Sunday, May 31, 2026

A Public Agenda for AI [Ezra Klein]

Ezra Klein, We Have to Take the Future of A.I. Into Our Own Hands, NYTimes, May 31. 2026. Here's Claude's summary of the article:

Ezra Klein's piece argues that the public conversation about AI has been almost entirely focused on preventing harms, while largely ignoring a different question: how can AI actively benefit the public?

He acknowledges the skeptical climate — polling is poor, data centers are controversial, and Pope Leo XIV's first encyclical addressed AI's dangers — but insists that since AI is here regardless, the meaningful question is how it gets directed and for whom.

His core argument is that AI's public benefits won't happen automatically. They require deliberate investment in data, financing, and compute. He points to impressive examples of AI solving hard scientific problems (protein folding, pancreatic cancer detection, a new pulmonary fibrosis drug, weather prediction) to show what's possible when it's properly deployed — but notes these successes depended on pre-existing public infrastructure like the Protein Data Bank, itself publicly funded since the 1970s.

His proposed agenda includes: a publicly controlled frontier-level AI model; subsidized compute access for universities and public agencies (to close the widening gap between institutions like Goldman Sachs and public institutions); government-guaranteed markets for AI-driven solutions to public problems (analogous to Operation Warp Speed); using AI to help citizens navigate government services; and funding the creation of clean, novel public datasets.

He closes by noting that we've been consumed by what we fear AI will do to us, at the expense of asking what we hope it will do for us.

125 years of women's fashion in America

Sites of construction in Northwest Hoboken

The Pope and the AI

H/t Tyler Cowen

Saturday, May 30, 2026

Ai gives mathematicians the freedom to try crazy ideas

Branding: From economics to culture [& econometrics to digital humanities]

I’ve been thinking about the economics issues that Tyler Cowen raises early in the last chapter of his marginalism monograph, “Why Marginalism Will Dwindle, and What Will Replace It?” An asset pricing model he discussed there had already precipitated me into a working paper of a methodological and philosophical nature, On Method: Computational Compressibility in Complex Natural and Cultural Phenomena, so that material was lurking in the background when I was watching a recent podcast by Kara Swisher and Scott Galloway. Galloway made a remark that resonated through that material: “Stocks are like brands and that is they’re part promise and part performance.”

That remark connected the assets in the pricing model, which are opaque to me, to things I’ve thought a great deal about, movies and novels. In that methodological paper I’d discussed Arthur DeVany’s work on Hollywood movies and Matthew Jocker’s work on the 19th century Anglophone novel. “If,” as Galloway remarked, “stocks are part promise and part performance, then, sure, they’re like moves and novels, too.” I made the connection on pure intuition.

I then turned to ChatGPT for help in explicating that intuition. So I issued another prompt into a dialog we’d had about those asset pricing models. I’ve appended that dialog below the asterisks. 

NOTE that I have inserted the larger headings after completing the dialog. Pay particular attention to the italicized comment I inserted after this heading, “Brand as a distinct conceptual object.”

* * * * * 

Stocks as Brands

I recently heard pundit Scott Galloway remark: “Stocks are like brands and that is they’re part promise and part performance.” Explicate that in terms of the discussion we’ve been having.

Galloway’s line is excellent for this discussion because it collapses the apparent distance between financial assets and cultural artifacts. A stock is not merely a claim on earnings. It is also a socially circulating promise about a future.

“Part performance” means the measurable side: revenues, margins, cash flow, debt, profitability, investment, growth, volatility, liquidity, analyst revisions, and so forth. These are the kinds of variables that show up among the 130 stock characteristics in the AIPT setup.

“Part promise” means the symbolic, anticipatory, collectively imagined side: what investors believe the company may become. Tesla is the obvious case: not just cars, but autonomy, energy, robotics, Elon-as-mythic-founder, technological destiny. Nvidia is not just current chip sales, but the promise of AI infrastructure. Apple is not just devices and services, but design trust, ecosystem lock-in, lifestyle aura, and continuity of desire.

That is exactly where stocks begin to look like brands, films, and novels.

A brand is a bundle of past performance plus future expectation. It has delivered something before, and that delivery authorizes a promise: “trust us again.” A stock works similarly. The firm’s past earnings, product history, management behavior, and market position generate a field of expectation. The price is not merely a summary of what the firm has done; it is an evolving collective judgment about what the firm will do.

In asset-pricing language, the “performance” side lives in observable characteristics and realized returns. The “promise” side lives in expectations, risk narratives, optionality, imagined futures, and the willingness of investors to pay now for possible future states. The pricing kernel/SDF is, in a sense, the market’s machinery for weighting those promised futures under uncertainty.

That is why low-dimensional factor models struggle. “Size,” “value,” “profitability,” and “momentum” capture pieces of performance and some traces of promise. But they do not capture the full cultural-cognitive ecology around an asset. The promise is distributed across analyst narratives, founder charisma, institutional herding, macro stories, technological imagination, regulatory fears, and the memory of past booms and crashes. That is a high-dimensional object.

Now compare movies. A movie before release is also part performance and part promise. The performance side includes director, stars, budget, genre, studio, opening screens, advertising. The promise side is what the audience imagines: “this will be the movie everyone talks about,” “this will give me the old Marvel feeling,” “this is the serious adult drama of the season,” “this is the date-night film.” De Vany’s “nobody knows” result follows because the promise cannot be validated until the social system responds. Word of mouth tests the promise.

Novels work the same way over longer historical time. A novel’s “performance” is its textual form: style, topic, genre, plot structure, diction, narrative technique. Its “promise” is the world of value, feeling, recognition, and possibility it offers its readers. Jockers’ 600-dimensional space captures formal and thematic performance, but the temporal diagonal suggests that the promise-world of novels changes over generations. Readers and writers inherit one horizon of expectation and then move it.

So Galloway’s remark helps unify the three domains:

A stock, a movie, and a novel are all promissory artifacts whose fate depends on how populations interpret prior performance as evidence for future value.

The difference is that financial markets price the promise continuously, movies test it sharply after release, and novels disclose it historically across generations.

This also helps explain why the AIPT result is so interesting. A 360,000-factor model is not simply “better math.” It is an attempt to approximate the high-dimensional geometry through which performance becomes promise and promise becomes price. That geometry is too rich for the old factors, just as the historical movement of novels is too rich for a few period labels, and the fate of movies is too rich for stars plus opening weekend.

So yes: stocks are like brands because they are not merely economic objects. They are expectational-cultural objects with cash-flow machinery attached. That is the brave-new-world point. Finance is not leaving culture behind; it is becoming analyzable by the same high-dimensional methods we need for culture.

Thus Galloway’s remark is very sophisticated. He has a podcast with Kara Swisher as well as a podcast (or two) of his own. Judging from his comments he’s a moderately wealthy man, and he made his money on his own. He comes from a modest background. I’d imagine that the comments he makes in his various public-facing venues are among the many signals that get incorporated into the judgments underlying the performances of the assets included in this high-dimensional models.

Yes. That is exactly the recursive loop.

Galloway is not merely commenting on the market from outside it. He is one of the many public-facing interpreters whose remarks enter the informational atmosphere in which assets are judged. His comments become part of the market’s semiotic environment: not hard data like earnings or cash flow, but signals that help shape collective expectations about firms, sectors, founders, brands, technologies, and macro direction.

That is where “stocks are like brands” becomes more than a metaphor. A brand is maintained by distributed talk: advertising, reviews, consumer experience, pundit commentary, memes, scandals, endorsements, complaints, jokes, status associations. A stock is maintained by a comparable but more formalized signal ecology: earnings reports, analyst notes, institutional flows, valuation models, regulatory news, founder behavior, social media, podcasts, CNBC hits, Substack essays, hedge-fund letters, Reddit chatter, and remarks by people like Galloway.

The AIPT model, strictly speaking, is not directly ingesting Galloway’s podcast transcripts. It begins with stock characteristics and then generates many nonlinear transformations of those characteristics into factors. But those characteristics are themselves downstream of an enormous informational process. Prices, momentum, volatility, analyst revisions, liquidity, profitability expectations, and valuation ratios already embody, in compressed form, the effects of countless judgments and signals. The paper’s model uses 130 stock characteristics and expands them into hundreds of thousands of nonlinear factors; that is a way of probing the market’s already-encoded collective cognition.

So, yes: Galloway’s public remarks are among the innumerable micro-signals that may influence the behavior of investors and analysts, which in turn affects price, volume, momentum, volatility, analyst expectations, and eventually the characteristic space that models like AIPT use. His comments may not be individually recoverable in the model, but they are part of the causal soup from which the measurable signals arise.

That also clarifies why his remark is sophisticated. He understands, probably from experience rather than formal theory alone, that markets are not just machines for discounting cash flows. They are machines for pricing credible stories about future performance. The credibility comes partly from past performance, but the price also reflects the market’s belief in the promise.

In our terms:

Performance becomes data.
Promise becomes expectation.
Expectation becomes price.
Price history and firm characteristics become model input.
Model output then feeds back into the interpretive environment.

That is the brave-new-world loop. Financial assets are no longer cleanly separable from culture. They are culturally mediated claims on future cash flows. Or, more compactly: stocks are narrative instruments with accounting attached. 

Brands as a cognitive bridge to culture (movies and novels)

Very interesting, especially for me. I know little about economics or about the stock market (and similar asset markets, e.g. commodities, currency). So these asset pricing models are very abstract indeed. But I know a lot about novels and movies and that gives me a way of grounding De Vany’s work and Jockers’ work. I’ve thought a lot about cultural evolution, and about complex dynamics. Thus their models make intuitive sense to me. Galloway’s remark, and your explication of it, gives me a way of grounding these otherwise opaque asset pricing models.

That is the productive move: you now have a cognitive bridge from a familiar domain to an unfamiliar one.

On the waterfront

Friday, May 29, 2026

The Origins of LLMs – A long tectonic subduction event finally producing a visible volcanic eruption in November 2022

A new working paper. Title above, link, abstract, contents, and introduction below.

Academic.edu: https://www.academia.edu/167895960/The_Origins_of_LLMs_A_long_tectonic_subduction_event_finally_producing_a_visible_volcanic_eruption_in_November_2022

Abstract: Large language models are the result of a rich research tradition stretching back to the 1950s. This tradition involves a network of researcher doing work in the following: classical MT and computational linguistics → symbolic/statistical/network alternatives → associative and distributed memory models → statistical MT and vector-space methods → neural MT → Transformers → LLMs.

Contents

Introduction: The tangled web of ideas resulting in LLMs 1
Google Translate, a capsule history 2
Vector semantics 5
Firth and distributional semantics 7
Contra Cowen 9
Phase shift 11
Kuhnian paradigm shift 13
Associative memory 15
Sydney Lamb and associative memory for PCs 17
Principles and Development of Natural Intelligence 18

Introduction: The tangled web of ideas resulting in LLMs

As part of my ongoing investigation of Tyler Cowen’s recent monograph, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026), I’ve been thinking about large language models (LLMs), which he discusses in Chapter 4, “Why Marginalism Will Dwindle, and What Will Replace It?” For the most part Cowen presents his readers with the Silicon Valley view: Just as Athena emerged fully-formed from the head of Zeus, so large language models emerged fully-formed from Silicon Valley laboratories in November of 2022. And that IS how things appeared to the public at large. After seeing AIs in science fiction movies, and reading about them for years, all of a sudden, here they are, out of nothing, on the web in the form of ChatGPT.

For all practical purposes, Cowen is a member of the public. He may have been following developments for years. Given his interest in chess I’m sure he followed that story at least since IBM’s Deep Blue beat Kasparov in 1997. And AI plays an important role in his 2013 book, Average is Over. Beyond that, he has contacts in Silicon Valley going back I don’t know how long. But this is not his intellectual field, which is centered on economics. It’s one thing to read about it, to talk with researchers and entrepreneurs, it’s something else to conduct research and publish.

I am in a different position. While my Ph.D. is in English Literature, my dissertation – “Cognitive Science and Literary Theory” – is as much about knowledge representation and computational linguistics as it is about literature. I was trained in that are by the late David G. Hays, who was a first-generation researcher in computational linguistics with the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s. For the last three years I’ve been conducting research in the behavior of LLMs and have been collaborating with Ramesh Viswanathan, and expert in machine vision and cognitive science at Goethe University Frankfurt.

THAT, broadly speaking, is my field. While I wouldn’t expect Cowen’s views to be the same as mine, I would have been happier if he had at least acknowledged that there the future of LLMs and their adequacy if a matter of controversy among the experts. He should have at least mentioned Gary Marcus, Yann LeCun, Fei-Fei Li, and Melanie Mitchell. He might even have mentioned that Ilya Sutskever, a student of Geoffrey Hinton who was on the OpenAI team that developed the GPT series, that Sutskever has abandoned the idea that pure scaling is the royal road to artificial general intelligence (AGI, whatever that is). Cowen has done none of this. To read him you’d think that the basic scientific and engineering issues have been settled and it’s full speed ahead – “To infinity and beyond,” to quote Buzz Lightyear.

I don’t know quite what I’m going to say about this in the piece I’m writing for my series on the marginalism monograph. I don’t want to recount the full history, for which this working paper can serve as an outline. At the very least I will point out that matters are by no means settled and that there is a statistical tradition with roots in 1950s linguistics and 1960s document retrieval that can serve as a tertium quid between GOFAI (good old fashioned AR) and computational linguistics on the one hand and neural-network based learning on the other.

A Kuhnian paradigm shift?

On page 14 I have a section entitled, “A Kuhnian paradigm shift, or only an invitation to one?” That’s not the original title, which was simply, “Kuhnian paradigm shift.” Why the change?

Simple. There certainly was a dramatic change in the wake of ChatGPT. But I think that change was mostly institutional, in the deployment of resources, the development of institutions, the proliferation of roles in institutions, and of training. It’s not at all clear to me that there was a Gestalt change in anyone’s conceptions about the nature of intelligence in machines, or in humans for that matter. For it is Gestalt switch, a reconfiguration of understanding, that is the hallmark of a paradigm change in Kuhn’s conception of an intellectual revolution. It is not at all clear to me that there was a widespread change comparable to going from a mentality where one sees the Morning Star and Evening Star as two different entities to a mentality where one sees them as two manifestations of a single entity, the planet Venus.

Perhaps something like that has happened here and there, but I suspect that, for the most part, everyone from the most senior researchers through the general public sees the world as composed of the same kinds of entities as processes as they saw before encountering ChatGPT, or GPT-3. Those who think we’re well on the road to AGI (artificial general intelligence) still think of AGI the way they did in, say, 2015 or 2021, as the case may be. The same is true for those who doubt that we’re on that road. All that is changed is people’s awareness of the behavior displayed by the devices we have created. Their sense of what those devices are, what they deeply and essentially are, that hasn’t changed.

Though it may be under tension. The fact is, whatever any of us believes, we don’t really know why kind of behaviors these devices will be exhibiting next year, two years after that, or in ten years. There are a lot of open questions hanging in the air. I suspect that once those questions are resolved, that is, if and when they are, then we will see genuine changes in mentality.

I regard the matter as open to discovery and investigation.

Beyond all that, well, you can read through the rest of this document, which records a dialog I had with ChatGPT (May 29, 2026) beyond the asterisks. I begin by asking ChatGPT to review the history of Google Translate. Why? Because language is the through line. The computational study of language began in the 1950s with the problem of machine translation, translating a text from one natural language to another. The technique used by LLMs for capturing single-word semantics has its origins in statistical methods for document retrieval that originated in the 1960s and 1970s. Google Translate switched to neural-net technology. A year later the transformer was invented in a Google lab. The transformer, as you know, is the engine used to create current large language models. Google Translate is a natural starting point.

Why most AI healthcare applications are misconceived

From the text:

Yet decades of transactional, episodic, payment-driven infrastructure undermined the patient–physician relationship at the center of health.

Financing models have stripped Primary Care form its primary role.

That said, Healthcare AI will not be won on automation. Winners will likely optimize for three things simultaneously:

  • Outcomes
  • Experience — patient and physician
  • Economic impact on total cost of care long term

But most healthcare AI investments are mispriced because they target short term transactional efficiency, not long term strategic value creation.

I'm thinking that Ribitzky's need to interpreted in terms of idolatry. Why? Because they reduce humans to mechanisms to be optimized rather than being cared-for.

Adam Neely points out the folly of misusing AI to create music

Neeley (16:33): “I hate small-minded people with money who use technology as a cudgel to enforce their terrible taste on the rest of us.”

Neely's page:

Berklee College of Music now teaches classes in AI songwriting, and that's a really dumb idea.

0:00 Intro
0:43 Student Backlash
2:53 Berklee President’s ties to Suno
4:01 “book burning”
5:42 Problem 1 - Branding
8:17 Problem 2 - Berklee is out of touch
11:03 Problem 3 - “AI Music” and Suno
14:11 Problem 4 - People really don’t like AI music

CEO of Suno, Michael Shulman (c. 5:35):

MIKEY: It’s not really enjoyable to make music now. It takes a lot of time. It takes a lot of practice. You need to get really good at an instrument or really good at a piece of production software. I think the majority of people don't enjoy the majority of the time they spend making music.

ADAM: Berklee had better hope that that's not true because its business model - as well as any music school’s - is based on the idea that people like to make music.

In fact, they like it so much that they're willing to spend a lot of money to learn how to do it better.

Suno was created so that people could make music without having to learn to play instruments, to sing, or how to arrange and compose. It was created to circumvent the human process of music-making. This makes use of Suno idolatrous in the technical sense of that word.

On Problem 2, Berklee being out of touch, Neeley points out that Berklee has courses offering to teach students how to use the Metaverse, which Zuckerberg killed in March, 2026.

Friday Fotos: Popeye's at Newport Mall

Idolatry and A.I. [Magnifica humanitas]

Yuval Levin,  Idols of the Valley, The New Atlantis, May 27, 2026.

Levin is commenting on Pope Leo  XIV's recent encyclical, Magnifica humanitas. The following paragraphs are from the last two sections (of five) in Levin's article.

* * * * * 

Our new technologies are neither demons nor idols, and we must make sure to keep them that way. But it is the challenge of idolatry that will be greatest. It increasingly seems to me that the essential text of the era we are entering will be this opening portion of Psalm 115:

Not to us, LORD, not to us
but to your name be the glory,
because of your love and faithfulness.

Why do the nations say,
“Where is their God?”

Our God is in heaven;
and does what he wills.

But their idols are silver and gold,
made by human hands.

They have mouths, but cannot speak,
eyes, but cannot see.

They have ears, but cannot hear,
noses, but cannot smell.

They have hands, but cannot feel,
feet, but cannot walk,
nor can they utter a sound with their throats.

Those who make them will be like them,
and so will all who trust in them.

Ever since I encountered this mysterious poem as a teenager, I have wondered at the image it paints of idolatry, especially in its stunning two final lines. The idols are made to seem human but do not partake of genuine embodied human experience. And both their makers and those who trust in them are destined to become like them — and so less than human — because they elevate them.

These lines have come to seem less mysterious to me in the last few years. They describe precisely the danger to which Pope Leo is pointing. It is the danger of turning our tools into idols, and thereby of becoming little more than tools ourselves. It is a danger that afflicts those who make these idols, and also threatens those who put their trust in them.

The appeal of idols has always been that they offer shortcuts. The God of the Bible demands that you live in a way that forms your mind and heart and soul toward your fullest human potential. This requires hard work but it yields a kind of person both capable and worthy of a flourishing life. The idol offers the material benefits of such a life without that formative work. And if all you care about are the benefits, not the form of your mind, heart, and soul, then the offer is awfully hard to resist. [...]

Such temptations of idolatry are ever-present. We resist them, now as always, by allegiance to a higher truth about ourselves that is as demanding as it is liberating. And we resist more actively and assertively, too — with the help of rules of conduct that constrain our appetites, of days of rest that offer us relief from the demands that expose us to temptation, and of formative disciplines of the soul embodied in family, faith, community, learning, work, and leisure toward which we are drawn by well-ordered loves.

All of these require us to choose the long, demanding, formative way through life. But various idolatries offer us shortcuts that promise the benefit without the work: Just turn yourself into a tool and you will be more productive without more effort. This is of course just what Magnifica Humanitas warns of. It is what AI at its most idolatrous and dangerous can offer. That doesn’t have to be what AI is in our experience — not at all. But it can be if we aren’t careful.

Thursday, May 28, 2026

Negative ROI on AI

The fountain in Shipyard Park, plus geese

Alexandria as the Manhattan of the ancient world, Rome, writing (Rank 2 culture)

Tyler Cowen, Toby Wilkinson on Ptolemaic Egypt and the First Great Commercial Civilization (Ep. 278), May 27, 2026.

Toby Wilkinson is one of the world’s leading Egyptologists, whose books have ranged across the full sweep of pharaonic history. His latest, The Last Dynasty: Ancient Egypt from Alexander the Great to Cleopatra, covers the 300-year Ptolemaic period — stranger and more modern-feeling than the Egypt of the pyramids, built around commerce and cosmopolitanism rather than divine kingship, and home to the greatest concentration of scientific talent the ancient world ever saw.

Tyler and Toby cover how Alexander took over the empire almost without a fight, why Alexandria became the Manhattan of the ancient world, whether the era was as philosophically fertile as it was scientifically, whether your ancient doctor’s visit had positive expected value, what Egypt was actually exporting and selling, whether living standards rose above subsistence or stayed Malthusian, how the ethnic divide between Greek rulers and Egyptian subjects shaped society, what constrained the Ptolemaic Empire from becoming the next Rome, whether Cleopatra has been overhyped, what Julius Caesar was really thinking when he sided with her over her brother, the new frontiers in archeology, whether Herodotus can be trusted, what ancient Egypt knew about Israel and India, when Egyptian jewelry peaked and why, what triggered the sudden emergence of civilization across the ancient world, why a six-year-old Tyler knew King Tut better than Napoleon, and much more.

After the preliminaries, the first of three segments from the whole conversation:

I. On intellectual activity of Alexandria

COWEN: How large was the library in Alexandria and how did they build that out?

WILKINSON: This is interesting because the Ptolemaic kings not only wanted to be wealthy economically, but they wanted to be renowned throughout the ancient world as great scholar leaders. They thought it was important that a new dynasty establish its credentials as a patron of the arts and of learning, not just as the head of a great commercial enterprise.

They invited all the leading scholars from the Greek-speaking world, from right across the Mediterranean to Alexandria, where they provided them with a library, with what was called a museum or a temple of the muses, a place where scholars could think great thoughts and be well looked after. The library was developed over centuries, really, as the greatest repository of learning that the world had ever seen up to this point. It is thought that maybe at its height, it contained half a million volumes, half a million manuscripts, mostly written on papyrus, but representing really the sum total of human knowledge at that time.

COWEN: Euclid and Eratosthenes are connected to this era?

WILKINSON: Almost any big name from ancient science has some connection with Alexandria. Euclid, the mathematician, studied there. Eratosthenes, who quite amazingly calculated the circumference of the earth, he carried out those calculations in Alexandria. There were leaders in the fields of astronomy, of anatomy and medicine, of geography, of philosophy, of literary theory. They were all active in Alexandria under the patronage of the Ptolemaic kings.

COWEN: Am I correct in thinking that the era was quite weak in philosophy in some ways? There’s no great name. Maybe it’s all lost manuscripts. It seems to be a bit like China, infrastructure intensive. They build amazing things. It’s commercial, but they’re not really thinkers.

WILKINSON: I think that would be a misrepresentation. Alexandria under the Ptolemies didn’t produce a Socrates or a Plato. It is true. What its scholars did was to synthesize strands of philosophy from ancient Greek thought, ancient Egyptian thought, Babylonian thought, ancient Hebrew philosophy and religion. It was a melting pot. It maybe didn’t throw up the big name, but it was a very fertile ground for the exchange and the interchange of ideas.

COWEN: Say I try to read Diodorus. There’s a lot of detail, but it’s not to me very interesting. It just seems much worse than Herodotus, who is profound and in a way a step back. Maybe that’s not representative.

WILKINSON: I think there are a lot more scholarly works, both surviving and lost, that were composed in ancient Alexandria that would be more surprising and more revelatory than those that you’ve just mentioned.

COWEN: What was it exactly that was so special about the intellectual, and scientific, and productive environment of Alexandria and environs? Was it that the Egyptians were there, or the mix of Greeks and Egyptians, or something else? What?

WILKINSON: I think there are three factors, really. One is certainly the Egyptian context. I don’t think those intellectual advances that were made in Alexandria could have been made anywhere else. Let’s take anatomy, for example. In the Greek world in general, there was a taboo on cutting up human bodies. Of course, ancient Egypt had a long tradition of mummification, which involved dissecting human corpses. If you were an anatomist and you wanted to make discoveries about how the organs functioned, the only place you could do that at this time was ancient Egypt. The same is true, actually, in many other branches of science. The Egyptian traditions of scholarship and of learning really laid the foundations for Greek thinkers to take them to the next level.

The second aspect was the wonderful infrastructure that was put in place by the Ptolemies to lure scholars to Alexandria. They were paid handsomely. They had access to the world’s best library. They had all of the facilities at their disposal. There was really no better place to be than Alexandria.

The third factor was really the kleptomania of the Ptolemaic rulers. They were not just bibliophiles, but they wanted to acquire a copy, preferably the original, of every book and manuscript circulating in the ancient Greek world. To that end, they indulged in downright thieving. They sent a word, for example, to Athens, which was one of the great centers of scholarship, a rival center of learning, and requested copies of books from Athens’ city library. The copies arrived in Alexandria. They were then seized by the Ptolemaic authorities and kept for Alexandria’s own library. They were only too happy to pay the fine because they had the books. It was a combination of factors that really led Alexandria to being the greatest center for scholars and for scholarship.

II. From the Ptolemaic Empire to Rome

COWEN: Given all the successes, what should I think of as the limiting principle behind rule here? It stretches as far as what we would call Cyprus today, but it never becomes a very large area, right? Now, it doesn’t become the next Roman Empire. Why doesn’t it?

WILKINSON: At its greatest extent, the Ptolemaic Empire includes much of the coast of modern-day Libya, certainly Cyprus, the Nile Valley, parts of present-day Lebanon, and Syria and Turkey, and some islands in the Aegean. It’s not as big as the Roman Empire would later be. What are its constraining factors? Partly, it’s a lack of ambition. Not a lack of ambition, moderate ambition.

The Ptolemies really want to rule Egypt, which is regarded as the jewel in Alexander the Great’s crown. It’s the most prosperous part of his empire. The other territories that they conquer in a ring around Egypt are really only there as a defensive buffer zone to protect Egypt. They have no particular ambition to create a world empire as Alexander the Great did. That was one constraining factor.

They are also not the only players in the ancient world. There are other powerful dynasties of kings in Asia and in the Greek mainland who have territorial designs of their own. It keeps these various powers in equilibrium, and it stops one of them becoming dominant, really, until the Romans upend the whole system. I suppose, yes, those are the two constraining factors, ambition and competition.

COWEN: Do you think the Romans had the ambition in a way Ptolemaic Egypt did not?

WILKINSON: Yes, I do. I think the Romans were motivated by a real desire to conquer. Ancient Roman military leaders were only as good as their last victory on the battlefield. You see that in the later days of the Republic and the beginning of the empire. Whereas in ancient Egyptian tradition, certainly, military success was not the benchmark of a successful reign. It was something that you needed to do in order to protect your own borders. There were other achievements—honoring the gods, building great temples, presiding over a glittering civilization—that were considered equally important.

COWEN: How is it that all this ends, or at least starts to decline? What’s the mechanism?

WILKINSON: It begins with the finances. The Ptolemaic Empire becomes overstretched. It has to invest hugely in its armed forces in order to fend off not just the growing predations of Rome, but actually its closer neighbors as well. That leads to higher taxes. There’s a series of climatic shocks, poor Niles leading to poor harvests. It’s a perfect storm. The economy goes south pretty quickly. The only solution that the Ptolemies can see is to go cap in hand to Roman moneylenders to bail out the Egyptian economy. That then really gives Rome leverage over Egypt.

That all gets bound up in the republican politics of Rome and in the rivalry between Caesar and his rivals, and then ultimately Octavian, who becomes the first emperor, Augustus. Egypt goes from being a great civilization, confident of itself, to being a pawn in other people’s power play. Ultimately, Rome is able to march into Alexandria, overthrow Cleopatra, and seize Egypt for itself. It’s a salutary lesson for our own time that a civilization can appear to the outside world to be magnificent, and wealthy, and successful, but actually the seeds of its own destruction are usually lying there somewhere just waiting for the conditions to germinate. [...]

COWEN: How important a figure is Cleopatra in this whole history? Is it just marketing, and Shakespeare, and Elizabeth Taylor, or was she really at the center of what was happening? Did she matter?

Whoops! The Singularity has been put on hold

From the article linked in the 16oz tweet:

If you're starting a company, The Yellow Brick Road is the most obvious path to go down, but it's the most dangerous. Take a high performing model, plug in some off-the-shelf connectors (like G Drive, Slack, Salesforce, Notion, GitHub), and ship some sort of agentic orchestration layer on top of that. Magic!

The problem with this is that this is what the labs are doing with Cowork and Codex. Obviously, they own the model, which gives them better margins, control, and the ability to exert pricing power on anyone who's downstream from them. But maybe most importantly also own the architectural choices that define what their products are built to solve well. They've been deliberate so far about the model plus tool calls pattern, and this is exactly what horizontal low-step-count work on the road requires. Even if a startup could somehow outperform Codex or Claude Code, the labs have massive distribution arms and the biggest brand halo in AI.

If you're an AI app company running that playbook with the same connectors, no sub-agents or configuration below it, and no distribution, you're likely walking down the road to nowhere.

H/t Gary Marcus

Wednesday, May 27, 2026

Living in Troy, New York

I lived in Troy from the fall of 1978 to 1998 or 1999. I moved there to take a job at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) and when I failed to make tenure I stuck around doing things and stuff, including playing in two bands, The Out of Control Rhythm and Blues Band, and the New African Music Collective (NAMC). You can read about my time at RPI in this post. I also worked for MapInfo, a software company started by three RPI undergraduates. Here's a story about something that happened there.

Danger, Will Robinson!

The Devil Wears Prada 2 [Media Notes 182]

I saw the original The Devil Wears Prada back in 2006, when I came out in theaters, and then again in 2022 on one of the streaming platforms. I can’t say that I remember much about it, but if it looked as good as The Devil Wears Prada 2, which I watched in a theater, then I probably liked it. Why? Because the current film is gorgeous and gorgeousness certainly counts for something in a movie. It surely counts for something, even something important. But I can’t carry the whole film.

And neither can a vibe. I’m talking about Meryl Streep as Miranda Priestly, the haughty editor of Runway magazine, a high-class fashion magazine. As soon as the film gets going you know that somewhere down the line that this b*tch Lady Boss will reveal herself to have, if not a heart of gold, at least one filled with crème brûlée. How do you know this? Because you’ve seen lots of movies and that’s how these roll. But you can’t hang the whole damn movie on that unveiling so that the revelation eclipses whatever events brought it about. That’s what Prada 2 does and, I’m willing at this point to assume, the original as well.

Somewhere within view of the end, Priestly is talking with Emily (played by Emily Blunt), a former assistant and explaining why she never promoted her within the magazine. She tells her: “You don't have what it takes. I'm sorry, but you're not a visionary. You're a vendor.” I know what the words mean, but in this context I’m afraid they don’t compute.

There’s nothing in the movie that gives meaning to the idea of a visionary editor of a fashion rag. We’re supposed to believe that that’s what Miranda is because, well, that’s what the plot requires of her, and that’s what she thinks of herself. That’s not enough. In The Aviator (2004) Martin Scorsese shows us what made Howard Hughes a visionary. Francis Ford Coppola does the same for failed auto maker Preston Tucker in Tucker: The Man and His Dream (1988). For that matter, the 2024 documentary, Martha, shows us that Martha Stewart was a visionary, and the first Lady Boss to become a billionaire. None of that, whatever it is, made it into the Prada films.

What we see are gorgeous clothes in beautiful settings. I hardly even noticed the “plot” in this film, which is about Runway being taken over by tech billionaire who has no interest in fashion. All he cares about is generating clicks he can sell to advertisers and settling his girlfriend, the afore-mentioned Emily, in as the new editor. The plot is foiled by Andy (Anne Hatheway), also from the old days (and the original film). What I’ll remember, however, is a beautiful light blue sport jacket in a subtle windowpane plaid worn by Nigel (Stanley Tucci), fashion director for the magazine.

No, I’m afraid there are no visionaries in the movie. Just vendors. High class vendors perhaps, but still vendors. All that talk about beauty and art doesn’t change that. 

* * * * * 

P.S. For very different look at the world of fashion, take a look at the Japanese series Atelier [Media Notes 110]. It's much more intimate, but also includes a central character reminiscent of Anna Wintour.

Three from the festival

Tuesday, May 26, 2026

Building a machine God

Cade Metz, At the Epicenter of A.I., Pope Leo’s Warnings Are Dismissed, NYTimes, May 26, 2026.

Jeremy Nixon is the 33 cofounder of A.G.I. House in San Francisco, which is a so-called “hacker house.”

Many of the founders and important researchers at Anthropic and OpenAI joined the earliest gatherings at A.G.I. House. Mr. Nixon is now founder and chief executive of a start-up called the Infinity Artificial Intelligence Institute, which is trying to automate the creation of A.I.

Mr. Nixon said he has met a generation of scientists who shunned traditional religion in favor of technology. After growing up with books like “The God Delusion” — in which the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins painted God as a false belief contradicted by empirical evidence — he and his peers saw A.I. as an alternative that was more real and far more powerful.

A.I. has started to crack math problems that humans struggled with for decades, he said, and it will soon cure diseases in the same way. “Practically speaking, it will achieve the outcomes that many religions claim their deities would be able to achieve,” he said.

This is an increasingly common belief among researchers in Silicon Valley. They insist they are on their way to building a more powerful species — or even a new God.

“People are matter-of-factly saying that they are looking to build a machine God,” said Rayan Krishnan, the chief executive of Vals AI, a San Francisco company that tracks the performance of the latest A.I. technologies. “They are not saying that ironically or in jest. They are saying it as a matter of fact.”

What Chris Olah said at the Vatican:

“What is actually happening inside them?” he said. “We find structures that mirror results from human neuroscience. We find evidence of introspection. We find internal states that functionally mirror joy, satisfaction, fear, grief and unease.”

Mr. Nixon thought Mr. Olah’s speech was far more spiritual than the words delivered by the pope, even if Mr. Olah was making claims that were not necessarily based on science. Though Mr. Olah hinted that chatbots may have working lives of their own, Mr. Nixon said, they are still very much dependent on humans to do anything, as Mr. Olah noted.

“A.I. is still controlled by people who are trying to make money or solve some mathematical problem or what have you,” Mr. Nixon said.

But what is clear, he added, is that A.I. researchers are trying to build technologies that have jobs, feel joy and pain, and exhibit all sorts of qualities that match and even exceed the traits that make us human. He believes it could happen within the decade. [...]

“A.I. and its capabilities represent something analogous to the Second Coming,” he said.

There's more at the link.

Popeyes in the food court at Newport Mall

Walking is good for creative thinking

Marily Oppezzo and Daniel L. Schwartz, Give Your Ideas Some Legs: The Positive Effect of Walking on Creative Thinking, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2014, Vol. 40, No. 4, 1142–1152. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036577  

Abstract: Four experiments demonstrate that walking boosts creative ideation in real time and shortly after. In Experiment 1, while seated and then when walking on a treadmill, adults completed Guilford’s alternate uses (GAU) test of creative divergent thinking and the compound remote associates (CRA) test of convergent thinking. Walking increased 81% of participants’ creativity on the GAU, but only increased 23% of participants’ scores for the CRA. In Experiment 2, participants completed the GAU when seated and then walking, when walking and then seated, or when seated twice. Again, walking led to higher GAU scores. Moreover, when seated after walking, participants exhibited a residual creative boost. Experiment 3 generalized the prior effects to outdoor walking. Experiment 4 tested the effect of walking on creative analogy generation. Participants sat inside, walked on a treadmill inside, walked outside, or were rolled outside in a wheelchair. Walking outside produced the most novel and highest quality analogies. The effects of outdoor stimulation and walking were separable. Walking opens up the free flow of ideas, and it is a simple and robust solution to the goals of increasing creativity and increasing physical activity.

Eh? So much for “Magnifica Humanitas.” Lots of words, the substance is weak.

Matthew Walther, The Pope Should Be Going to War Against A.I. Why Isn’t He? NYTimes, May 26, 2026.

This is not exactly the Unabomber manifesto. One is even tempted to call it naïve. The encyclical certainly does not live up to its billing as the A.I. equivalent of “Rerum Novarum,” the revolutionary text on the Industrial Revolution with which his predecessor and namesake Leo XIII inaugurated modern Catholic social teaching in 1891. The presence of Christopher Olah, a founder of the A.I. firm Anthropic, at the presentation of the encyclical on Monday rightly raised eyebrows. (Imagine if Leo XIII had invited John D. Rockefeller to hear him speak on the dignity of labor!)

For those of us who see the rise of A.I. as unambiguously evil, Leo’s emphasis on its ethical use is a nonstarter. He seems to underestimate A.I.’s ability to exacerbate existing crises and to accelerate processes of cheapening and redefinition. The encyclical says nothing, for example, about how A.I. abets the replacement of medicine as a humanistic profession with an algorithmic conception of health care justified by the language of “access.”

In perhaps the most telling passage, Leo contrasts the dangers of a myopic, self-aggrandizing “idealism” with what he calls “authentic realism,” a clearheaded outlook that “does not give up on changing the world” but rather, “by clearly identifying interests, fears, constraints and power dynamics,” is able to “determine what can be achieved, and the measures needed to achieve it.” (This, perhaps, is an implicit rebuke to technophobic critics.)

The pope’s sanguine attitude should not surprise anyone who is familiar with his personality. Unlike Francis, a well-known Luddite, Leo is an internet user, a quaint phrase that describes roughly six billion of us.

What might be possible:

For years now I have believed that, in the face of the technological destruction of human relationships, literacy and contemplation, the church may well become the only guardian of humanistic values, even for secular people. But it will not fulfill this role by publishing encyclicals or issuing sterner disciplinary measures, but simply by staying true to itself.

Catholics are able to bear witness not only to the power and beauty of holiness but also to forgotten habits, practices and values, to the importance of craftsmanship and deliberation, to the past as a worthy and even delightful object of study rather than a catalog of forgotten barbarisms. They are able to present truth as something immutable and transcendent rather than contingent and self-constructed, and to speak to the value of liberality, magnanimity, filial piety and countless other shabby neglected virtues.

How exactly the church’s message will reach a distracted world is unclear. But it will almost certainly not be a top-down endeavor, dependent upon the actions or personal charisma of a pope. What seems more likely is that in the decades to come we will see the emergence of a distinctly Christian cultural movement that defies standard political categories but is united against technological utilitarianism and the subsuming of human life into digital frameworks.

At the heart of this resistance, I suspect, will be the Mass. With its grand symbolic gestures, its hieratic language and profound silences, the liturgy exists outside the framework of ordinary human experience and even of time itself. The sacraments are impervious to technological improvement.

There's more at the link.

Going to Jersey City on the light rail

R.I.P. Sonny Rollins - September 7, 1930 - May 25, 2026

Jazz Video Guy (Brett Primack):

Rollins sits at the intersection of two things that rarely coexist: absolute technical mastery and genuine spontaneous risk-taking. Most musicians have one or the other. He had both, and he used them in a way that reshaped what jazz improvisation could be.

The core contribution is what's called "thematic improvisation." Where most bebop players treated a song's melody as a launching pad — state the head, then depart into harmonic territory — Rollins kept circling back to the thematic material itself. He'd take a fragment of a melody and develop it the way a composer would, spinning variations, inverting it, stretching it rhythmically, then bringing it back transformed. A Rollins solo has an architectural logic to it. It feels inevitable in retrospect.

He also expanded the harmonic vocabulary of the saxophone without abandoning swing. His sound was enormous — a rough, almost vocal quality — and he could play "outside" harmonically while still making you tap your foot. That's harder than it sounds.

The trio recordings without piano, especially "Way Out West" and "Freedom Suite" (1958), were genuinely radical. Removing the chordal instrument forced both Rollins and the listener to reimagine where harmony lives in jazz. Bass and drums suddenly became structural, not just rhythmic support. That influenced a generation of players and opened the door to the free jazz experiments that followed.

Then there's the Williamsburg Bridge period (1959-1961), when he withdrew from performing to practice on the bridge in the middle of the night. He came back with "The Bridge" (1962) and demonstrated that a major artist could step away, reassess, and return with something new rather than coast on reputation. That act of self-criticism at the height of his fame meant something to other musicians.

He also bridged swing and post-bop without breaking stride. He'd played with Miles, Monk, the Clifford Brown-Max Roach Quintet — he'd absorbed all of it and kept moving. His longevity (still performing into his eighties) and consistency are part of the argument too.

The short version: Rollins proved that jazz improvisation could be compositionally intelligent without losing its immediacy.

Monday, May 25, 2026

The Vatican News presents Magnifica humanitas in 4 minutes and 37 seconds

The old religion (Christianity) vs. the new (A.I.)

David Streitfeld, As A.I. Fever Rises in Silicon Valley, Pope Leo Has a Few Words, NYTimes, May 25, 2026.

A dozen paragraphs or so into the article:

Magnifica Humanitas arrives as a challenge to tech moguls like Mr. Musk, whose power and influence rival such medieval popes as Innocent III. Pope Innocent asserted that the papacy was the sun and mere kings the moon: The latter could not be seen without the light cast by the former.

Love ’em or hate ’em, Mr. Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Peter Thiel, Sam Altman and their peers exert similar influence on our modern kings, which is to say politicians. The American economy is being propped up by spending on A.I. The technology is being deployed in offices and classrooms with dizzying speed and unknown effect.

The old religion challenging the new is a dramatic story, the stuff of thrillers.

Silicon Valley has encountered little public opposition in its 50-year history. Certainly nothing with the sweep and authority of Magnifica Humanitas. Pope Leo is the spiritual leader of 1.4 billion Catholics, and instructing them to be cautious or even suspicious of A.I. — especially if the warning is regularly reinforced among the laity — could put a dent in tech’s global ambitions.

“How much influence does the pope have in our secular Western world?” asked Timothy Ahn, a doctoral candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, studying the development of A.I. in religious institutions. “We’re about to see. I doubt that tech executives in Palo Alto are going to be reading this encyclical.”

In the best-case scenario, said Mr. Ahn, a former seminarian, the encyclical “will shape some moral deliberations.”

Popes have traditionally worked with the long term in mind, and any evaluation of the encyclical’s effect is years away. Those who know both Silicon Valley and the Vatican say any expectations of a head-on confrontation, much less a holy war, are misguided. A decade ago, Pope Francis began inviting tech luminaries in for an annual A.I. conference called the Minerva Dialogues.

In any case, if Leo confronted Silicon Valley outright, he would probably lose.

The fact that the Vatican unveiled the encyclical with Christopher Olah, a co-founder of Anthropic, the self-styled “good” A.I. firm, pointed to the possibility that Leo is trying less to undermine A.I. than simply participate in the conversation around it. When Francis released his scathing encyclical about climate change in 2015, no oil company executives were invited to speak.

The new religion of A.I.:

Mr. Thiel, the tech investor, gives lectures about the Antichrist, which he says has arrived in the form of environmentalists. A former Google engineer, Anthony Levandowski, set up a church in 2017 to “promote the realization of a Godhead based on artificial intelligence,” closed it and then opened it again in 2023.

Mr. Levandowski, who was sentenced to 18 months in prison for stealing trade secrets from Google but was pardoned by Mr. Trump, was ahead of his time. A.I. is now widely seen in tech and tech-sympathetic circles as quasi-divine.

Market share:

Whatever ethical and humanist reasons Pope Leo has to protest A.I., he also needs to defend his market share, much the way Walmart had to defend itself against the upstart Amazon.

The tech world’s initial reaction to the encyclical was muted on the holiday weekend. Jack Dorsey, a co-founder of Twitter, recirculated it to his millions of followers on X.

For all the noise over religion in Silicon Valley, Leo doesn’t have many faithful there. A character on the satirical show “Silicon Valley” once joked that Christianity was “borderline illegal” in the tech community, although the reality is more complicated.

Is it too late? The article concludes with an observation by Greg Epstein, humanist chaplain at Harvard:

“The pope is really doing the Lord’s work here, and I say that as an atheist. There are so few institutions left on planet Earth that have the gravitas, the strength, the communal network to take on this phenomenon, which is trying to become inevitable and superhuman.” [...]

“Big Tech is essentially its own religion with its own theology and rites, not to mention its own power and influence,” Mr. Epstein said. “Pope Leo’s encyclical will be automatically viewed as false doctrine.”

Yes. But Silicon Valley does not yet rule the world. And lots of people are becoming wary of A.I.

There's more at the link.

Meta-level note: The New York Times is giving this encyclical a LOT of coverage today.