Once again, the appeal of The Rockford Files [Media Notes 164 B]

Once again I find myself working my way through The Rockford Files thinking, “Gee, this is my intellectual comfort food, I should write a post about that.” And once again I discover, “Hey! I’ve already written that post.” And so I have.

That means that, to justify this post, I’ve got to cover new material, so I will. Here’s what I said in that previous post:

Garner is a handsome middle-aged man, six feet and perhaps an inch or two tall. He plays an easy going character, James Rockford, who is masculine without being macho. He can handle himself in a fight, which he frequently has to do, but he’s not a martial artist or a superhero. He’s competent, but vulnerable and takes his lumps. He likes sports, going to games, going fishing, often with his dad. He’s single, but is attractive to women, and kind. He’s had affairs in the past, and has one or three in the course of the show, he may even have been close to marriage.

Much of the appeal stems from the fact that he’s an interstitial character, if you will. He falls between the keys, lives in the cracks. While he makes a living, just barely, he’s not chained to a 9-to-5 job. He’s not been broken to harness.

I also noted that he doesn’t live within the confines of work mode. He’s not a slave to Homo economicus.

Moreover, he’s not married. His police buddy Lt. Becker is married, but Rockford himself is not. We do see Becker’s wife in a handful of episodes, but that’s all. She’s there as an adjunct to Rockford’s relationship with her husband. That’s all she could be in the show. So it doesn’t make sense to have her in too many episodes. She’d be in the way.

But why couldn’t Rockford himself be married? We know that he’s thought about, maybe even came close in the past. But married himself? How would that change the dynamic that makes the show work?

What if he’d married his attorney, Beth Davenport? It seems that they’d dated in the past and she pretty much confessed that she’d thought of him as a husband. Well, if they’d have gotten married, what kind of life would they have lived? I can’t imagine her living with him in that trailer; that’s not at all her style, not at all. Nor can I imagine him living her life style, with the elegant apartment. What of his PI business? Would he have taken it upscale to suit her clientele as a lawyer? I don’t think so.

Now, can I translate that paragraph into a statement about audience preference? That is, whoever finds Rockford appealing, male or female, finds him appealing as he is, an interstitial bachelor who likes women, dates them occasionally, and has longer term affairs, but that’s it. Whatever the basis of the show’s appeal, it’s incompatible with marriage as we currently conceive it.

Now, David Chase wrote and produced many episodes of The Rockford Files. But he’s best known as creator of and writer for The Sopranos. Marriage is central to that show, both Tony’s relationship to his wife and his two children, in addition to his many responsibilities as a gangster. What I’m suggesting is that, in a way, Tony Soprano is a Jim Rockford who’s married. Obviously, they’re very different types of people. Tony Soprano is overbearing, aggressive, and violent in a way that Jim Rockford his not. And if Jim Rockford is interstitial, then Tony Soprano is interstitial on steroids. And where Jim had is lawyer, Beth, Tony Soprano had his psychiatrist, Jennifer Malfi. That’s a very different kind of relationship – and I note that Rockford’s most substantial affair within the show was with a (blind) psychiatrist.

What interests me is that neither Rockford nor Soprano are “broken” to work mode. They make their living in (something like) play mode. I’m thinking something like: If you want to center a program around a Rockford-like character AND have him be married, you have to make him a gangster to do it. That is to say, our conventions about men, women, and marriage are such, that that’s what you have to do.

Do I believe that? Not quite. After all, I just made it up. It’s worth exploring with shows like Breaking Bad and Ozark, both about married couples (forced) to live on the wild side. The Hunting Wives? Sex/Life? Hmmmm....

AI populism and the rejection of robot overloards & their techbro minions

Ezra Klein, The A.I. Giants Weren’t Prepared for This, NYTimes, Aug 4. 2026

What is big, ugly and has united Republicans and Democrats at a time when it has felt like nothing else could? A.I. data centers.

Last August, a Heatmap News poll found that approximately four in 10 voters would oppose a data center being built where they live. By May of this year, opposition grew to seven in 10. Gov. Ron DeSantis, of Florida — a Republican, of course — proposed legislation that was known as an A.I. Bill of Rights.

Senator Bernie Sanders called for a national data center moratorium — one of more than 100 local or statewide moratorium proposals across the country. And here in New York, Gov. Kathy Hochul, not usually thought of as a hard-core populist, just imposed a one-year moratorium on data center construction.

So I wanted to get into the fight over data centers. How much of this is really about water or electricity or aesthetics, and how much is about A.I. and the companies that are behind it?

My guest is Jasmine Sun. Jasmine has been doing excellent coverage of both the culture inside the A.I. companies — an unusual culture — and the anger that is building against them in the rest of the country.

Here's one excerpt from a much longer interview:

You have a very influential definition of A.I. populism where you call it a worldview in which A.I. is viewed not only as a normal technology but as an elite political project to be resisted.

The phrase that you hear a lot from A.I. critics is: Why is this being shoved down our throats? Or with ChatGPT, it’s not that people are saying there is literally no use for ChatGPT, it’s people are saying: Why are you forcing me, at my job, to use A.I. to do something worse when I could do it better?

And so I think that a lot of the public backlash to A.I. that has arisen over the past six months is not explained by people thinking that the technology has no use at all. It’s not explained by their being worried about specific technical properties of large language models that might lead to rogue A.I. or misalignment or whatever, which are the safetyist arguments.

It’s A.I. as sort of an avatar for a small group of Silicon Valley billionaires’ ability to impose their vision of the world onto everybody else without their consent.

And I think that’s also what I hear echoed in these data center debates. It’s not just: It’s going to use this much water or that much water. I frankly think that even if there was no misinformation about water use, people would be just as angry about the data centers. [...]

Maybe it will make things better, but I really don’t know. I think that the costs are going to be very, very high for us relationally and economically. And so I’m very conflicted.

But do I want to live next to a data center? Yeah, no. [Laughs.]

Yeah. It’s totally different.

That’s easier — somebody is just making you do that.

I mean, one of the most interesting things — back to back, I went to this Abdul-Bernie-A.O.C. rally in Lansing, Mich., and then I went and saw the Saline activists the next day, and I was researching how the Saline Stargate project happened. And it was really interesting to see these echoes of the populist message manifest in this specific project.

When I’m at this rally, people are talking about the oligarchy. They’re talking about corporate billionaires, whether it’s Big Tech or Big Pharma or DTE — the utility companies — paying off politicians in order to screw the people over. And that’s why you need the people to come together and to get money out of politics, to prevent DTE from donating to these super PACs and paying off Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, or whatever.

And then when I learned how the Saline data center saga played out, what happened was the Saline Township board, unlike a lot of boards, actually voted 4 to 1 against rezoning their land for the data center. So this was a case where local government said: This is not our vision for our community. It’s not worth it to us.

And what happened? The data center developers sued Saline Township, a town of, again, a few thousand people, saying: Wait, no, this is exclusionary zoning. You can’t have no industrial use in your entire township. And when a town of that size is getting sued by a giant A.I. data center developer, they just settled.

They were just like: Fine, give us a few million for the fire department and for some schools, and this fight is not worth it to us. But that, to people, felt like a profound violation of little-D democracy.

It felt like the dark money in politics story, which is: You have some very rich companies show up with a bag of money to your politicians. They don’t tell anybody else what’s happening. The politicians aren’t allowed to tell their citizens and involve them in the decision-making process, and they themselves work out a deal — a deal that is fundamentally asymmetric because of the amount of money on one side — that will then transform the image of your community, your lived reality, into the world that these tech companies have decided for you.

And so I think that the data centers, in that sense, are a very visceral microcosm of the way that a lot of people feel that A.I. is showing up in their lives.

I would also maybe even take that a little bit further.

I think the way that, not all of the A.I. companies — and I think Anthropic has largely been a good actor here — but the way many of them have acted has opened up such a chasm between what they say and then how they act under pressure, so that one should be incredibly, incredibly skeptical of them.

And what I mean by this is, Sam Altman and all these different people, in front of congressional testimony and in interviews, will say: It should not just be us making these decisions. There should be a real, deep, small-D democratic role here in how A.I. rolls out, in what effects it has on communities and how it is governed.

And then when a community, or a politician who’s representing a community, tries to say: Well, we don’t want this data center here. Or: We want to impose these regulations — we have watched, repeatedly, these companies turn tremendous amounts of financial artillery against whoever is standing in their way. And use the expertise and the money and the power they are amassing to short-circuit that democratic voice.

Yeah. I mean, a couple things. I think one big gap I noticed between Silicon Valley and the folks in these communities I was talking to is: Silicon Valley does tend to think that money solves all problems — that if you just make the check bigger, everything is going to be OK.

And I think people have a sense for: I’m being bribed. This corporation is not offering me a free lunch or whatever. There is going to be something that I’m losing here.

And, in fact, sometimes the fact that the data center deals were bigger, or the amount of political spending was bigger, actually just makes people more suspicious. In the Abdul El-Sayed Senate race in Michigan, his No. 1 hit on opponent Haley Stevens is how much money she is getting from AIPAC, from DTE, from Big Pharma or whatever.

And so I think we’re in a political environment where making the numbers bigger and the amounts of money bigger makes people more suspicious, not less.

Another one I’ll just quickly mention is, I don’t even think Anthropic should be let off the hook for things like the labor market impacts. They are the ones simultaneously warning that we might see 50 percent of white-collar jobs lost by 2030. They’re saying: This is really important to us, we’re freaking out about it.

Anthropic C.E.O. Dario Amodei has written in his essays that we might see an underclass of people of lower intellectual ability. And Anthropic is building the agents — they are building the coding agents, the banking agents, the design agents — that they know are going to displace jobs, or they believe, at least, are going to displace jobs.

And I think that people feel that hypocrisy, as well, which is: If you are so worried about the inequality, why are you building the agents to do it? And when I ask executives and researchers and whomever at Anthropic this question, they don’t really have a good answer. Because it is true that their business model is fundamentally premised on the disruption that they say they are causing.

You did a big piece for The Times on the very widespread belief in Silicon Valley that they will create this underclass.

Yeah.

What does the underclass mean to them?

The idea of a permanent underclass caused by A.I. is basically a world where any job a person can do, either A.I. or a robot can do it for them. Which means that workers lose all the economic leverage they have, and capital owners — people with money — can simply pay machine labor to do all the work instead of paying workers.

What that means is anyone who earned their living by working is no longer able to do that. You end up with a world of runaway inequality, where the rich get richer and the working class gets poorer. Maybe they get some welfare checks, but fundamentally, it’s a loss of economic mobility in a society.

And when I ask folks in Silicon Valley: Do you think by default A.I. is going to increase or decrease inequality? I have not yet heard anyone say it will decrease inequality or keep it the same.

They might say the floor will get really high. They might say A.I. will bring the cost of consumer goods down, and so people’s lives are going to get cheaper, and everyone will be superhealthy, so it’s OK. But I have not heard a single person in the tech industry tell me that they believe that A.I. is going to decrease inequality.

In fact, many people are very worried that instead, most workers will lose their leverage and be on a kind of permanent welfare in the far-off future.

There's more at the link.

The odd destruction of books en masse by AI companies [Homo economicus on a binge]

I'm a second-generation bookseller. My family runs Houston's largest used & rare bookstore and I'm building an AI tool for used bookstores. We got hit by exactly these orders, including a single order for 70 obscure books that made us pause online sales entirely. So I dug in. I… https://t.co/IK7OE8f1DG

— Charlie D. Becker (@charliedbecker) July 28, 2026

America and China in the World, a quick note

Is that where we’re headed, to a bipolar world dominated by America and China? I just asked Google Search: “Is China the largest economy in the world?” Its reply:

China is the world's largest economy when measured by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), but the United States is the largest in terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

• By Purchasing Power Parity (PPP): China is the world's largest economy, with an estimated output exceeding $44 trillion. This metric adjusts for the cost of living and the price of local goods, reflecting a higher real volume of economic activity.
  
• By Nominal GDP: The United States holds the top spot. In current market exchange rates, the U.S. economy is valued at approximately $32 trillion, while China's nominal GDP is roughly $20 trillion.

So that’s one thing. The other is AI. America and China are in a race for dominance in AI. America has a technical lead, but with respect to Frontier LLMs, that lead is measured in months, not years. And China is making its models open weight while the most advanced American models (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google) and not open. It’s not at all clear how that will shake out.

With the Trump administration authoritarianism is on the rise in America. While the Democrats may well win the next presidential election, it’s not at all clear what that means for America’s already precarious democracy. The problem is that a great deal of power is concentrated in the hands of political and business elites, so much that America’s democracy looks like a chess game played by oligarchs where ordinary Americans are the pawns.

Is that what the world will become in 2040, a competition between American and Chinese oligarchs in which everyone else is a pawn, with Homo economicus triumphant over all?

Elle (from the world of Legally Blonde) [Media Notes 186]

I’ve just been through the first season of Elle (on Amazon), which is a prequel to Legally Blonde, from 2001. And so I decided to re-watch Legally Blonde, which I had enjoyed when it first came out in theatres and then some years later when it was streamed. I decided that I preferred the Legally Blondes over The Devil Wears Prada 2.

Now, I’m not sure I’m in the target demographic for either films. Maybe I’m at some edge of the demographic for Prada, but nowhere near the demographic for Blonde. But it seems to me that Blonde serves its demographic better than Prada serves its. Prada is about the imperious editor of Runway magazine, modeled after Vogue. I’m sure I’ve looked at Vogue once or three times, but that’s it. However I’ve long looked at the fashion coverage in the Sunday New York Times and I generally look at photos of the “looks” on display at important award shows and, of course, the Met Gala. So I’ve got some interest. I don’t have any interest in Cosmopolitan, but I’ve certainly leafed through issues. I have a vague sense that my sister may have read it decades ago. While Blonde is not about Cosmo, it does treat Cosmo as the bible, mentions it frequently, and splashes its cover on the screen often enough. Elle Woods swears by it.

Well, I suspect that the readers of Cosmo are more honestly served by Elle Woods in her various incarnations than the readers of Vogue are served by Prada 2, I don’t remember the original well enough to judge. But I do remember that speech about cerulean:

I can believe the substance of the speech. But what does that have to do with the line I remember from Prada 2: “You don't have what it takes. I'm sorry, but you're not a visionary. You're a vendor.”

I know Miranda thinks of herself as a visionary. A visionary of what? Of design? That’s the designers, no? Or is it her eye for design that makes her a visionary, an eye that crafts the editorial style of her magazine? Does that make her a style visionary or merely an astute vendor? I’m sure that Prada 2 doesn’t make the distinction, or tries and fails, but perhaps the original Prada did, I just don’t remember it well enough.

But there is no such pretension about Legally Blonde. Yes, there’s some snobbery and some cliquishness, but the movie wasn’t really about them nor is the prequel series. They prove to be superficial and harmless. The movie presents us with what we initially take to be a dumb blonde prom queen who swears by Cosmo and shows us that she is, or can easily be, a smart, resourceful, and tenacious young woman. In the movie she follows her handsome, shallow, and transactional boyfriend to Harvard Law School. She proves to have shrewd judgment about people and a good legal mind, dumping idiot boyfriend in the process. Elle gives us the same characteristics stretched over an eight episode series. She figures out who’s scamming the high school budget and develops fast friendships with grunge Seatle teens whose sensibility seems (and is) at odds with her perky pink California glam. She grows.

What we’ve got is a light romp with Homo Ludens in Blonde vs. a highly polished trek with Homo economicus in Prada.

Stop merely predicting a shorter workweek and make it happen.

Joanne Lipman, Sorry, A.I. Is Not Giving Us a Four-Day Workweek, NYTimes, July 6, 2027.

Some of the brightest minds in business believe that artificial intelligence will spell the end of the 40-hour workweek. The financier Steve Cohen has said we will work four days per week soon, while Zoom’s chief executive, Eric Yuan, predicts it will be three. Bill Gates foresees a two-day workweek within a decade, and Elon Musk says work will ultimately become optional altogether, akin to a hobby, like “playing sports or a video game.”

Don’t count on it.

The truth is, any one of these executives could have shortened the workweek years ago, long before A.I.

Studies have proved that a four-day workweek with the same pay is not only possible, but superior. A 2015 trial in Iceland was so successful — productivity remained the same or better, while employee satisfaction soared — that it has since expanded throughout the country. A 2022 study in Britain involving 61 companies and almost 3,000 employees found that revenue increased, while employee stress and burnout plunged. Experiments in New Zealand, Japan, Australia and Brazil have also been home runs.

Americans overwhelmingly favor a four-day workweek, too. Yet it has largely been a non-starter here. In my four-plus decades as a journalist and editor, I’ve written and assigned multiple articles about workplace trends. Almost every expert prediction on the demise of the five-day workweek has been wrong.

Why? Because we consistently underestimate executives’ ferocious attachment to face time. [...]

Moreover:

Full-time employees last year worked an average of 41.9 hours per week, a figure that hasn’t changed much since the pre-internet 1990s. And at home, the advent of the internet didn’t decrease the amount of time Americans spent on housework. It’s an old pattern: As dishwashers and microwaves supercharged productivity in the 20th century, expectations about cleanliness, nutrition and child-rearing ballooned accordingly, and chores like laundry that once might have been outsourced migrated right back to homeowners.

A.I. appears to be following the same trajectory, increasing our output rather than decreasing our workload.

It sounds like these folks are committed to long hours for (pseudo)moral reasons but can't bring themselves to admit it.

Notably, while the chorus of leaders predicting a shorter workweek continues to grow, most are vague about when that change might happen. None of them appear to be setting things in motion now. Admittedly, a wholesale shift to a shorter workweek would be highly complex for large companies — and far more so for a society that’s built around the five-day cadence, encompassing everything from school hours to infrastructure projects.

A shorter workweek would also require a significant shift in America’s workaholic culture, which views busyness as a status symbol. [...] There’s a reason that one of the most quoted lines from “The Devil Wears Prada 2” is the workaholic editor Miranda Priestly cooing, “Boy, I love working. I really do. Don’t you?”

Exactly. Homo economicus strikes again.

Why do American's fear AI, but many other countries don't? [Homo economicus strikes again!]

Paul Kedrosky, There’s One Clear Reason Why Americans Are Gloomy About A.I., NYTimes, June 25, 2026.

Hating artificial intelligence may be the only thing about which Americans agree. But they are global outliers in their pessimism. A survey of 24,000 adults across 30 countries found that citizens of nearly all of those countries, rich or poor, see A.I. more favorably than Americans do. This is startling for citizens of a wealthy, advanced economy who are usually enthusiastic tech adopters of anything with a wall charger. [...]

Why isn’t it working? Because the theory is incomplete, at best. If American A.I. pessimism were merely cultural or informational, it would correlate with media consumption, education levels or political polarization. Instead, it cuts across all those categories. It correlates instead with labor market institutions.

Start with the global picture. Plot A.I. sentiment against income and labor market, and there is a pattern. Poorer countries are A.I. optimistic: Indonesia at 76 percent, Thailand at 77 percent and Mexico at 63 percent. Rich countries like the United States, the Netherlands and Belgium are not. What A.I. means depends, in large part, on where you sit economically.

In countries with largely informal economies — where large numbers of people work without contracts, benefits or legal protections — A.I. looks like a ladder to better economic outcomes previously available only to those with capital, education and formal employment. A small manufacturer in Guadalajara or a street vendor in Jakarta doesn’t have much to lose from A.I. disruption, and potentially a great deal to gain.

In rich countries with more formal labor markets, however, A.I. looks more like an ambush. It threatens what people already have: stable employment, predictable income and accumulated professional standing. [...]

But not all wealthy nations feel the same. Norway is more optimistic than France, and Germany more than Canada. Those countries have broadly similar income levels, so income alone doesn’t explain the variation.

So what does? In Norway, losing your job means receiving around 67 percent of your previous wages in unemployment benefits while you search for the next position. In France, it’s around 66 percent, and 60 percent in Germany. The insurance system treats unemployment as a temporary inconvenience and bridges you smoothly across.

The United States pays significantly less in unemployment benefits than many European countries do. [...]

There's more at the link.

Clueless thy name is Zuckerberg

Victor Tangermann, Mark Zuckerberg Orders His Employees to Start Having Fun Again After Brutal Layoffs Culled Their Colleagues, Yahoo!Finance, June 16, 2026.

Morale at Meta has seemingly hit rock bottom.

Employees have been roiling from multiple rounds of major layoffs. Last month alone, the Mark Zuckerberg-led company laid off a whopping 8,000 workers, roughly ten percent of its workforce, as part of its chaotic refocusing efforts around AI.

Many of those who remain are now forced to perform the grunt work to train AI models, weekly busywork that's already driving some of them up the wall, as Wired reports.

In an internal memo to employees on Friday, Zuckerberg attempted to lift their spirits in what appears to be a notable failure to read the room. Specifically, the billionaire promised to host a companywide AI hackathon in July — only to get brutally shut down by workers who were in no mood for such a thing.

Meta has regularly hosted hackathons in the past, but given last month's layoff announcement, the reception was extremely chilly. [...]

For all its employees' pain and suffering, Meta has surprisingly little to show. The company continues to trip over its own feet, struggling to release impressive new AI models as its competitors pull ahead further in the ongoing AI race.

Victor Tangermann, Meta’s Super Expensive New AI Team Is Already a Complete Catastrophe, Yahoo!Finance, June 15, 2026.

Now that Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg's dream of a metaverse has collapsed in on itself, the billionaire has moved onto his next money pit: a wildly expensive "Superintelligence" unit.

But those who've survived several brutal rounds of layoffs at the company aren't exactly thrilled to be part of his new vision for it. As Wired reports, morale within Meta's 6,500-staffer Applied AI team, which was created in March to support the Superintelligence Labs, is hitting rock bottom.

Three employees who spoke to the publication on the condition of anonymity said that the weekly busywork tasks they are being assigned, like generating puzzles to test the reliability of Meta's AI models, is "soul-crushing." [...]

A petition has also been signed by more than 1,600 employees, opposing a draconian new initiative that involves installing software on work computers to track everything employees to, including keystrokes and clicks, data that's then fed to train AI.

Homo economicus on steroids.

Ezra Klein contra (extreme) Homo economicus [Don't torture pigs]

Ezra Klein, What the Cult of Efficiency Costs Us, NYTimes, June 14, 2026.

The opening:

Chris Murphy, the Democratic senator from Connecticut, offered the graduates of Wesleyan University wise counsel in his commencement speech a few weeks back. “You are about to step out into a world that prizes efficiency and the annihilation of drift and friction above all else,” he said. “Our entire economy is built on rewarding companies that are efficient at making a profit, not based upon how they treat their workers, the social value of their product or the impact they have on the community.”

“You didn’t design this world,” he continued. “You didn’t choose it. But you will live with the consequences of this cult of efficiency. And you will have to choose which side you are on.”

Efficiency inflicted on pigs:

In 2016 and 2018, voters in Massachusetts and California passed ballot initiatives banning, among other things, the sale of pork from pigs confined in gestation crates. These crates confine breeding sows — large animals, often 400 to 500 pounds — in two-by-seven-foot cages in which they cannot so much as turn around, much less root or socialize. Because sows are often reimpregnated about a month after their piglets are born, they can spend years of their lives in these crates.

I watched, in the interest of fairness, a video from an arm of the National Pork Board on why gestation crates are good for pigs. It features row upon row of sows penned between bars so narrow they cannot turn around. It is no way for any animal to live, particularly not one as smart and as social as a pig.

There are studies I can cite on the psychic and physical violence these crates inflict on pigs — the elevated cortisol levels, the sores, the obsessive biting of metal bars — but I think the way Kristof puts it is simpler and more honest: “Think of your dog enduring what pigs face, and you realize that the moral cost is incalculable.” The difference between dogs and pigs is neither their intelligence nor their sentience. It is our willingness to admit their intelligence and their sentience. It is our decision to extend them our compassion and concern.

Homo economicus:

In traditional economics, prices are the informational lifeblood of an economy: They reveal the cost of materials and labor, the balance of supply and demand. But much can be hidden in prices. Perhaps it is artificially low because waste is being dumped into the rivers or workers are being robbed of their wages or the burden is borne by animals that will spend years of their lives without the comfort of their herd or the ability to feel grass beneath their hooves or turning around when curious about a sound. When that happens, we have sacrificed compassion for cost.

Most of us know by now that the lives animals lead in factory farms are often hideous. A 2019 survey by the Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future found that a majority of Americans wanted stronger oversight of confined animal feeding operations and a plurality wanted a ban on new ones. Those numbers were even higher when the same pollsters asked Iowans and North Carolinians, where majorities favored a ban on new concentrated animal feeding operations, in part because these operations often impose terrible costs on the human beings who live near them.

There's much more at the link.

Dealing with the Devil, John Malone and American business

Matt Stoller, A Billionaire Explains Why American Business Now Feels like the Mafia, BIG, June 5, 2026.

The article opens:

In 1981, a consultant named Elmer Smalling, an expert in pay-TV systems, was negotiating on behalf of Jefferson City, Missouri, to see about better prices for residents. Across the table was an executive for a giant corporation named TCI, which had 25% of the U.S. cable market and was known for the hard-charging tactics of its CEO, John Malone. The negotiations were not going well, because the city was thinking of taking away the franchise and going with someone else. Paul Alden, one of Malone’s subordinates, lived up to that reputation.

“We know where you live, where your office is and who you owe money to,” he told Smalling. ”We are having your house watched and we are going to use this information to destroy you. You made a big mistake messing with T.C.I. We are the largest cable company around [.] We are going to see that you are ruined professionally.”

The bulk of the article is a review of Malone's autobiography, Born to Be Wired: Lessons from a Lifetime Transforming Television, Wiring America for the Internet, and Growing Formula One, Discovery, Sirius XM, and the Atlanta Braves, 2025.

Stoller observes:

And this book, while not honest, is as close as I’ve ever seen to getting to the core of how the billionaires who took over American society really think. Malone’s book helped me understand the generation of media billionaires, before the tech oligarchs, who had to contend with the dying embers of New Deal regulations. And they knew a world where it wasn’t ok to do what they were trying to do, and yet they did it anyway, with energy, creativity, and a malevolent zeal to make the world safe for capital.

I'll give you three paragraphs from the review:

At age 27, he presented to the AT&T board of directors something that was then novel in corporate governance. He argued for them to buy back their own stock, which would reduce the total number of shares and thus increase earnings per share. The Chair of AT&T at the time, Fred Kappel, rejected the suggestion, while congratulating Malone on a fabulous presentation. Kappel told him, “If in your whole career, you can do a single thing that changes the Ma Bell system in even the smallest way, you would be very successful.”

It was a jarring moment for Malone. Though a rising star at AT&T, he realized he’d have to leave Bell Labs because it wouldn’t satisfy his need for control. But it’s also, unwittingly, the moment we see a young aggressive corporate leader’s reaction to that of an executive who was genuinely engaged in caretaking of a vast enterprise. Bell Labs had violated what would become a cardinal rule for Malone, which is that its leaders valued the corporation itself over the efficient use of capital in maximizing returns. Malone told his colleagues that Bell Labs, the legendary scientific lab, was a bureaucratic mess, a dinosaur, headed for extinction.

When he left Bell Labs for McKinsey, Malone writes as if it is an act of rebellion. “I wondered whether I had just jumped from the biggest, safest vessel I would ever board,” he wrote, “I felt ill.” This kind of odd faux rebellious streak courses through the book.

That middle paragraph is about a man who's sold his soul to Homo economicus.

There's much more in the article.

Stanford as a hatchery for future tech overlords [Book Review]

Anand Giridharadas, The Secret Elite One Freshman Discovered at Stanford, NYTimes, May 18, 2026.

Book Review: How to Rule the World: An Education in Power at Stanford University, by Theo Baker.

Theo Baker arrived at Stanford in 2022 and pursued two somewhat different paths, junior tech bro, and student journalist. His freshman year included:

(1) Losing your grandparent. (2) Losing your girlfriend. (3) Losing your virginity. (4) Bringing down a university president. (5) Overdosing. (6) Winning a George Polk Award. (7) Partying on yachts and socializing with billionaires. (8) Fending off legal threats. (9) Becoming a meme. (10) Neglecting to complete your homework.

Giridharadas observes:

There are two questions people ask as much as any other: “How can I belong?” and “Who runs the world?” They differ in tenor and aim. The former is vulnerable, often unspoken; the latter fuels two-thirds of Reddit.

What gives Baker’s book its power is that, in this setting, these inquiries strangely dovetailed. By trying to answer what it takes to fit in — the freshman question — he Forrest Gumps his way into answering a question about the attitudes and pretensions overlording mankind. In coming of age as a young man, he travels to the heart of a dehumanizing age.

And so:

Stanford through Baker’s eyes is a foreign country with its own customs, religion, mores and language. Some students are “high-agency” super-builders or super-thinkers — techie Übermenschen expected to make billions. There is the “Coupa circuit,” where shady, tech-adjacent adults spend their days at a coffee shop with students, hoping to get in early on start-ups. There are the NGMIs, who are not going to make it. And there are the “plucked,” highly bright students who form a Stanford within Stanford, with access to Big Tech slush funds and parties. (The liberal arts majors and others with no prospects in technology are largely irrelevant.) [...]

The Stanford-within-Stanford Baker exposes matters to you even if this exclusive core feels impossibly distant. The university has let technology firms and venture capitalists worm so deeply into it that it now functions, in Baker’s telling, as a talent-scouting system for future unicorns. Everyone else is window dressing. And this campus elite betrays attitudes — captured by Baker — so contemptuous of non-Übermenschen, not to mention those far outside this world, that one gets a feel for the kinds of mentalities designing A.I. and presuming to rewire our societies.

Silicon Valley has long promoted itself as more meritocratic than elite circles past. Baker perforates this story. As always, connections, access, shadowy brokers and whims decide who gets the keys. Many students are smart. But those who rise fastest often seem the most ruthless and maniacal. [...]

“Teenagers like me were a commodity,” Baker observes. “We were to be protected and preserved, cosseted and buttered up, exploited, manipulated, funded, bribed and cultivated. We were business.”

There's much more to the review, mostly the story of how Baker joins the school newspaper and pursues an investigation that helps topple Stanford's president, Marc Tessier-Lavigne.

Homo economicus on steroids

Central Park is great, but it takes up a lot of space and isn’t utilized to its full potential.

That’s why I worked with McKinsey on a plan to make it a state of the art data center, complemented by rooftop parking and nuclear power.

We can still build beautiful things. pic.twitter.com/MemRKeVMsK

— Nick Lindquist (@nick_lindquist) May 15, 2026

America and China have different attitudes about and approaches to AI and work

Ross Douthat, Why China Isn’t Worried A.I. Will Replace Its Workers, NYTimes, May 14, 2026.

The United States and China are really the only two countries that matter right now in shaping the A.I. future. As President Trump and President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing, there’s a kind of Cold War atmosphere, with people talking about an A.I. arms race. But who is winning? Are we even in a race at all? Kyle Chan, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution, says it’s hard to call it a race because the U.S. and China have very different A.I. goals.

I presented the conversation to Claude (Sonnet 4.6 Adaptive) and asked it for a summary. 

 * * * * *

I have uploaded conversation to the project area, filename “China AI workers.”

It is between Ross Douthat, who writes for The New York Times, and Kyle Chan, who is a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution. I would like you to summarize the conversation for me. I’m particularly interested in the Chinese attitude toward AI in general and the (proper) relationship between AI and humans.

This is a rich and wide-ranging conversation. Here's a summary, with particular attention to the themes you flagged.

Overall frame

Douthat's central premise is that the U.S. and China are in an AI "arms race," but Chan's main contribution is to complicate and largely deflate that framing. China, he argues, is running a different kind of race, not the same race at a slower pace.

The Chinese approach to AI: practical, not transcendent

The sharpest contrast Chan draws is between the American fixation on AGI — the idea of a "machine god" that surpasses all human capability — and the Chinese orientation toward diffusion and application. China wants AI in food delivery, ride-hailing, health care, government services, and factory floors. They want smaller, cheaper, more deployable models, not necessarily the most powerful frontier model. Chan puts it directly: Beijing is not "AGI-pilled."

He sees this as continuous with how China approached the internet era: not as a transformative metaphysical event, but as infrastructure to be integrated into daily life and governance. The Chinese state is also notably more willing to use open-source models, giving away AI capabilities to gain adoption at scale — both domestically and in the Global South — which is a strategy the commercially driven American labs largely ignore.

The proper relationship between AI and humans: tool, not god

This is where the conversation is most relevant to your homo ludens framework. Chan describes Beijing's view of AI as essentially instrumental — AI serves human economic and social purposes. The Chinese government is actively hostile to AI use that it considers "nonproductive": AI companions, AI boyfriends/girlfriends, even excessive gaming. The fear is that young Chinese will waste time on AI-mediated entertainment and social substitution when they should be building the economy.

There's a revealing parallel Chan draws: the same regulatory instinct that cracked down on video games and private tutoring platforms is now being pointed at AI companionship apps. The state's implicit position is that AI must serve the collective project — not become a substitute for human connection, productivity, or reproduction. This is a deeply anti-mystical, anti-transcendent view of the technology.

So the Chinese "proper relationship" between AI and humans is essentially: AI augments human labor, fills demographic gaps (falling birthrate, shrinking workforce), and extends state capacity. It does not replace human flourishing or social life; it should not become an end in itself.

The demographic driver

Chan adds an important materialist dimension: China's embrace of robotics and AI is partly driven by sheer demographic necessity. Their labor force peaked over a decade ago, youth unemployment is near 17%, and the birthrate is roughly two-thirds the U.S. rate. This produces a different calculus than in America — the question isn't whether a robot waiter displaces a human worker, but whether you have a waiter at all. AI and robotics fill a structural labor hole, which makes China more tolerant of automation than Western economies that still have more human workers to protect.

The public mood: anxiety about falling behind, not about being displaced

Where American anxiety about AI tends toward fears of job loss, surveillance, or existential catastrophe, Chan describes Chinese popular anxiety as nearly the inverse: fear of not using AI enough, of being left behind in a hyper-competitive labor market. Individual workers, companies, and policymakers all share this orientation. Chan calls this a "mirroring" — the individual's fear of losing competitive edge mirrors China's national fear of falling behind the U.S. technologically.

On AGI and existential risk: skeptical distance

Chan thinks it's telling that when Trump relaxed chip export controls, Chinese AI companies wanted the chips but Beijing declined — preferring to build domestic semiconductor capacity rather than become dependent on American supply chains. This, he argues, is not the behavior of a country sprinting toward superintelligence. A true AGI race would involve gobbling up every available chip. China is playing a longer, more measured game.

He also pushes back gently on the "race" metaphor itself: the intermediate risks (cyberwarfare, biosecurity) are, in his view, underrated and real; the AGI-superintelligence scenario is overblown. He ends by urging dialogue between the U.S. and China on shared risks from rogue actors and open-source proliferation, while acknowledging the deep mutual distrust that makes formal arms-control agreements essentially impossible at this stage.

A thought for your book

Chan's portrait of Beijing's AI worldview sits almost perfectly at the opposite pole from Silicon Valley's quasi-religious eschatology — no Omega Point, no machine god, no homo deus. What you might find generative: the Chinese model is also, in its own way, a version of homo economicus applied to AI — purely instrumental, collectively economistic, hostile to play and to what the government calls "wasted time." It's not an alternative to the Silicon Valley eschatology so much as its mirror image — the same foreclosure of genuine play, just in a different ideological register.

AI’s New Trillion Dollar Mission (is BS)

YouTube:

This week on Prof G Markets, Scott Galloway and Ed Elson discuss the growing belief in Silicon Valley that AI won’t just replace workers, but managers too. Then, they break down the proposed pied-à-terre tax in NYC and why they believe taxing luxury second homes makes sense. Finally, they unpack why alcohol stocks are struggling while GLP-1 drugs are booming, and what that says about the future of American consumer behavior. [...]

Timestamps:
00:00 Preview
00:26 Today's number
01:04 Today's episode
05:23 AI's new mission
24:35 Ad break
26:55 The wealth tax debate is heating up
46:10 Ad break
48:41 The death of the night out
01:08:56 Week ahead
01:11:11 Scott's prediction
01:12:51 Ed's prediction
01:14:05 Credits

Starting at about 20:08, Scott Galloway:

And that is there is something to be said of and there's a balance here. I've in my companies, I'm doing some virtue signing right now. I've always said there should be two or three people and I've always had small companies, right? They they start at zero. Once we have a someone in HR or CFO, I either step step down from the CEO role or become the chairman because I I don't have those skills to scale a company and I don't want to deal with that stuff.

But until then, I've always said we should have two or three people that are one or two bad decisions away from living in their car. They're not, you know, they're they have bad judgment. They're they do stupid shit all the time. They're not what I'd call there's no way they're leaving us for Google. Let me put it that way. A little bit down on their luck maybe. And guess what? The business can be a great means of a little bit of social good.

And also the notion this is basically the notion that part of an organization if you think of stakeholders and I didn't get this. So, I always thought my goal was to pay people less than market and figure out other tricks of the trade to get them to stay and retain them. And then what you realize as you get older is that what is more rewarding is to build a profitable company and slightly overpay people. And if there's some fat in the organization and if there's a few people who quite frankly are, you know, not going to get a job anywhere else but work, you know, work hard or good people and maybe they're not, you know, amazing. Okay, that's okay too. And in some countries, the objective of a lot of the owners is to increase employment. Now, you have to balance that with making sure the organization can survive and has profitability.

But this is again this singular messiah complex that is nothing. There's only one stakeholder and it's shareholders. and I can figure out technology to replace people and we can all work singularly and then eventually the AI will take out those singular teams and replace them and then there will just be one. It'll be Jack Dorsey and Elon Musk who each own 49% of the world and do a lot of ketamine and if they're good enough they will provide UBI for all of us such that we don't uh rise up and kill them.

I I I'm not a fan, Ed. I'm not a fan of this whole line of thinking. I think it's [ __ ] and I think it's unhealthy and I think it's nihilistic.

Capitalists vs. Capitalism

In terms I’m developing for my book, Play: How to Stay Human in the A.I. Revolution, capitalism is an economic system both dominated by captalists and organized to suit the dictates of Homo economicus.

On the Appeal of Tne Rockford Files [Media Notes 164 A] {Beware of work-mode!}

I've been watching The Rockford Files again and though I should write up a post about the appeal of the show. But I decided to check the blog first and, wouldn't you know it, I'd already written that post, in June of 2025. So instead I'm just bumping that post to the top of the queue along with a prefatory note. If you look toward the end of the post, the highlighted areas, you'll see that I brought up work mode, pointing out that Rockford doesn't seem possessed by it. 

Now that I'm explicitly thinking in terms of a contrast between Homo economicus and Homo Ludens that in itself seems sufficient to revisit this post. I'm thinking that might be a good way of analyzing the show. Rockford's wayward buddy, Angel Martin, also manages to keep work mode at bay. He met Angel where? Prison, that's right, prison. But he was pardoned. Jim – that's his name, "Jim Rockford" – and Angel are contrasted with Rocky, his retired truck-driving father, and his good friend, Dennis Becker, an overworked cop. Rocky's always after to Jim to get a legit job, like driving a truck.

That's a beginning. I wonder how far we could get with that? Here's the original post, though I added a phrase at the very end.

* * * * * 

I’m currently working my way through The Rockford Files for the fourth, if not the fifth, time. I watched the program when I was originally broadcast back in 1974-1980, and I’ve watched it online several times in this century. Part of the program’s appeal certainly comes from the star, James Garner.

Garner is a handsome middle-aged man, six feet and perhaps an inch or two tall. He plays an easy going character, James Rockford, who is masculine without being macho. He can handle himself in a fight, which he frequently has to do, but he’s not a martial artist or a superhero. He’s competent, but vulnerable and takes his lumps. He likes sports, going to games, going fishing, often with his dad. He’s single, but is attractive to women, and kind. He’s had affairs in the past, and has one or three in the course of the show, he may even have been close to marriage.

Much of the appeal stems from the fact that he’s an interstitial character, if you will. He falls between the keys, lives in the cracks. While he makes a living, just barely, he’s not chained to a 9-to-5 job. He’s not been broken to harness.

He’s an ex-convict who’s been pardoned. Was he ever guilty? Probably not, but I don’t recall off hand. Does it matter? He’s damaged goods. He lives in a beat-up trailer on the beach at Malibu, a marginal dwelling in a desirable location.

He makes his living as a private investigator, which is depicted as a marginal occupation in this, and other shows, but not always. While he’s a decent and honest man, he does quite a bit of sneaking around and more than a little deception. There are a number of episodes where he orchestrates a complex con, though on behalf of a good cause. Always.

He’s got a good friend on the police force, Lt. Dennis Becker, but is otherwise persona non grata with the police force. And he’s friends with a good lawyer, Beth Davenport, who once had a crush on him. He’s also got an ex-con pal, Angel Martin, who’s a bit more marginal than he is, and cowardly as well, yet somehow manages to retain Rockford’s loyalty.

All of which is to say, he doesn’t work within the confines of work-mode, as I’ve been writing about it. Life is not easy for Jim Rockford. He’s often broke, and in at least one episode that I can remember, in danger of losing his home. But his life is interesting and challenging.

I wonder, off hand, how many TV shows present us with lives that are NOT dominated by work mode? And in work-place shows, just how is work depicted? How much entertainment presents us with alternatives to work-mode? And how often is the alternative presented as a critique of work-mode?

Is The Rockford Files a critique? I don’t think so. It’s not pointed enough. Perhaps that’s why it’s been so popular. It presents a clear alternative, a clear difference-from, but it never goes so far as to present the work-a-day world as a soul-destroying trap, though the depiction of Becker comes awfully close to that. 

* * * * * 

Also about The Rockford Files: Myth-Logic and a Lady Librarian in The Rockford Files, Myth-Logic and a Lady Librarian in The Rockford Files 2.

Our (grim) yuppy legacy [the triumph of Homo economicus]

Dylan Gottlieb, How Yuppies Changed America, NYTimes, May 4, 2026.

So much of what we take for granted today — from our meritocratic rat race to our gentrified neighborhoods to our culture of overwork, fitness training and foodie obsession — was born in the yuppie-made 1980s. In that moment, they fashioned a bargain that we are still living with: An increasingly diverse professional class signed up for a life of hard-won affluence, at the cost of deep inequality for everyone else.

Yuppies were called into being by the forces that were remaking the economy in the 1980s. After the Carter and Reagan administrations loosened the regulations governing Wall Street, finance began to generate a greater share of profits than manufacturing or services. Investment banks and law firms now shaped the fates of the corporations they had once served. As America hitched its fortunes to finance, those banks and firms began to chop up, spin off, merge, offshore or otherwise squeeze short-term value out of the nation’s legacy corporations. But to do it, they needed legions of employees to handle the grunt work: the proofreading, drafting and document review that kept the takeover machinery in motion.

o find those employees, recruiters flooded the campuses of America’s elite universities. In 1976, less than 5 percent of surveyed seniors at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School were headed to Wall Street for investment banking. By 1987, it was one in three. At Yale, 40 percent of the entire graduating class of 1986 applied to work at the investment bank First Boston.

High-level grunt work:

Once they were hired, aspiring yuppies were expected to work more hours, often on smaller and less intellectually demanding piecework. They were also given less meaningful training, all for narrower chances of promotion to partner. As the professional world was beginning to diversify, it became an increasingly miserable place to work. This was no accident: The legal and financial bosses who were commanding these diverse armies of young professionals sought to extract maximum value out of their labor.

This early wave of yuppies contains the origins of our present-day meritocratic competition, which turned college admissions into something akin to “The Hunger Games.”

Grunt work all the time in everything:

On the job, newly minted yuppies were also sold a particular story: Upward mobility was open to anyone with the right degree and the right work ethic. [...]

That dogged pursuit of the strenuous life extended from the workplace into yuppies’ leisure time. They developed a passion for road races like the New York City Marathon. This wasn’t the casual jogging that countercultural types had embraced in the late 1960s. It was distance running, and it required the same self-control and long-range planning that characterized yuppie careers. [...

The yuppies also helped forge our modern foodie culture: one that required wealth but also the cosmopolitanism to know that, say, balsamic vinegar, sun-dried tomatoes and Manchego cheese were foods worth savoring.]

They consumed the Democratic Party:

Yuppies also redrew our political map. They helped to shift the Democratic Party away from the unions, Black Americans and urban bosses of the New Deal coalition and toward the interests of metropolitan professionals. During the 1980s, a new generation of politicians and donors — people like Gary Hart, Chuck Schumer and Bruce Wasserstein — remade liberalism for the postindustrial era. The meritocratic ethos of the trading floor, they reasoned, should govern society at large. Innovation, not regulation or redistribution, would drive growth. And the sclerotic regulatory state was only hampering it. What was needed instead was a nimbler government that oversaw a technology-heavy economy, with yuppies at the vanguard.

Hello inequality my old friend:

The rise of the yuppie was not without its costs. The upper echelons of our society became more inclusive in terms of race, ethnicity and gender — but only for those who ran a gantlet of educational and professional challenges on their way to the top. By admitting women and members of racial minorities, the new yuppie elite helped obscure the skyrocketing economic inequality that would soon become a central fact of American life. Since the 1980s, upwardly mobile yuppies have left blue-collar, pink-collar and less-educated service workers further and further behind.

Resentment sets in:

After decades sitting atop this brutal hierarchy, yuppies and their arrogance bred new resentments. In the 2010s, a brand of populist conservatism opposed nearly every tenet of the yuppie dream, from racial and gender diversity to educational meritocracy to frictionless finance and globalization to gourmet culture and the very idea of urban living itself.

This response was unsurprising given the real harm done by Wall Street firms to blue-collar America. But the wounds were as much psychic as they were economic. Racial grievance gave the movement its power. So did geographic and class-based resentment of the cosmopolitan elite that yuppies embodied. After all, locally rich but less educated white people — owners of car dealerships and construction companies across the South and Midwest — were among the fiercest populist conservatives.

And this set the stage for Donald Trump.

Today, the class of people once known as yuppies are both everywhere and under threat. The Trump administration’s attack on diversity, equity and inclusion and affirmative action might damage the recruiting pipeline that has conveyed women and members of racial minorities into the professions. Employers will have to rely on more informal and more discriminatory forms of hiring: personal connections, nepotism and cultural “fit,” all of which tend to favor the privileged. Our professional class may shrink, welcoming only the sons and daughters of the already rich. [...]

What’s more, the rollout of A.I. threatens to decimate entry-level professionals [...] Even a moderately secure upper-middle-class lifestyle might soon be out of reach.

The upshot:

Yuppies were the first class of young people to be drawn into the sweatshop of the meritocracy. Now is the time to rethink the bargain they made, which offered diversification and affluence at the cost of exploitation and broader inequality. If history teaches anything, it is that if a class can be made, it can also be unmade.

There's more at the link.

The coming AI-driven workplace apocalypse [We aren't ready]

Jasmine Sun, The A.I. Fear Keeping Silicon Valley Up at Night, NYTimes, April 30, 2026. Sampled from the article:

The opening paragraph:

Most people I know in the A.I. industry think the median person is screwed, and they have no idea what to do about it. I live in San Francisco, among the young researchers earning million-dollar salaries and the start-up founders competing to build the next unicorn. While Silicon Valley has long warned about the risk of rogue A.I., it has recently woken up to a more mundane nightmare: one in which many ordinary people lose their economic leverage as their jobs are automated away.

Silicon logic:

But even those who view the idea of a permanent underclass as overblown tell me that the meme contains a kernel of truth. [...]

Most economists and A.I. experts do not expect this scenario, but the persistence of the permanent underclass idea should concern all of us. First, because it signals how much collateral damage the A.I. companies will tolerate en route to A.G.I. And second, because the production of a social underclass is a policy choice. Instead of waiting for impact, we need to think seriously — now — about how we plan to support workers through A.I. disruption.

If left to its own devices, Silicon Valley may summon a permanent underclass through its own market logic. If you believe that human-substituting A.I. is inevitable, then every company should race to be the one to build it — and claim a market valuation the size of the economy and then some.

Unimaginative techno-determinism:

Tech workers, for their part, are scrambling for lucrative A.I. jobs in hopes of securing financial freedom — even when they harbor ethical hangups. [...]

This apparent dissonance can be justified if you believe that the arc of technological progress is fixed. For instance, the founders of Mechanize, a once buzzy start-up with a mission to “enable the full automation of the economy,” argued in a blog post that “the only real choice is whether to hasten this technological revolution ourselves, or to wait for others to initiate it in our absence.”

Many A.I. employees are ultimately motivated by visions of a beautiful future: a promised land where goods are cheap, diseases are cured, and abundant machine labor liberates humans to enjoy lives of infinite leisure. But increasingly, they also worry about triggering a jobs apocalypse along the way. “There are some people who care about jobs and inequality because they really care about people. There are others who think this is going to lead to instability, insurrection and revolution, and that’s bad for business,” said a researcher who has worked at two frontier A.I. labs...

And, I would add, if and when that future arrives, we'll not be ready. Why? Because we train adults to become addicted to work mode (Homo economicus). As a result, they won't know what to do with the leisure (Homo ludens).

An emerging techno-federal oligarchy (a successor to Eisenhower's "industrial military-complex"?):

At the same time as A.I. erodes ordinary workers’ leverage, it may concentrate power and wealth in large companies and the U.S. government — two entities whose interests are increasingly linked. A.I.-related investments such as software and data centers accounted for 39 percent of U.S. economic growth in the first three-quarters of 2025, per an analysis by the St. Louis Fed. That gives the federal government a vested interest in sustaining the A.I. boom. Mr. Amodei acknowledges that this concentration can lead to “the reluctance of tech companies to criticize the U.S. government, and the government’s support for extreme anti-regulatory policies on A.I.”

In March, the company started the Anthropic Institute to house its teams working on economics, societal impact and frontier safety. The institute is led by Jack Clark, the affable British journalist turned A.I. billionaire and Anthropic co-founder, who seems to be replacing Mr. Amodei on the media tour of late. When we spoke, I asked Mr. Clark if he, too, expects A.I. to create a permanent underclass.

“This is basically a societal choice,” he replied. Like Mr. Altman and Mr. Amodei, Mr. Clark sees the default path for A.I. as dire: one where we “let technology rip, and don’t think about the social effects until later.” But he also feels optimistic that sufficiently conscientious A.I. builders and policymakers can steer the ship away from the storm.

I have little faith in those (mythical) A.I. builders and policymakers. Meanwhile:

On the evening of Feb. 25, several dozen A.I. employees and civil society advocates gathered in a converted warehouse in San Francisco’s sleepy Dogpatch neighborhood to hear the Democratic pollster and strategist David Shor. The event was titled How to Prepare Our Politics for A.G.I., and doubled as a fund-raiser for a new “six-to-nine-month sprint” to rally Democratic politicians around the campaign issue of A.I. job displacement. [...]

While the American public ordinarily hesitates to support left-wing policies like a jobs guarantee or single-payer health care, A.I. seems to expand the political Overton window. “Right now, the argument is, ‘You’re all about to lose your jobs, and the choice is either you get nothing and starve, or we do something fair,’” Mr. Shor said. “People don’t want to be members of the permanent underclass.”

Not all policies are created equal, however. A universal basic income is unpopular, but a federal jobs guarantee has legs, Mr. Shor found. American voters don’t care about beating China, but they are excited about A.I. curing diseases. And, crucially, populism sells. In one of the top-performing political ads that Mr. Shor’s data firm tested, the nameless narrator declares: “We make the corporations and billionaires who profit from A.I. pay their fair share.” The ad concludes: “They work for the bots. We work for you.”

The near term:

If current trends continue, A.I. models and agents will be capable of performing a wider range of knowledge-work tasks at higher levels of complexity. At that point, A.I. shifts from automating single tasks to taking over entire roles. Hiring may slow in accounting, marketing, design, administrative work and other white-collar professions.

The work force will shift toward less automatable jobs where humans retain a comparative advantage — such as entrepreneurship, care work, the skilled trades and entertainment like sports and the performing arts. We will also see new jobs we haven’t imagined yet, in numbers we cannot predict. Many displaced workers will struggle to retrain, as they have in past automation waves. Education, health care and tax systems will require an overhaul if white-collar employment is no longer a reliable path to middle-class stability. [...]

But the debate over the most extreme scenarios conceals a more immediate threat: Even in the most limited case, A.I. will break the career ladder for millions of current and future workers, a prospect often waved away with euphemisms like “transitional friction.” The Oxford economist Carl Benedikt Frey puts it plainly: “Most economists will acknowledge that technological progress can cause some adjustment problems in the short run. What is rarely noted is that the short run can be a lifetime.”

Class solidarity?

In this sense, A.I.’s broad capabilities foster a rare class solidarity between white-collar and blue-collar workers. When 20-something software engineers in San Francisco talk about escaping the permanent underclass, I hear them projecting concerns about their own precarity: What happens if the invisible hand of the market decides that my skills are no longer valuable? Who will catch me if I fall? For once, a rarefied class of employees — those used to being the automaters, not the automated — is reckoning with their potential obsolescence.

The final paragraphs:

Society’s ability to cushion A.I.’s disruption may determine whether we get to reap its gains at all. Without a safety net and a transition plan, blunt protectionism is workers’ rational response to automation. If you hear that A.I. will entrench a permanent underclass, you’ll do anything to stop it. [...]

And what if we don’t act? [...] In March, the Palantir chief executive, Alex Karp, spoke on a panel with the Teamsters president, Sean O’Brien. “The biggest challenge to A.I. in this country is political unrest,” Mr. Karp said. “If I were sitting here in private with my peers, I’d be telling them the country could blow up politically and none of us are going to make any money when the country blows up.”

The financialization of the American economy, Homo economicus run amuck

Oren Cass, The Finance Industry Is a Grift. Let’s Start Treating It That Way. NYTimes, Feb. 6, 2026.

From the article:

Less than 10 percent of Goldman’s work in 2024, measured by revenue, was helping businesses raise capital. Loans of Goldman’s own funds to operating businesses accounted for less than 2 percent of its assets. At JPMorgan Chase the figures were 4 and 5 percent; at Morgan Stanley, 7 and 2 percent. Even the efforts at helping to raise capital are misleading, because less than a tenth of it goes toward building anything new. The rest funds debt refinancing, balance sheet restructuring and mergers and acquisitions.

These are symptoms of financialization. That’s the term for making financial markets and transactions ends unto themselves, disconnected from — and often at the expense of — the societal benefits that support human flourishing and are capitalism’s proper purpose. Chief among those benefits are good jobs that support families, and products and services that improve people’s lives.

In a financialized economy, businesses become mere sources of cash, assets to be manipulated and then operated for maximum investor returns. Workers become just another cost, like lumber. Customers are just revenue streams to be tapped.

Financialization has made American businesses less resilient, less innovative and less competitive. It has been a major cause of slow wage growth and rising inequality. It has fueled the loss of manufacturing jobs across the heartland. It has corrupted sectors in which the profit motive was never meant to reign supreme — veterinary practices, funeral parlors, campgrounds, residential treatment services, youth sports, hospitals and nursing homes, even suppliers for volunteer fire departments — consolidating and managing them with ruthless efficiency, squeezing their vulnerable customers and then pointing to the higher cash flow as “value creation.”

Later:

It’s the absurd endpoint of financial nihilism: an entire business model built on gaming the system without knowing or even caring what’s being traded. Along the way, it increases market volatility and risk without producing any larger benefit.

Private equity firms control trillions of dollars, very little of which is invested directly in companies that will use the funds to grow. (Venture capital is the exception to this general rule; that’s real investment in growing businesses, though concentrated in a few industries and places.)

Homo economicus at work:

The Excel spreadsheets have always seemed to give the same answer: Do not invest in shipyards, or semiconductor fabs, or research and development for a new airplane. Do cut costs, offshore to Asia, increase the dividend or invest in the social media company that could be the unicorn worth billions in a matter of months.

There's much more at the link.

Adam Neely: On Suno, AI Music, and the Bad Future

0:00 Intro
4:06 Challenge accepted
6:55 Three Questions
24:14 Why no influences? (deskilling/narcissism)
35:50 Profiles of the Future
47:54 Good uses of Suno
59:05 Futurism/Techno-Optimism
1:16:22 New Virtues
1:22:03 Final Predictions

Neely conducted an informal survey of his follows. Here he's discussing some of the results (c. 16:43):

Now, zooming back a little bit and taking a look at the answers to this 1st question, we see that nobody answered anything musical, really. All the answers were about saving time, saving money, and replacing friends. In other words, Suno lets you make the same music faster, cheaper, and lonelier. I'm not sure if that's a good thing.

That's pure Homo economicus, to invoke a term I'm using in the book I'm developing, Play: How to Stay Human in the AI Revolution. Neely continues:

The 2nd question I asked was, “do you feel like you have a unique voice with your music when you create songs with Suno?” Some people said yes, but the majority of responses felt that the music that they made was not particularly unique to them. One possible explanation for this is that commercial generative AI can't really create anything new. It's just remixing old recordings. And so you can't have a unique voice with something that's just a remix of an old recording. Suno has admitted to have been trained on essentially all music files on the internet. What a lawsuit has called “copyright infringement on an almost unimaginable scale.”

A bit later (c. 20:21):

Now, the 3rd question I asked was, “Who are some of your favorite AI musicians who have influenced you?” “What about them inspires you?” Okay, so even though I kind of knew what the answers to this question would be, it still was really bleak reading them, because the vast majority of people, as it turns out, do not have influences.

RESPONSES: I don't have any AI influences. I'm afraid I don't have any. At the moment, nothing. I don't listen to anybody else. I don't know any. I do not listen to AI slop. No influence. I don't know of any. Haven't heard any. No one. I don't know any AI relevant artist. Not applicable. I have no idea to be honest. At the moment, nothing. I don't have an AI music influence. None. I do not religiously follow anyone. I don't have any AI music influences.

ADAM: Why can't people who use Suno cite their influences? It's strange, right? because if you ask the same question to any musician, writer, or artist who didn't use gen AI, they would be able to go off forever… on their influences! I think about, you know, the bass players that inspired me, Jaco Pastorius, Victor Wooten, modern-based players like Tim Lefebvre - huge influence. I love Evan Marien. I don't know of anybody of any skill level who can't do that who can't just be like, mm, mm, mm, “these guys are awesome!”

Neely goes on to say how very strange this is. The musicians he knows ALL OF THEM have favorites and influences. This Suno music seems to br narcissistic music. These people just listen to their own music.

There's much more in the podcast.