E. Glen Weyl and Tyler Cowen on the future

Tyler Cowen, What libertarianism has become and will become — State Capacity Libertarianism, Marginal Revolution, January 1, 2019.

Having tracked the libertarian “movement” for much of my life, I believe it is now pretty much hollowed out, at least in terms of flow. One branch split off into Ron Paul-ism and less savory alt right directions, and another, more establishment branch remains out there in force but not really commanding new adherents. For one thing, it doesn’t seem that old-style libertarianism can solve or even very well address a number of major problems, most significantly climate change. For another, smart people are on the internet, and the internet seems to encourage synthetic and eclectic views, at least among the smart and curious. Unlike the mass culture of the 1970s, it does not tend to breed “capital L Libertarianism.” On top of all that, the out-migration from narrowly libertarian views has been severe, most of all from educated women.

There is also the word “classical liberal,” but what is “classical” supposed to mean that is not question-begging? The classical liberalism of its time focused on 19th century problems — appropriate for the 19th century of course — but from WWII onwards it has been a very different ballgame.

Along the way, I believe the smart classical liberals and libertarians have, as if guided by an invisible hand, evolved into a view that I dub with the entirely non-sticky name of State Capacity Libertarianism.

Cowen then goes on to list eleven propositions defining this view.

E. Glen Weyl, The Political Philosophy of RadicalxChange, no date.

A common pattern in mainstream Western political discussions is to imagine an ideally just society and seek to correct deficiencies of our present society relative to this benchmark. Implicit in this construction is the notion that we can easily know what such an ideal political economy would look like and that all we need do is correct a few injustices of present democracy or “market failures” to arrive there. This attitude differs profoundly from the way the same culture approaches technology, where no one believes we are even close to imagining, much less achieving, perfection. Einstein’s words above invite us to be similarly ambitious in reimagining our social institutions as we are with physical technology.

Over the past two hundred years, communications technology has advanced dramatically with the invention of the telegraph, telephone, television, video conferencing, and more. Each generational stage of technological development allowed more aspects of in-person human communication accessible at long distances. We can think of the primary tokens of our present formal political economic systems, money and state-issued individual identities, as the telegraph of political economy, conveying as they do so little of the richness that constitutes informal social relations and value creation.

Weyl then lays out his philosophy at some length ending with the assertion of 16 principles.

There has been some discussion on Twitter. Here's where that is now:

I want to apologize to @tylercowen for unproductively repeating previous attempts to clarify our differences in the same language he previously objected to. This was a waste of his time. I would like, if possible, to get to the root of the disagreement in language he accepts.

— (((E. Glen Weyl))) (@glenweyl) January 2, 2020

Weyl continues with a series of tweets, from which I have extracted the prose substance:

When I think of folks who believe systemic change to our political economic institutions is desirable and perhaps necessary, I think of, among others, @JuliusKrein, @MattBruenig, @robinhanson, @MazzucatoM, @dsallentess, @margaretlevi, Curtis Yarvin and Roberto Mangabeira Unger.

These figures disagree on many, many things, and my overall politics are closer to @tylercowen's than to many of these folks. However, I believe there is a clear sense in which there is a clear divide between all of them and @tylercowen (and other libertarians of his ilk)

on the need for "structural" change to political economy. Furthermore, to the extent that @tylercowen does favor changes to our political economy, I believe the primary aim of these is to accelerate the progress of what he would call "technology" rather than to assure

a parity in progress between "governance" and "technology" (which I would call simply two side of technology that if unbalanced become dangerous). This leads to several questions to ensure I am not wandering back into semantics that are unhelpful.

1. @tylercowen do you acknowledge a common thread among the folks I mention above that distinguishes fthem from you? If so, what terminology would you prefer I use to describe this difference so that we can move beyond a semantic into a substantive discussion?

2. Do you agree that most of the reforms you advocate have the intention of accelerating technical progress/growth-as-currently-measured rather than accelerating governance progress/improvement in our measurement of/accounting for growth?

3. How do you positively (not normatively) evaluate the statements of some of the great scientists of all time like Einstein and E. O. Wilson that there has been far greater progress in our physical than our organizational/governance technology?

None are really questions well-suited for Twitter, but I will address many of them over time, thanks!

— tylercowen (@tylercowen) January 2, 2020