The so-called “hard” problem of consciousness

Here’s what Wikipedia says:

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why and how we have qualia or phenomenal experiences. This is in contrast to the "easy problems" of explaining the physical systems that give us and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, and so forth. These problems are seen as relatively easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify the mechanisms that perform such functions. Philosopher David Chalmers writes that even once we have solved all such problems about the brain and experience, the hard problem will still persist.

Why? Why will it persist? It seems like a manufactured problem to me.

Let’s say we’ve got all the “easy” stuff accounted for and that we have a system diagram with all the parts and functions. So along comes Chalmers and he says,

I don’t see qualia anywhere in the diagram? Where’s qualia? You gotta’ add a box for qualia. Where’s that box going to go? See, we have a problem.

Nonsense. We don’t need a special box for qualia. It’s not a box IN the system anywhere. It IS the system. The system is us. Quali is what if feels like. There is nothing more.