Ross Douthat interviews Amitav Acharya, NYTimes, Feb. 19, 2026.
Douthat's introduction:
Right now, 21st-century geopolitics seems like it’s defined by the struggle between America and China.
But the major power with the world’s fastest growing economy and largest population isn’t China. It’s India.
And right now, India has a unique role in global politics, doing deals with Europe one day and with Donald Trump the next, all while maintaining a strong partnership with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
Its large and spreading diaspora gives it a unique cultural influence around the world, one that may only increase as other major powers grow old and people remain India’s most important export. My guest today is a prominent international relations scholar, Amitav Acharya, who’s written about what he calls a multiplex world order. A future where diverse powers compete to shape the world.
Between China and Pakistan:
Douthat: So let’s talk about, then, two concrete expressions of Indian power: The relationship with Pakistan, and the relationship with China.
Let’s say we’re living through a 15- to 20-year period where India’s influence and power are going to increase. What does success for India look like with its less powerful, but nuclear-armed rival Pakistan, and its more powerful neighbor, China?
Acharya: This depends on whom you ask. For foreign policy—
Douthat: I’m asking you.
Acharya: OK. My sense is that for India, if India can achieve the kind of growth and become the third-largest economy, not necessarily overtaking China, but maintaining political system openness and more diplomatic influence, I think that will be quite acceptable to India.
India is not a revisionist power. India is a status quo power. So I think that’s what success would mean. And domestically, at home, generate more employment. But you cannot have the third-largest economy without having a sustainable employment and industrial base.
With Pakistan, it’s terrorism. There is of course Kashmir and other issues, but it’s all linked, from the Indian perspective, to support for terrorism. And they see that. They see the West not really understanding India’s position. And then China’s support for Pakistan — China is the biggest, they say, ironclad relationship with Pakistan. They see that Pakistan will not be as adventurous or as assertive vis-à-vis India without Chinese help.
That’s what gets Indians angry about China. Otherwise, I don’t think there is any dimension that cannot be diplomatically addressed between India and China
Douthat: What changes the situation for the better for India? Is it just economic growth? Or is there a level of military power where India thinks that it could get Pakistan isolated and force China to be friendlier?
Acharya: I think nuclear weapons play a big role here. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. But China is also a much bigger nuclear power.
For a while, Indian foreign policy moved in the direction of ignoring Pakistan and engaging China. So it’s China they have to deal with. China is a true peer competitor rather than Pakistan.
Indian culture and the diaspora:
Douthat: The idea that Indian civilization is something that’s born in India and then spreads around the world is obviously relevant to an age when Indians have spread around the world. Modi has, I think, very explicitly talked about the Indian diaspora as a mode of Indian national influence.
But let’s talk about the diaspora. Let’s talk about America. You mentioned that in the United States, relations have been better than ever, up until very recently. Trump in particular spent a lot of time courting Indian American voters. He did an event with Modi in 2019 — “Howdy Modi” in Texas. It’s an amazing name.
But then, in the second Trump term, there’s been a swing. And it isn’t just a swing where Trump is imposing tariffs on Europe. It’s also a swing where there is this kind of anti-Indian backlash on the right.
Tell me where you think that comes from, but also just talk about how you think Americans see India — or see Indians, I think, is the better way to put it.
Acharya: By the way, don’t forget that Modi had one of the biggest rallies right next to Madison Square Garden.
Douthat: New York as well as Texas. All the centers — yeah.
Acharya: So I think, generally, Modi has used that as a foreign policy tool. It’s partly genuine, but it’s also partly a significant foreign policy asset.
So how about the American perception of India? First of all, Americans don’t know much about India. I’m sorry to say this. India doesn’t strike American imagination the way the Chinese do, and also, in some ways actually, the way the Soviet Union did, because it was a threat for a different reason.
There are many more universities with centers for China studies, Americans going to study in China, getting trained in the language — this goes back to the Cold War period. There’s nothing like that. As a professor, I can tell you that India studies is nothing comparable. American students and American academic institutions, and to some extent, think tanks too, are catching up now. But nothing like China.
As you know, the United States is not a country where there’s a lot of interest in foreign cultures. I can tell you that I have a son who just graduated from school and they studied China, Europe, Rome, Greece. Not much about India. So that’s part of the problem.
Americans don’t go to India as large numbers as tourists. So because of that, we have had this relative ignorance about India and neglect of India. We talk about democracy, but the U.S. and India, the largest democracies in the world — that’s rhetoric. It doesn’t really translate into endearment of India in the American public imagination.
Now you did mention the Indian diaspora, which is quite influential politically, although smaller than China, but more successful economically.
Douthat: Part of my perception about the place of India in the U.S. is that there’s this way in which Indian immigrants have been more successful at attaining positions of elite influence. This is most obvious maybe in Silicon Valley, but you can also see it in U.S. politics — and in both political parties. It’s Vivek Ramaswamy and Usha Vance, as well as Indian Americans in the Democratic Party.
Acharya: And Kash Patel. Yeah.
Douthat: But there’s a flipping back and forth, where at certain moments, Indian success drives a kind of admiration where it’s like: This is the successful minority.
But then you have, especially just in the last couple years on the right, a flip against a sense that Indian Americans — that there’s abuse of H-1B visas and people forming “ethnic mafias” inside Silicon Valley. That kind of narrative takes hold. How do you see that?
Acharya: I think it’s a real problem. And it’s partly — well, I’m not going to fault anybody, but it’s partly the way the Indian diaspora, especially the tech elite in the U.S., conducts itself.
I have heard this story about Indian dominance of Silicon Valley as a factor of why many non-Indians, especially from Southeast Asia, have left Silicon Valley. So I think maybe they don’t realize it, but that perception remains.
And also, maybe getting into some controversial issues here, but the H-1B visa is partly how American companies recruited them. You have, what? Seventy percent until recently of H-1B visas. This obviously creates a perception.
That’s a huge number. And even though they’re all qualified, that number, when it gets into the public domain, people probably did not know about it. Now it’s out in the open. They think: Why should any particular minor ethnic group have a hugely disproportionate share of the visas?
India in 2060:
Douthat: Pull up to close. It’s 2060. Everything has gone as well for India as could be imagined in that time. How would you describe the Indian place in the world, in that future?
Acharya: If everything goes well, I still think India will be the third-largest economy and not the top economy. There have been some studies that put India as the No. 1 economy, overtaking the United States and China. But the gap between India and China will be less — much less — and possibly, the gap between India and the United States will be much less.
India’s main problem is not human resources or lack of talent. It’s the domestic politics. India has serious domestic fractures and frictions. So I would worry a bit about India continuing as a united, integrated country. I’m optimistic it will, but we cannot take it for granted. But if India does that, it’ll be one of the most respected powers in the world. It will not only have hard power, but also a lot of soft power. That’s the very optimistic scenario.
The pessimistic scenario will be domestic breakdown in India, turning very nationalistic, war with Pakistan that damages both the countries very seriously, and also China.
I’m an optimist and I think India has the resources, the population base, and the human talent. I think generally it’ll be very beneficial. India will not be a divisive country in the world order, I can tell you that. I don’t see that, as far as the diaspora is concerned. They want to mix with people. They want to make a contribution. They want to be recognized. They want to get respect. So I think they will be a very unifying force, even for the West. They will be an asset to the West. If that sounds too optimistic, maybe I am an optimist.
There's much more at the link.
No comments:
Post a Comment