Annie Jacobsen on Nuclear War, Intelligence Operations, and Conspiracy Realities, Conversations with Tyler, August 6, 2025.
Annie Jacobsen has a favorite word for America’s nuclear doctrine: madness. It’s madness that any single person has six minutes to decide the fate of civilization, madness that we’ve built weapons capable of ending the world in 72 minutes, and madness that everything hangs by the thread of deterrence. But to Tyler, life is “a lot of different kinds of madness,” and the real question is simply getting the least harmful form available to us. It’s a conversation sparked by her latest book Nuclear War: A Scenario, which Tyler calls one of his favorites from last year—and which is compelling enough that Denis Villeneuve is turning it into a screenplay.
Tyler and Annie explore whether we should be more afraid of nuclear weapons or if fear itself raises the risks, who should advise presidents during the six-minute decision window, whether moving toward disarmament makes us safer or more vulnerable, what Thomas Schelling really meant about nuclear war and rational actors, the probability that America would retaliate after a nuclear attack, the chances of intercepting a single incoming ICBM, why missile defense systems can’t replicate Israel’s Iron Dome success, how Pakistan-India nuclear tensions could escalate, why she’s surprised domestic drone attacks haven’t happened yet, her reporting on JFK assassination mysteries and deathbed phone calls, her views on UFOs and the dark human experiments at Area 51, what motivates intelligence community operators, her encounters with Uri Geller and CIA psychic research, what she’s working on next, and more.
Iron Dome and ICBMs
JACOBSEN: Just a couple of technical points to drill down on. North Korea does have missiles that can reach the East Coast of the United States presently. That is the precise scenario I choose in my book because it was actually Richard Garwin who told me that was what he was most afraid of. He died last week at 97, the most knowledgeable person on the technical and the theoretical aspects of this, having looked at it since the ’50s and advised presidents since the ’50s.
Now you’re asking about, can our interceptor program shoot down that incoming single missile? That is a problem that the Missile Defense Agency faces. I write about it specifically. My answer would be no. There is technically a 50 percent chance of one interceptor missile on the US side being able to shoot down one incoming ICBM, but you have to remember those statistics are from a curated test.
COWEN: Sure.
JACOBSEN: It’s a test — just for listeners — which is like Vandenberg Air Force Base says, “Oh, we’re doing whispers to the powers that be.” They’re doing a test, and they know it’s coming, and less than 50 percent of the time, actually, it succeeds.
COWEN: You can’t have all your probabilities at one or zero. What’s your probability? I’d say 20 percent, but what’s your number?
JACOBSEN: You mean what is my mathematical equation for what — ?
COWEN: Yes, the betting odds. You’re indifferent on taking the bet or not. I’ll say 20 percent that we’d nail it.
JACOBSEN: To my eye, it’s either all or nothing. Again, I’m not a mathematician. I’m an author and a journalist, but it’s all or nothing. In the scenario I write, it’s nothing. We do not hit it with four missiles. I ran that by several former NORAD commanders, and they did not say, “Annie, not true.” Their odds are unfortunately, even with the [shoot-look-shoot] technology that we have on our interceptor systems, would not be capable of shooting down a warhead.
Let’s give listeners some specs just so that they can understand, so that you can visualize this, because that’s what helped me. The warhead coming in is traveling at about 14,000 miles an hour, 500 to 700 miles above the earth. The interceptor is trying to shoot it down, essentially, like a giant bowling ball at 20,000 miles an hour, 500 to 700 miles above the earth. The technology involved is exquisite, and it fails time and time again.
To me, the poetics of that are more important than to try and use a defense that we should have more interceptors, because that leads to, “Let’s just have as many interceptor missiles as the other guys have nuclear weapons.” Then you’re talking about bankrupting the United States.
COWEN: Israel has done a great job. They don’t stop literally everything, but it’s quite impressive. I know it’s a smaller country, but it can be done along some margins, right?
JACOBSEN: No, absolutely not. Wrong science. The Iron Dome you’re referring to shoots down short-range and some medium-range, including ballistic missiles. They come from either land-based systems, like the THAAD system, or they come from sea ships, the Aegis system, but they cannot shoot down ICBMs — intercontinental ballistic missiles — traveling, as I just mentioned, 500 miles above the earth’s surface.
That is an extraordinary distinction, and people incorrectly mix them, because it sounds great and it’s quite fantasy hopeful to think, “Wow, I can just build a system, an Iron Dome or a golden dome over the United States, over my head, and I will be free from nuclear attack.”
Now, because I have brought the golden dome up. I also must say, having interviewed Charles Townes, for example, who was the Nobel Laureate who invented the laser, and spoke to him a decade ago about whether or not an Iron Dome–type system could work. He said unequivocally no.
The intelligence community
COWEN: I think of the Pentagon as being one of the worst run and parts of the deep state as being relatively well run. That’s my personal impression. You differ from that?
JACOBSEN: Interesting. When you say deep state, you mean the intelligence community?
COWEN: Yes, especially the consultants who are attached and the way in which they really bring very high intelligence and analytic powers to bear on questions. It may not survive the passage of a memo to the presidency, but still, I think they’re quite on the ball.
JACOBSEN: We probably agree in that regard, that if discipline and system is important — again, I’m just using myself like a personal example, but what you really want to lead with is your own character and your own decision. I would probably agree with you, but the government is such a . . . I’m also fascinated that most people just think the government is one whole thing. As you and I both know from looking at this, that couldn’t be further from the truth.
COWEN: The people you’ve worked with who were part of the secret or semi-secret deep state — overall, what do you think they’re like as people or what motivates them? Or what have you observed? What has occurred to you?
JACOBSEN: I’m fascinated that you call them the “deep state.” Again, that’s like loaded nomenclature. It’s right there with conspiracy.
COWEN: No, I’m fine with deep state. It’s this negative thing, but a lot of these words get inverted. Let’s just call them the deep state. I don’t mind. Some of it’s bad, but some of it’s good.
JACOBSEN: Listen, I spend time with people who others view as everything from a twirling-mustache bad guy to a savior. And I’m not dodging the question here; I’m trying to be earnest in my reportage, how I work with people. That has to do with the fact that I try to be agnostic going into interviews, as I would wish one would be with me, meaning not . . . Because if you’re going to prejudge someone based on what you “read” or heard on a podcast, that is dangerous.
COWEN: Yes, but I want your post judgment, right?
JACOBSEN: Okay, but be specific. Tell me —
COWEN: The people you’ve met from the deep state — what’s your overall impression? Some mix of what they’re like, what motivates them, what surprised you. Any impressions you’ve had about these people. [...]
JACOBSEN: Everybody’s different. I don’t think you could put people into a box. I am astonished. Look, one of the things about being a reporter is that you allegedly are objective. I think the past 10 years have shown us that that is actually not true, yet you should strive to be. So, when I’m reporting books, I aim to be objective so that I can gather agnostic details and come to a conclusion.
Sometimes afterwards, having spent a lot of time with a person, then they might even become a friend. The book’s out, and that is maybe where I would get to know someone even better.
Who’s coming to mind is Billy Waugh who became a friend of mine after I reported. He was the main character in my book about the CIA’s paramilitary called Surprise, Kill, Vanish. Billy was extremely complicated. After the book published and we became friends, he shared with me a lot of things that were deeply personal, that are not to be on the public record, but made me realize — and you are going to say this is a cliché, but I’m going to say it anyways — we are all so much more alike than we are different.
COWEN: That would be my answer, in fact. I don’t mind if it’s a cliché. I would agree with you. I think they’re more analytic than other individuals I meet on average, just as you might say, “Well, the Swiss are more orderly,” but they’re not that different deep down.
There's much more at the link.
No comments:
Post a Comment