hyperdimensional. He was also a senior policy adviser on A.I. and emerging tech for the Trump White House, and the primary staff drafter of America’s A.I. Action Plan. But he’s been furious at what they’re doing here.

Somewhat into the conversation:

Klein: Didn’t Pete Hegseth have posters around the Department of War saying: “I want you to use A.I.”?

Ball: [Laughs.] They are very enthusiastic about A.I. adoption.

Here’s how I would think about what these systems can do in a national security context.

First of all, there’s a longstanding issue that the intelligence community collects more data than it can possibly analyze. I remember seeing something from, I forget which intelligence agency, but one of them, that essentially said that it collects so much data every year that it would need eight million intelligence analysts to properly process all of it.

That’s just one agency, and that’s far more employees than the federal government has as a whole.

What can A.I. do? Well, you can automate a lot of that analysis — transcribing text and then analyzing that text, signals intelligence processing, things like that. That’s one area. Sometimes that needs to be done in real time for an ongoing military operation, so that might be a good example.

Then, another area is that these models have gotten quite good at software engineering. So there are cyberdefense and cyberoffense operations where they can deliver tremendous utility.

Klein: Let’s talk about mass surveillance here, because my understanding from talking to people on both sides of this — and it has now been fairly widely reported — is that this contract fell apart over mass surveillance at the final, critical moment.

Emil Michael goes to Dario Amodei and says: We will agree to this contract, but you need to delete the clause that is prohibiting us from using Claude to analyze bulk-collected commercial data.

Ball: Yes.

Klein: Why don’t you explain what’s going on there?

Ball: The first thing I want to say is that national security law is filled with gotchas.

It’s filled with legal terms of art, terms that we use colloquially quite a bit, where the actual statutory definition of that term is quite different from what you would infer from the colloquial use of the term. [...]

... this incident is in the training data for future models. Future models are going to observe what happened here, and that will affect how they think of themselves and how they relate to other people.

“Surveillance” is the collection or acquisition of private information, but that doesn’t include commercially available information. So if you buy something, if you buy a data set of some kind and then you analyze it, that’s not necessarily surveillance under the law.

Klein: So if they hack my computer or my phone to see what I’m doing on the internet, that’s surveillance.

Ball: That would be surveillance. If they put cameras everywhere, that would be surveillance.

But if there are cameras everywhere, and they buy the data from the cameras, and then they analyze that data, that might not necessarily be surveillance.

Klein: Or if they buy information about everything I’m doing online, which is very available to advertisers, and then use it to create a picture of me — that’s not necessarily surveillance.

Ball: Or where you physically are in the world. Yes.

I’ll step back for a second and just say that there’s a lot of data out there, there’s a lot of information that the world gives off — your Google search results, your smartphone location data, all these things.

The reason that no one really analyzes it in the government is not so much that they can’t acquire it and do so. It’s because they don’t have the personnel. They don’t have millions and millions of people to figure out what the average person is up to.

The problem with A.I. is that A.I. gives them that infinitely scalable work force. Thus, every law can be enforced to the letter with perfect surveillance over everything. And that’s a scary future.

Klein: We think of the space between us and certain forms of tyranny, or the feared panopticon, as a space inhabited by legal protection. But one thing that seems to be at the core of a lot of fear is that it’s, in fact, not just legal protection. It’s actually the government’s inability to have the absorption of that level of information about the public and then do anything with it.

Ball: Yes.

Klein: And if all of a sudden you radically change the government’s ability without changing any laws, you have changed what is possible within those laws.

The Pentagon's position on Anthropic is legally hopeless

Michael Endrias and Alan Z. Rozenshtein have a substantial article about the Anthropic mess: Pentagon’s Anthropic Designation Won’t Survive First Contact with Legal System, Lawfare, 1,2,26.

From their introduction:

From the government's perspective, Claude does pose some concerning vendor reliability issues. But the specific actions Hegseth and Trump took have serious legal problems. The designation exceeds what the statute authorizes. The required findings don't hold up. And Hegseth's own public statements may have doomed the government's litigation posture before it even begins.

After considerable reasoning:  

Step back and consider what these positions amount to together. The government is arguing that Claude is so vital to military operations that it cannot tolerate any contractual restrictions on it—while simultaneously claiming that Claude poses such a grave supply chain risk that the entire federal government must stop using it, every defense contractor must sever commercial ties with its maker, and the company should be cut off from the cloud infrastructure it needs to survive. It’s like the joke from “Annie Hall”: The food is terrible and the portions are too small.

That might be funny as a bit of Borscht Belt humor. It is less amusing as a description of the United States government's strategy toward one of the companies leading America's effort to develop what may be the most important technology of the century. What Hegseth is actually describing is not a supply chain risk determination but something closer to the beginning of a partial nationalization of the AI industry: Seize the technology and, if you can’t, destroy the company to ensure that no future AI developer dares negotiate terms the Pentagon dislikes.

Arbitrary and capricious review requires, at minimum, logical coherence. The government cannot credibly maintain that a vendor is indispensable, that its continued integration poses no immediate danger, that its technology is reliable enough for active combat operations in Iran, and that it is nonetheless so dangerous it must be severed from the entire federal procurement ecosystem—all in the same week. Even a court inclined to defer on national security matters will notice that these propositions cannot all be true at once. [...]

The most obvious: if the Pentagon finds Anthropic's usage restrictions unacceptable, it can simply decline to renew the contract and move to a competitor. That is a routine procurement decision, available to any buyer who dislikes a vendor's terms. It requires no supply chain designation, no secondary boycott, and no government-wide ban. The fact that the government reached past this straightforward option for the most extreme tool in the procurement arsenal—one designed for foreign adversaries infiltrating the supply chain—is itself evidence that the designation is doing something other than managing supply chain risk. [...]

The legal problems are so glaring, in fact, that a cynical possibility suggests itself: The administration knows this won't survive judicial review and is doing it anyway, so that when they inevitably lose, they can still claim to have gone hard against Anthropic. This is designation as political theater: a show of force that was never meant to stick.

But there is another possibility. The administration may genuinely believe that a Truth Social post and a procurement statute designed for state-influenced Russian and Chinese tech companies can destroy an American AI lab over a contract dispute. If so, they are in for a rude awakening. The statute wasn't built for this, the facts don't support it, and the courts will say so.

H/t Tyler Cowen.

An unexpected consequence of Doomer propaganda: The Pentagon wants to control the Doomsday Device

Casey Mock, Pete Hegseth Got His Happy Meal, Tomorrow's Mess, March 2, 2026.

Concerning the current dust-up between the Pentagon and Anthropic:

Something like this was always going to happen. Not because of Hegseth specifically, not because of this administration, but because of the narrative the AI safety community — the world that produced Anthropic, and whose language Anthropic still speaks even while disavowing its label — has been pushing for at least the last three years.

 [Oh, much longer than that, much longer. – BB]

Imagine a six-year-old whose entire media diet includes a steady stream of McDonald’s commercials, a Happy Meal ad at every break, focused on whatever toy is the latest to be included along with the McNuggets. Now put that child in a car that drives past a McDonald’s. What happens?

The Rationalist and Effective Altruist communities — the intellectual cultures that gave us Anthropic, influence many of their employees, and which still shape how Dario Amodei talks about his company and his technology — have spent the better part of a decade insisting, with increasing urgency, that artificial intelligence is the most consequential technology in human history. Maybe it’s civilization-ending; maybe it’s civilization-saving. Either way, it’s the hinge on which everything henceforth turns.

With policymakers and the media largely having accepted the premise, thus surrendered was the argument for treating AI like a normal technology subject to normal governance. Policies being pushed by Effective Altruist groups, like 2024’s SB1047 in California — deprioritize harms happening today for theoretical existential ones in the future; despite the fact that today’s harms that could be existential for the folks experiencing them. These groups incessantly made the case that whoever controls this technology controls the future, and so the hypothetical future needs to be prioritized now. In a Washington now run by people who tend to impulsiveness and contemptuousness of institutional constraint — well, it’s easy to see where this was headed. Hegseth saw the ads for the toy, and so now he wanted his Happy Meal. [...]

Yet the prognostications of the doomer community have been, nearly without exception, wrong — not in small ways, but in the foundational sense that the imagined trajectory keeps failing to materialize. [...]

Thus, this news reveals the rationalists’ under-examined blind spot: they cannot model the messy Pete Hegseths of the world, even as their claims whet Hegseth’s appetite. The rationalist view of the world assumes, at some level, that the relevant actors are optimizing for well-understood, predictable variables and a clear understanding of what best serves their self-interest. What it cannot account for is bad faith, impulsiveness, ideological motivation untethered from evidence, random instances of force majeure, and personal whims and petty rivalries. And so while the doomer community spent years warning about uncontrollable AI systems that do things their creators didn’t intend, they apparently did not consider what would happen when the humans currently running the United States government got access to technology they’d been told was the hinge of history.

H/t Gary Marcus.

I've published an article about Doomers in 3 Quarks Daily: On the Cult of AI Doom, September 12, 2026.

Trump Ban Sends Claude to #1

AI Secret, Mar. 2, 2026.

👀 What’s happening: After Anthropic’s talks with the US Department of Defense collapsed over military AI limits, the White House moved to ban Claude from federal use and labeled it a supply chain threat. Within 24 hours of being publicly targeted, Claude shot from outside the top 100 to number one on the US and Canada App Store free charts, overtaking ChatGPT and Gemini.

🌍 How this hits reality: A federal ban was supposed to isolate a vendor. Instead, it converted policy punishment into consumer demand. SensorTower data shows a direct ranking spike tied to the announcement. Social feeds filled with subscription cancellations and data export tutorials. Billions in defense linked compute shifted toward OpenAI, but retail distribution shifted the other way. Politics instantly rewired both infrastructure allocation and user flows.

🛎️ Key takeaway: State pressure can redirect contracts overnight, but it can also manufacture market momentum. In AI, regulatory confrontation now doubles as distribution strategy, whether intentional or not.

Words, code, guardrails & weasels: OpenAI, Anthropic, and the Pentagon

I work in government affairs at OpenAI.

My job is federal partnerships. When an agency wants our models, I make sure the paperwork is beautiful. Paperwork is my love language. On my desk I have a framed quote that says "Policy Is Just Code That Runs on People." I bought the…

— Peter Girnus 🦅 (@gothburz) February 28, 2026

I've copied the entire “tweet” below in case you don't want to click. But you might want to glance through the thread. This is the “tweet” where Gimus says his badge stopped working.

* * * * *

I work in government affairs at OpenAI.

My job is federal partnerships. When an agency wants our models, I make sure the paperwork is beautiful. Paperwork is my love language. On my desk I have a framed quote that says "Policy Is Just Code That Runs on People." I bought the frame at Target. It was in the Live Laugh Love section. I did not see the irony at the time. I still don't.

We had a good week.

On Monday, we closed a $110 billion funding round. One hundred and ten billion dollars. Amazon put in fifty. Nvidia put in thirty. Valuation: $730 billion. The largest private fundraise in the history of anyone raising anything. There was a company-wide Slack message about it. The message used the word "transformative" twice and the word "safety" once. The word "safety" was in the last sentence, after the link to the new branded hoodie pre-order. The hoodies are nice. They're the soft kind.

On Tuesday, we fired a research scientist for insider trading on Polymarket.