Thursday, June 18, 2026

Tyler Cowen, Tycho Brahe & Rank Shift @3QD

I’ve got a new paper at 3 Quarks Daily:

Tyler Cowen is the Tycho Brahe of Economics

It came about as a side effect of my writing and thinking about Cowen’s new monograph, Tyler Cowen, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026). I was interacting with Marge, the AI attached to the online text of the monograph, when I remarked: “So, he’s the Tycho Brahe of economics.” Marge replied:

That's a sharp analogy. Brahe had the best observational data of his era, ran an extraordinary research enterprise on Hven, trained Kepler who then used Brahe's own data to refute the model Brahe himself believed in. [...] Brahe couldn't make the conceptual leap to heliocentrism despite having everything he needed to do so — his intuitions were too deeply formed in the Ptolemaic rank. But he was indispensable to the transition precisely because of his institutional energy, his data gathering, his willingness to fund and train the next generation.

Emergent Ventures is Hven. Tyler is gathering the data — the people, the ideas, the unconventional bets — that someone with different intuitions will synthesize into a framework he himself can't quite reach. The book is his Tychonic system: a genuine attempt at synthesis that's more sophisticated than what came before, that captures real phenomena, but that preserves the central commitment — equilibrium, marginalism, the whole apparatus — that the next rank will have to abandon.

My first impulse was to put that observation in my introduction to the overall series of blog posts when I gathered them into a single document. But, after thinking things over, I decided that it would be more interesting to write it up as a stand-alone document, one I could publish in 3QD. So that’s what I did.

Now, if you’ve been following the series of blog posts, you know that I write quite a bit about the theory of cultural ranks that David Hays and I developed in the 1990s. I didn’t see any need to mention that in the 3QD article, but now that it’s been published I see that it’s quite directly relevant. One problem with the theory as Hays and I wrote about it, is that it’s easy to come away with the idea that the shift from one rank to another is a step function. That’s not at all the case, such shifts take decades and even centuries. But it was all we could do simply to articular the idea of different cognitive ranks.

However, this particular comparison, between Tyler Cowen, an economist in the 21st century, and Tycho Brahe, an astronomer from the 16th century, is about rank shift. Tycho was participating in the transition from a Rank 2 model of the solar system, the geocentric model inherited from Ptolomy, and the Rank 3 model, initiated by Copernicus. Cowen is participating in the shift from Rank 4 economics, which is the focus of his monograph, to a possible Rank 5 economics, which doesn’t quite exist yet. But, who knows what the future will bring?

* * * * * *

You can download a PDF:

LLMs are not enough [LeCun]

English translation is available at the link. 

Orange, yellow, yellow, orange, red

The world's first trillionaire racist [Musk]

Toby Buckle, Greg Sargent, Elon Musk’s Race War Just Took Darker Turn—Time for a Global Response, The New Republic, June 17, 2026.

If you were on the verge of becoming the first trillionaire in human history, with the press breathlessly reporting on your every move, that would probably be your focus. Yet in the days before SpaceX’s initial public offering vaulted Musk into the 13-digit wealth club, the tech mogul’s mind was elsewhere—a white man in Belfast had been viciously stabbed by a Sudanese immigrant, and it provided Musk an opening.

In numerous social media postings, Musk highlighted the crime in starkly racist terms. Several nights of violent anti-immigrant pogroms orchestrated by fascist mobs followed. It was a telling confluence of events: Musk’s extraordinary wealth is fueled by investors’ bedazzlement at his techno-utopian schemes. But the Belfast conflagration revealed the other side of his future vision: his belief that the white populations of the world must violently subjugate the nonwhite enemy in what he sees as a multicontinental, Armageddon-like Total War for global racial supremacy.

As the bedlam raged in Belfast after the stabbing—resulting in far-right rioters torching cars, buses, and even the homes of immigrants—Musk egged it on. Using X—the platform he acquired precisely for moments like these—he posted locations for groups of rioters to congregate. He elevated vile, overtly fascist and white-supremacist exhortations. When one far-right British politician called for the prosecution of officials who “placed dangerous third world savages in our communities,” Musk replied: “This is the way.” [...]

In a very real sense, the fires in Belfast illuminate the emerging outlines of that coming struggle. Musk’s involvement in British politics has tracked with his growing fantasies about global race war.

Back at home:

In the United States, Musk had already been experimenting with a consistent trope in fascist rhetoric: seizing on a crime committed by an individual member of a minority group and claiming that it shows the innate murderous tendencies of the group as a whole. The real claim here is that these isolated horrific acts “reveal” the whole minority group’s disguised genocidal intent toward white peoples—and suggest that this is why the group has deviously infiltrated white countries and communities.

Western civilization is under attack:

By endorsing Reconquista, Musk is amplifying one of the clarion calls of the European far right and, increasingly, the American right, as well: “remigration.” This is the idea that saving Western civilization (as Musk imagines it) requires the forced expulsion of huge numbers of immigrants, especially Muslims, and even untold numbers of their descendants. In response to a missive about white people potentially becoming a minority in New Zealand, Musk posted recently: “The doom of Western Civilization must be averted!”

A robot-AI utopia:

But the real intent behind Musk’s indictment of “suicidal empathy” appears to be future-focused too. In an interview, Tarnoff points out that Musk’s imagined future of humanoid robots and AI can be squared with his hatred of mass migration. “You reduce your reliance on immigration as a labor source if you automate more labor,” Tarnoff tells us, noting that in this scenario, AI and robots might then be pressed into service to “restrict immigration.”

In this context, we believe it’s not an accident that Musk explicitly denigrated “civilizational suicidal empathy” while his Department of Government Efficiency decimated the budget of USAID, which helped produce hundreds of thousands of deaths abroad. That was a test run: If Musk’s robot-and-AI utopia fails to produce mass abundance for the global poor, and global warming spurs more suffering and more migrations, saving human “civilization” will require dispensing with the empathy gene: It will give us the fortitude to cut loose all that third-world civilizational dead weight.

A national security threat:

Then there’s what a future Democratic Congress can do. The Musk problem will have to be on its agenda in a serious and meaningful way. Claire Finkelstein, a professor of national security law at the University of Pennsylvania, points out a core problem here: His many government contracts, and his access to privileged information, pose a “national security threat,” even as Space X itself is in many ways a “national security asset.” We need to know a lot more about what Musk’s contracts actually translate into in terms of his personal influence inside the government.

There's much more at the link.

Wednesday, June 17, 2026

Dick Cavett interviews Salvador Dali

Inside and out on the light rail

Disclosure Day [Media Notes 184]

Meh. I made it through. I wasn’t hard, except for the seat. I couple of years ago my local theater converted to those recliner seats. I wish they hadn’t. I can never find a position I find really comfortable, so I keep it moving around. I liked to old seats. They had plush cushions and just enough “give.”

Anyhow, back to the movie, Disclosure Day. By the time I decided to see it I knew it was about aliens. Not my favorite. But Spielberg’s done it before. I really liked Close Encounters of the Third Kind and E.T. the Extra Terrestrial; War of the Worlds was OK. So I went. Spielberg.

It was a chase movie, with aliens swirling around in there. That much was obvious. But just who these peoples were and what these agencies were, not at all obvious. They’re just there, doing stuff. But then the two central characters, Daniel Kellner (Josh O. Conner) and Margaret Fairchild (Emily Blunt) didn’t really know who they were or what had happened to them, much less why. And then there’s the Wardex Corporation, some kind of private security firm with deep government ties, they’re pulling all the strings. Except for the ones pulled by the extraterrestrials.

Spoilers ahead.

Anyhow, the world seems to be on the brink of another world war and the good guys and bad guys are messing with Kellner and Fairchild about the aliens while they’re running around wondering “Why me?” And fast cars and chases. There’s lots of talk about empathy and hand-held stick devices that control others and then near the end there’s a flashback when we see Kellner and Fairchild stretched out on tables. Apparently they’ve been abducted and these wand things are ringed around their heads and doing something glowy.

At that point I flashed on Forbidden Planet, from the previous century. There Dr. Morbius uses the Krell mind device to juice up his intelligence with, shall we say, mixed results. Here the results seem better. It’s kind of the inverse. Seventy years, from 1956 to 2026. At the same time I felt echoes of the current moment, where, instead of aliens, we have AIs.

And then there’s the alien, when we finally see it. We’d seen aliens in video tapes. They seem to be the standard “Greys,” short, spindly, with big heads and big eyes. This poor guy was very tall, very spindly, and with a super-large head. It’s a wonder it could stand up at all. But it did, getting up from a wheel chair – where’d they keep it, how, and why? It put one hand on Kellner and the other on Fairchild, and then the scene changes abruptly – but we’re very near the end. I kept thinking, “So very frail and fragile and somehow it caused all this fuss. Does not compute.”

All these loose ends. The whole thing, just hanging in midair, pushed and dragged along by a bunch of breathless chase sequences to keep you from thinking too much. It does not compute. 

* * * * * 

Hoboken streets

Clueless thy name is Zuckerberg

Victor Tangermann, Mark Zuckerberg Orders His Employees to Start Having Fun Again After Brutal Layoffs Culled Their Colleagues, Yahoo!Finance, June 16, 2026.

Morale at Meta has seemingly hit rock bottom.

Employees have been roiling from multiple rounds of major layoffs. Last month alone, the Mark Zuckerberg-led company laid off a whopping 8,000 workers, roughly ten percent of its workforce, as part of its chaotic refocusing efforts around AI.

Many of those who remain are now forced to perform the grunt work to train AI models, weekly busywork that's already driving some of them up the wall, as Wired reports.

In an internal memo to employees on Friday, Zuckerberg attempted to lift their spirits in what appears to be a notable failure to read the room. Specifically, the billionaire promised to host a companywide AI hackathon in July — only to get brutally shut down by workers who were in no mood for such a thing.

Meta has regularly hosted hackathons in the past, but given last month's layoff announcement, the reception was extremely chilly. [...]

For all its employees' pain and suffering, Meta has surprisingly little to show. The company continues to trip over its own feet, struggling to release impressive new AI models as its competitors pull ahead further in the ongoing AI race.

Victor Tangermann, Meta’s Super Expensive New AI Team Is Already a Complete Catastrophe, Yahoo!Finance, June 15, 2026.

Now that Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg's dream of a metaverse has collapsed in on itself, the billionaire has moved onto his next money pit: a wildly expensive "Superintelligence" unit.

But those who've survived several brutal rounds of layoffs at the company aren't exactly thrilled to be part of his new vision for it. As Wired reports, morale within Meta's 6,500-staffer Applied AI team, which was created in March to support the Superintelligence Labs, is hitting rock bottom.

Three employees who spoke to the publication on the condition of anonymity said that the weekly busywork tasks they are being assigned, like generating puzzles to test the reliability of Meta's AI models, is "soul-crushing." [...]

A petition has also been signed by more than 1,600 employees, opposing a draconian new initiative that involves installing software on work computers to track everything employees to, including keystrokes and clicks, data that's then fed to train AI.

Homo economicus on steroids.

Big AI vs. Big Government in the 21st Century

Ross Douthat, The Battle With Anthropic Is the Start of a New Kind of Conflict, NYTimes, June 16, 2026.

The nature of the Anthropic conflict can be swiftly summarized even if the details are in dispute. Two months ago the company declined to publicly release its latest model, Mythos, citing various safety concerns (and hyping the model’s revolutionary power). After previewing Mythos to the U.S. government and certain corporate actors, Anthropic then released Fable, a version of the model with various safety guardrails. Amazon, an Anthropic investor and client, discovered a way to bypass some of those guardrails. This was reported to the White House, Anthropic’s response was deemed unsatisfactory, and the administration used its export-control power to forbid the use of Fable by any foreign national inside the United States and anybody at all outside it — a rule that Anthropic treated as a requirement to shut the new A.I. model down.

That’s where we are now, with the company and the administration negotiating over how to bring back Fable while ongoing leaks to the press paint one or the other side as unreasonable or reckless or ideological and clueless about tech.

Two facets of the conflict:

But beyond the specifics of why, say, the libertarian tech people in the Trump administration distrust the effective-altruist tech people running Anthropic, the kind of conflict we’re seeing here is overdetermined by the trajectory of the A.I. models: There is too much potential power here not to have ongoing, escalating struggles over who actually gets to rule.

The war over Fable previews the two broad forms that this conflict will take. First there is a private-public struggle, where governments grope for a regulatory sweet spot that allows them to maintain a meaningful veto over the A.I. behemoths without killing off their innovative power, while the A.I. companies try to maintain control over their own models and influence over how governments use their innovations.

There is a path here that leads to nationalization in all but name and a path that leads to a kind of de facto corporate takeover of the government, or at least a too-big-to-fail symbiosis. And along the way there may be not just conflicts between presidents and A.I. executives but also increasingly ruthless corporation-on-corporation action, out of fear that the A.I. landscape is winner-take-all to an extent we’ve never seen in capitalism before. [...]

Then alongside the struggle to control A.I. power within American borders, there is the geopolitical struggle to maximize global power (where the only real players are probably the United States and China) and maintain sovereignty (where everyone else is likely to be scrambling to maintain some independence). The use of export controls to shut down Fable presumably reflected U.S. fears of Chinese access to a jailbroken version of the model, but it was also a warning to every other country in the world: If we end up with economy-permeating A.I. models that are made and regulated in America, the American government will control the on-off switch.

There's more at the link.

Tuesday, June 16, 2026

Liszt, Hungarian Rhapsody for 2, Victor Borge and the other one

While you're laughing yourself silly at what you're seeing think about the interpersonal coordination required to pull this off. That's what music is like, all the time.

Thick Objects, High-Dimensional Models, and the New Intuitions [MR #11]

Early in Chapter 4 of his marginalism monograph, “Why Marginalism Will Dwindle, and What Will Replace It?,” Cowen reviews what happened between the late 19th century and now. He then makes his way to a striking example from something called Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (pp. 99-100):

There is a recent working paper which is perhaps more striking yet, by Antoine Didisheim, Shikun (Barry) Ke, Bryan T. Kelly, and Semyon Malamud. They pick up from Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), a well-established idea from financial economics. APT typically looks for “factors” in the data which predict excess returns, and a traditional APT model might have found five or six such factors. Are “inflation” or perhaps “the term structure of interest rates” useful factors? Well, that can be debated, but if so, those results sound pretty intuitive. But those intuitions seem to be disappearing. In a paper by these authors, they apply machine learning methods to look for more factors. As we know, machine learning is very good at finding non-obvious relationships in the data. The largest model they built has 360,000 (!) factors, and it reduces pricing errors by 54.8 percent relative to the classic six-factor model from Fama and French. Bravo to the authors, but what kinds of intuitions do you think possibly can be supported by those 360,000 factors?

That sent me through a loop. I thought about it, consulted Claude, and ended up writing a rather long working paper, On Method: Computational Compressibility in Complex Natural and Cultural Phenomena. I thought about it some more and then went to ChatGPT this time for another long dialog (14K words). I then asked ChatGPT to summarize the dialog. Here’s the prompt I gave it:

Would you summarize the preceding discussion in terms suitable for a blog post? I want it to start with some kind of quick introductory overview and then go on through asset pricing, De Vany on movies, and Jockers on novels in that order. Two things to bridge between asset pricing and movies: 1) Despite the different objects, movies vs. stocks, the objects are both ‘thick’ and the underlying structures are similar to a first approximation though the analytic methods are quite different. 2) Galloway’s remark about stocks as brands connects movies with stocks as thick objects.

I’ve appended that summary below. The title of this post is the one ChatGPT gave to its summary.

* * * * *

We have been circling around a question raised by Tyler Cowen’s recent reflections on economics and artificial intelligence: what happens when the old economic intuitions no longer seem adequate to the objects economists are trying to understand? Cowen’s worry is that marginalist reasoning, once the pride of economics, may have helped create a world too complex for marginalist intuition to master.

That is a real worry, but perhaps not a hopeless one. If we look across asset pricing, movie dynamics, and literary history, a different picture emerges. Machine learning and high-dimensional modeling are not simply replacing human understanding. They are revealing new conceptual objects. Just as telescopes and microscopes disclosed new physical objects in the early modern world, computational models now disclose new relational objects: pricing kernels, heavy-tailed outcome regimes, temporal diagonals in literary space.

The old intuitions are not enough. But the new models may help us build new intuitions.

Asset Pricing: From Marginalism to High-Dimensional Valuation

Classical asset-pricing theory begins with a powerful marginalist intuition: investors require compensation for bearing risk. An asset’s expected return should depend on its exposure to systematic risks. CAPM gave us beta; later factor models added size, value, momentum, profitability, investment, and other variables.

These models are attractive because they are low-dimensional and intuitively graspable. A few named factors are supposed to explain many asset returns. That is the dream: a compact causal vocabulary.

But recent high-dimensional models suggest that the true pricing structure may not be compressible into five or six factors. The AIPT work we discussed begins with roughly 130 stock characteristics and then generates hundreds of thousands of nonlinear factors. These are used to approximate the market’s pricing kernel, or stochastic discount factor: the hidden valuation structure through which future payoffs are priced under uncertainty.

This is no longer a simple causal story in which one named factor explains one outcome. It is more algorithmic. The model works by probing a vast feature space and finding structure there. The individual factors may not be interpretable as ordinary causes. But the model still has an economic frame: markets price future payoffs, and that pricing process appears to be high-dimensional.

This is where Cowen’s story becomes interesting. Marginalism did not merely explain markets. It helped construct modern finance. Pricing theory made derivatives, securitization, and the decomposition of risk into tradable claims possible. But once those instruments proliferated, they helped create a financial world too complex for the original marginalist intuitions to command.

In short: marginalism may have helped build the world that now requires machine learning to map.

Thick Objects: Stocks, Brands, and Movies

At first glance, financial assets seem very different from movies or novels. A stock is an economic claim; a movie is a cultural artifact. But the distinction begins to blur once we treat both as “thick objects.”

A thick object is not exhausted by one or two measurable properties. It has many dimensions. It is embedded in social interpretation. Its value depends on history, expectation, reputation, performance, and future promise.

Scott Galloway’s remark captures this beautifully: “Stocks are like brands and that is they’re part promise and part performance.” [YouTube, Pivot, May 29, 2026.]

That is a sophisticated observation. A stock is not merely a claim on current earnings. It is a socially circulating judgment about a company’s future. The performance side includes revenue, earnings, margins, growth, debt, liquidity, volatility, and so forth. The promise side includes brand power, technological imagination, managerial credibility, founder charisma, regulatory risk, and collective belief about what the company may become.

That makes stocks resemble brands. A brand is not just a name, logo, or handle. It is a socially stabilized promise. It condenses past performance and future expectation into a recognizable entity.

And that is the bridge to movies. A movie before release is also part promise and part performance. The performance side includes director, stars, genre, budget, studio, distribution, trailers, and reviews. The promise side is what audiences imagine the movie will deliver: spectacle, prestige, emotional satisfaction, social participation, novelty, nostalgia.

So although movies and stocks are different objects, both are thick. Both circulate through populations. Both are interpreted under uncertainty. Both depend on the conversion of signals into expectation and expectation into value.

The analytic methods differ. Asset-pricing models estimate valuation structure. Movie models track social diffusion and outcome distributions. But to a first approximation, the underlying situation is structurally similar: complex objects move through fields of collective judgment.

Newport Mall in Jersey City

In brains of Spanish-English bilinguals grammar is embodied in shared tissue

Xuanyi Jessica Chen and Esti Blanco-Elorrieta, A Shared Neural Mechanism for Abstract Grammatical Computations Across Languages in Bilinguals, The Journal of Neuroscience, June 15, 2026.

Abstract: A central question in cognitive neuroscience is how the brain implements abstract computations that must generalize across superficially different inputs. Language provides a strong test case: the same grammatical operation, such as pluralization, can be realized through distinct rules and forms across languages. Whether such transformations rely on language-specific neural systems or on abstract mechanisms that generalize across linguistic contexts remains unresolved. Crucially, these transformations must be computed online and integrated into speech planning within a tightly constrained time window. Using magnetoencephalography (MEG), we tracked the millisecond dynamics of grammatical word-form transformations during semi-naturalistic phrase completion in humans of both sexes. Highly proficient Spanish–English bilinguals produced singular and plural noun forms in both languages in a design that fully orthogonalized semantic number, phonological changes, grammatical inflection and produced language. Adjusting words to fit their grammatical context engaged a left-lateralized fronto-temporal network beginning ∼100 ms after cue onset. Multivariate decoding revealed that the neural patterns supporting this computation generalized across languages, across different surface plural forms, and to pseudowords, demonstrating that abstractly equivalent operations are instantiated in the same neural substrates despite differences in linguistic form. Together, these findings provide time-resolved neural evidence for a language-general computational mechanism, showing that the brain implements grammatical transformations as abstract, generative operations. More broadly, they show how bilingualism can be used to probe general principles of neural organization, revealing how abstract computations may be shared and reused across representational systems.

Significance Statement: Human language relies on the ability to modify words to convey information like number and tense, but languages vary widely in how these transformations are implemented. This variation raises a fundamental question in cognitive neuroscience: do such transformations depend on language-specific neural systems, or are they processed by abstract neural mechanisms that generalize across languages? We demonstrate that Spanish–English bilinguals engage a shared left frontal–temporal network when producing grammatically appropriate forms in both languages. This common neural signature emerges early during speech planning and even generalizes to novel words. These findings indicate that the brain builds abstract, reusable neural mechanisms, consistent with models where language is organized by computational principles rather than by language-specific systems.

Here's an article in the NYTimes about these results: K. R. Callaway, How Does One Brain Speak Two Languages?, NYTimes, June 15, 2026.

When deciding how to make a word singular or plural, for instance, bilingual people exhibit strikingly similar brain activity regardless of whether they are speaking in their first or second language.

“It wasn’t obvious that it was going to be so shared,” said Esti Blanco-Elorrieta, a psychologist and neuroscientist at New York University and an author of the study, which was published on Monday in the journal JNeurosci. “I think this is arguably one of the first very fine-grained findings of how truly integrated two languages in the brain are.”

Early research viewed bilingualism as an “add on” or “disruption” to the processing of one’s native language, said Judith Kroll, a psycholinguist at the University of California, Irvine who was not involved in the new study.

Subsequent studies have found that bilingual brains tend to display physical differences, such as more efficient white matter and changes to the gray matter, and to perform better on memory and concentration tasks.

Now scientists are probing further, to understand whether core aspects of the brain’s neural network does double or triple duty to process multiple languages.

A single grammatical engine:

The finding is in line with other initial results in this area, said Mirjana Bozic, a cognitive neuroscientist at the University of Cambridge who was not involved in the study. For instance, the new study provided additional evidence that the front left side of the brain was typically involved in processing the grammatical structure of sentences across different languages. On the whole, Dr. Blanco-Elorrieta said in a news release, a single “grammatical engine” in the brain appeared capable of powering multiple languages at once.

Dr. Bozic said that the find, although not surprising, was “highly informative, providing elegant and convincing evidence that bilingual speakers rely on shared neural mechanisms. She added, “One question that remains is how far these findings generalize across language pairs that differ more substantially.”

Monday, June 15, 2026

Claude Code is 98% traditional computer code

John Quiggin on the SpaceX IPO

At Crooked Timber, June 15, 2026.

The SpaceX IPO, valuing a motley collection of dubious business at over a trillion dollars, marks the abandonment of the Efficient (financial) Markets Hypothesis, one of the zombie ideas I criticised in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Not only do financial markets fail in the task of valuing assets accurately, but the institutional structures that are supposed to make them work have given up trying.

This was prefigured by the rise of Bitcoin and other forms of crypto. Revealingly, no one any longer uses the term “cryptocurrency” – these assets are never used as currency in ordinary transactions, and even their illicit uses seem to have faded. Rather, Bitcoin is valuable solely because it is valued. As I pointed out back in 2018, (free from paywall here) once this logic is accepted, it can be applied to financial assets more generally, and particularly to stock markets. [...]

It’s only with SpaceX that we can see the complete abandonment of any pretence at rationality. In the case of SpaceX, I was struck by Dave Karpf’s observation that Musk’s wealth in 2020 was “only” $24 billion. Everything of value in his career (Tesla cars, batteries, Starlink) had been achieved by then, and everything he has touched since then has been a disaster (Xitter, Cybertruck, robotaxis, Starship). Yet his wealth has multiplied 50 times over).

In support of the IPO, Goldman Sachs has put its name to the claim that the company will grow 100 times over by 2030. This is patently absurd. Nothing in Musk’s ragbag of assets has this kind of potential. [...]

The comprehensive corruption of the financial system confirms me in the view that the USA is one big grift. Not just the financial system, but politically and militarily as well. But that’s a topic for another day.

How'd that happen?

Sunday, June 14, 2026

Masterful control of all ten digits

A sophisticated take on the AI bubble argument

GeometricInvestor has a longish analysis of money flow and investment in the AI business, The AI Capex Ledger: Who Pays, Who Earns, and What the Bond Market Is Missing, June 12,2026.

The opening paragraphs:

The AI debate is stuck on the wrong question.

The question is not whether AI is a bubble. Nor is it whether NVIDIA is expensive, whether Michael Burry is early again, or whether productivity gains will eventually lower inflation. The better question is an accounting one: who needs to earn what return for the AI capex cycle to make sense?

At the bottom of the stack, GPU, HBM, networking, power, and cooling suppliers are already earning. The capex is real. The checks have cleared. That was the first phase of the trade.

The harder question sits one layer above. Hyperscalers and neoclouds are converting capital into compute. Compute becomes tokens. Tokens must become revenue. Revenue must become gross profit after depreciation, power, financing, and model costs. And finally, the buyers of those tokens must earn a return high enough to keep spending.

Only then does AI become a true macro productivity shock rather than a capital-spending boom with better branding.

Then comes the long analysis, followed by these concluding remarks:

The AI cycle will not be resolved by asking whether GPUs are expensive or whether chatbots are useful. It will be resolved by a chain of returns.

Can infrastructure suppliers earn margins without oversupply?

Can hyperscalers and neoclouds sell enough tokens to cover depreciation, power, financing, and obsolescence?

Can enterprises earn more from those tokens than they spend?

Can the economy convert those firm-level returns into productivity growth?

And if it can — does the bond market understand that higher productivity may mean a higher neutral rate, not just lower inflation?

That is the real AI macro debate. Each layer has a hurdle, and each hurdle has a date with evidence. The next time an AI headline crosses your screen, skip the bubble question and ask the ledger question: which layer is this, and what return does it need?

The framework carries its own falsifier, as it should: monetizable AI revenue clearing the hurdle band for years while aggregate productivity and corporate operating leverage outside the supplier base stay flat. That would mean buyers funding sellers indefinitely without a return — the one thing this piece says cannot last.

The first phase was about capex. The next phase is about returns.

H/t Tyler Cowen.

Plantain lily [colour]

Ezra Klein contra (extreme) Homo economicus [Don't torture pigs]

Ezra Klein, What the Cult of Efficiency Costs Us, NYTimes, June 14, 2026.

The opening:

Chris Murphy, the Democratic senator from Connecticut, offered the graduates of Wesleyan University wise counsel in his commencement speech a few weeks back. “You are about to step out into a world that prizes efficiency and the annihilation of drift and friction above all else,” he said. “Our entire economy is built on rewarding companies that are efficient at making a profit, not based upon how they treat their workers, the social value of their product or the impact they have on the community.”

“You didn’t design this world,” he continued. “You didn’t choose it. But you will live with the consequences of this cult of efficiency. And you will have to choose which side you are on.”

Efficiency inflicted on pigs:

In 2016 and 2018, voters in Massachusetts and California passed ballot initiatives banning, among other things, the sale of pork from pigs confined in gestation crates. These crates confine breeding sows — large animals, often 400 to 500 pounds — in two-by-seven-foot cages in which they cannot so much as turn around, much less root or socialize. Because sows are often reimpregnated about a month after their piglets are born, they can spend years of their lives in these crates.

I watched, in the interest of fairness, a video from an arm of the National Pork Board on why gestation crates are good for pigs. It features row upon row of sows penned between bars so narrow they cannot turn around. It is no way for any animal to live, particularly not one as smart and as social as a pig.

There are studies I can cite on the psychic and physical violence these crates inflict on pigs — the elevated cortisol levels, the sores, the obsessive biting of metal bars — but I think the way Kristof puts it is simpler and more honest: “Think of your dog enduring what pigs face, and you realize that the moral cost is incalculable.” The difference between dogs and pigs is neither their intelligence nor their sentience. It is our willingness to admit their intelligence and their sentience. It is our decision to extend them our compassion and concern.

Homo economicus:

In traditional economics, prices are the informational lifeblood of an economy: They reveal the cost of materials and labor, the balance of supply and demand. But much can be hidden in prices. Perhaps it is artificially low because waste is being dumped into the rivers or workers are being robbed of their wages or the burden is borne by animals that will spend years of their lives without the comfort of their herd or the ability to feel grass beneath their hooves or turning around when curious about a sound. When that happens, we have sacrificed compassion for cost.

Most of us know by now that the lives animals lead in factory farms are often hideous. A 2019 survey by the Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future found that a majority of Americans wanted stronger oversight of confined animal feeding operations and a plurality wanted a ban on new ones. Those numbers were even higher when the same pollsters asked Iowans and North Carolinians, where majorities favored a ban on new concentrated animal feeding operations, in part because these operations often impose terrible costs on the human beings who live near them.

There's much more at the link.

Plantain lily [greyscale]

Saturday, June 13, 2026

Burton “Random Walk” Malkiel on SpaceX’s IPO and the poor upside potential for the stock

Burton Malkiel, best known for his 1973 book, A Random Walk Down Wall Street, has some interesting remarks in the NYTimes for those who are wary of being stuck with a stake on SpaceX (and perhaps OpenAI and Anthropic as well) as a consequence of having index funds in their 401(k).

Given that so many millions of Americans are suddenly having SpaceX shares foisted upon them, I understand why some financial experts are criticizing the practice of index investing itself. Right now, just a handful of A.I.-related stocks represent almost half the value of the total stock market index. If A.I. stocks collapse, so will the worth of your index fund.

This is the paragraph I find particularly interesting:

Unlike prior initial public offerings, SpaceX shares are already so expensive there isn’t a lot of upside potential left. When Facebook, now Meta, went public in 2012 with a valuation of $100 billion, shareholders were able to benefit financially from its growth to a $1.5 trillion giant. Amazon went public with a generous (for 1997) valuation of $440 million, and shareholders profited as it grew into a $2.5 trillion behemoth. Not so SpaceX. Because it was owned by private investors for so long, much of the gain will immediately be handed off to its venture and private equity backers rather than preserved for new investors.

He goes on to point this as well:

Moreover, unlike other public companies, SpaceX is employing a dual class share structure that gives Elon Musk essentially complete control with no independent oversight. Public shareholders will, comparatively, have no voice in corporate decisions. Mr. Musk controls multiple related corporate enterprises, raising the possibility of conflicted transactions within the Musk ecosystem. Many investors will be uncomfortable giving him so much power and holding an index fund in which he has so large a share.

He then says:

These are all legitimate reasons to worry. But in my view, it would be a mistake to abandon an indexing strategy. Timing the market is impossible. Yes, the stock market is unusually concentrated today, and it is likely to get even more so over the next period with Anthropic and OpenAI looking to go public soon.

You can read the rest of the article, if you wish. But it's that paragraph about upside potential that caught my attention.

More Hockney, a cat, wall of blue, and leafy branches

Day liliys over the Budha

From Jagged AI to Scaling, Yevick, Natural Intelligence, and Beyond...

I had a very interesting conversation with Google's AI – by which I mean the AI on the standard search page. I asked Claude to summarize it. Pay particular attention to the penultimate paragraph about alignment. 

An exercise for the reader: What are the implications of this conversation for the idea of super-intelligence? In the words of Aretha Franklin, “Who’s zoomin’ who?”

 

 

 

Overview

This is a transcript of a wide-ranging conversation between you and Google's AI, structured around the concept of AI's "jagged" capabilities — the phenomenon where AI excels at complex tasks but stumbles on apparently simple ones, with no predictable boundary between the two.

The Arc of the Conversation

The document moves through ten topics:

Jagged Skills & Moravec's Paradox — You open by asking about the origins of the "jagged frontier" concept (traced to Harvard Business School researchers in 2023, popularized by Ethan Mollick). You immediately point out that this is essentially a replay of Moravec's Paradox from the 1980s — the AI agrees, but notes some differences: the modern jaggedness is intra-domain (within knowledge work) rather than the macro divide between symbolic reasoning and physical/perceptual tasks, and human intuition about where the failures will occur has now completely broken down.

Cyborg & Centaur Workflows — You steer toward practical implications. The AI explains two human-AI collaboration strategies: Centaurs (clean division of labor, human handles reality, AI handles execution) and Cyborgs (deeply interleaved real-time co-authorship). You frame the underlying issue as being about the relationship between a computing system and the nature of the world it computes over — a framing the AI endorses.

Hallucinations — The AI argues (and you presumably agree) that "confabulation" is a better term than "hallucination" for LLM errors: like neurologically impaired patients, the LLM's narrative engine runs flawlessly while its error-checking against reality is absent.

Scaling — Discussion of whether scaling (more data, more compute) will smooth the jagged frontier. The AI describes the "scaling wall" now being hit: data drought, model collapse from training on AI-generated content, and diminishing returns — pointing toward structural, not just quantitative, limits.

Miriam Yevick & Holographic Logic — Here your own intellectual history enters the conversation. You surface Yevick's 1975 Pattern Recognition paper on Holographic vs. fourier logic, which you discovered in 1978 via a comment she made on a Haugeland article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. The AI treats this as a profound, forgotten piece of computer science that precisely explains the mechanism behind the jagged frontier.

Principles and Development of Natural Intelligence (1988) — You describe how you and David Hays incorporated Yevick's insight into your 1988 Journal of Social and Biological Structures paper. The AI discusses how that paper, if injected into current debates, would reframe LLMs as having "hacked" the top-level indexing principle of intelligence (via language) while lacking the foundational lower layers — modal, feedback, Gestalt — that ground intelligence in reality. Hallucinations become not a bug but an architectural inevitability.

Ramesh & Wikipedia — You mention your ongoing collaboration with Ramesh Viswanathan (machine vision, Goethe University Frankfurt) and the Wikipedia entry on Yevick that now exists, connecting her Fourier logic to David Bohm's holonomic brain theory and your 1988 paper.

ChatGPT Tells Stories — You describe your working paper "ChatGPT Tells Stories, and a Note about Reverse Engineering," in which you apply Lévi-Strauss's structuralist transformation method to probe ChatGPT's internal constraints. Ramesh has students working with the data. The AI frames this as demanding a "top-down behavioral interpretability" that the industry's current bottom-up neuron-level approach entirely misses.

Suggestions for Students — The AI offers three research frameworks for your upcoming Zoom with Ramesh's students: a "Narrative Stress-Test" benchmark, 3D vector-space visualization of holographic ripple effects through story transformations, and a co-authored manifesto paper for venues like NeurIPS.

AI Researchers Need Their Alignment Adjusted — You wrap up with a characteristically dry observation: it's "fitting and ironic" that LLM-based chatbots can understand Yevick's work better than the engineers who built them. You suggest the researchers need their alignment adjusted — and sign off to get breakfast.

The Document's Character

It reads as both an intellectual exploration and a kind of vindication narrative — the AI functions as a surprisingly capable interlocutor for ideas that the mainstream AI research community has largely overlooked. The irony you close with is the document's real punchline: the systems built on these mathematical structures understand them better than their builders do.

Late Hockney

Friday, June 12, 2026

Ghatam Quartet (Clay Pots)

DeepSeek Q & A, John Searle, Proprietor

Our alien overlords have arrived and their name is “Elon” [Starbase, TX]

Amy Gamerman, Elon Musk Is Colonizing Earth, NYTimes, June 12, 2026

In this town, almost every communal space is private property. A company controlled by the world’s richest man owns nearly all of it. He shapes its future.

This is Starbase, Texas, the city that Elon Musk built on America’s ragged hem at the southern border as the home for SpaceX, his aerospace and artificial intelligence company. Locals describe a highly secretive environment overseen by a company-affiliated city commission that rubber-stamps Mr. Musk’s vision, a place where even kindergartners are guided by his philosophies. Starbase is the newest manifestation of Mr. Musk’s political power. It is a beta test for a rising oligarchy that seems intent on transforming America from the inside out. [...]

On May 12, Mr. Musk announced on social media that “SpaceX is considering several locations domestically and internationally to build the world’s most advanced spaceports!” His announcement came on the heels of reports that a large parcel of land in coastal Louisiana may have been acquired by an anonymous aerospace company, widely rumored to be SpaceX.

These spaceports will allow Mr. Musk to create his own reality for other people to live in. He doesn’t need Mars. Mr. Musk has already built a colony of his own.

Mr. Musk often cites “Star Trek” as inspiration for founding SpaceX. “We want to make ‘Star Trek’ real, OK?” he said in January. But Starbase bears less similarity to the enlightened wonderland depicted in that 1960s television show than it does to the autocratic company towns of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Like Mr. Musk, the industrial titans of that era built their own private fiefs, not only to cement control over workers, but to realize their vision of an ideal society.

Perhaps the most grandiose company town of them all was Fordlandia, the sprawling city that Henry Ford built in the Brazilian rainforest to grow rubber trees. Fordlandia was Ford’s personal Utopia, an expression of his social views, his personal predilections and even his vegetarianism. Workers were forced to subsist on a diet heavy on brown rice, oatmeal and canned peaches, as detailed in Greg Grandin’s “Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City.” For amusement, there was square dancing — Ford loved square dancing — and poetry readings.

Fordlandia’s ghost haunts Mr. Musk’s colony. Corporate control is so all-encompassing at Starbase that a warning on the menu at its Astropub restaurant alerts diners to the “confidentiality and proprietary nature” of the fare. Students at its private Ad Astra school are guided on “hands-on experiential missions.” The interplanetary mission is even written into the job description for a facilities supervisor overseeing waste management and janitorial needs.

There's much more at the link. It's not pretty reading.

Friday Fotos: Some things I saw in May

The intelligent AI-based instruments of the future

Judah Goldfeder, Philippe Wyder, Yann LeCun, Ravid Shwartz-Ziv, AI Must Embrace Specialization via Superhuman Adaptable Intelligence, arXiv:2602.23643v1 [cs.AI], 2026.

Abstract: Everyone from AI executives and researchers to doomsayers, politicians, and activists is talking about Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Yet, they often don't seem to agree on its exact definition. One common definition of AGI is an AI that can do everything a human can do, but are humans truly general? In this paper, we address what's wrong with our conception of AGI, and why, even in its most coherent formulation, it is a flawed concept to describe the future of AI. We explore whether the most widely accepted definitions are plausible, useful, and truly general. We argue that AI must embrace specialization, rather than strive for generality, and in its specialization strive for superhuman performance, and introduce Superhuman Adaptable Intelligence (SAI). SAI is defined as intelligence that can learn to exceed humans at anything important that we can do, and that can fill in the skill gaps where humans are incapable. We then lay out how SAI can help hone a discussion around AI that was blurred by an overloaded definition of AGI, and extrapolate the implications of using it as a guide for the future.

In view of the articles in this special double-issue of Dædalus, AI & Science: What Is the Future of Discovery?, I must agree. Yes, the ascent of Mount AGI will continue, but at the same time we will be developing more specialized AIs for specific tasks, AlphaFold is one example, but it is only one of many. Back in 1990 David Hays and I published an article in which we asserted, "Sooner or later we will create a technology capable of doing what, heretofore, only we could." We didn't put any dates on that, nor did we envision today's technology, but we could see the long-term trend. And that trend certainly includes specialized AIs. Think of them as intelligent instruments. 

[Hmmm... Why don't we think of trains, planes, and cars as superhuman vehicular transportation (SVT)?]

The computational capacity of a single biological neuron is very large

Here's the abstract of that article:

Cortical pyramidal neurons possess elaborate dendritic trees with diverse nonlinear membrane conductances and thousands of plastic synapses, suggesting substantial computational capabilities at the single-cell level. Yet, what can a neuron compute remains an open question, largely due to the lack of a systematic framework to quantify its computational capabilities. We introduce TwinProp, a digital-twin-based backpropagation algorithm that enables gradient-based optimization of synaptic strengths and dendritic locations in detailed neuron models via a millisecond-accurate deep neural network (DNN). Using TwinProp, we demonstrate that a detailed model of rat layer 5 pyramidal cell (L5PC) can perform naturalistic image and audio classification tasks at a remarkably high accuracy, significantly surpassing perceptron and leaky integrate-and-fire baselines. The same neuron solves high-dimensional nonlinear problems, including exclusive-or (XOR), 10-bit parity, and random Boolean tasks, demonstrating capabilities typically attributed to multilayer networks. Mechanistically, increasing task complexity recruits distributed dendritic nonlinearities, including NMDA- and voltage-dependent mechanisms; removing these or collapsing dendritic structure markedly impairs performance. These findings identify dendrites as a substrate for high-order feature binding and position single cortical pyramidal neurons as powerful, noise-robust, general-purpose analog computational units. Our results offer testable in vivo predictions and provide a systematic framework linking cellular morpho-electrical properties to computation in both brains and artificial systems.