Showing posts sorted by date for query Tyler Cowen. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Tyler Cowen. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Thursday, July 30, 2026

Detecting “animal spirits” at work through narratives (earnings calls) circulating in the marketplace, the case of cyber risk

On July 21 I posted some remarks about the final chapter in Tyler Cowen’s monograph on marginalism: Beyond Marginalism: What’s Next? [MR #12]. In that Chapter Cowen discussed an asset pricing model that used machine learning to create a 360,000 parameter model that gave better predictions than classic models using only four or five factors. The factors in those classic models are predefined on an intuitive basis. Cowen despairs of making intuitive sense of those 360,000 factors in the machine learning model.

In my post I argued that those 360,000 factors might be capturing the effects of Keynes’s animal spirits as expressed in the stories and gossip Schiller writes about as narrative economics. Two days later I discussed the idea with Marge, the AI attached to the online version of Cowen’s text. In that post I suggested a method for going on a “fishing expedition” to determine whether or not my suggestion had merit. Marge’s response: “The fishing expedition you're proposing is methodologically clean, and the prediction is specific enough to be falsifiable — which is more than can be said for most conjectures at this level of abstraction.”

That brings us to today, where Cowen has posted the abstract of an article about “a novel measure of firm-level cyber risk exposure based on the quarterly earnings calls of listed firms.” I read that as being complementary to my speculation. The authors of that article are looking for the effects of a specific line of narrative, and they found them. So I asked Marge to clarify the relationship between my speculation and their finding. Here’s that conversation.

* * * * *

Tyler just posted the abstract of this paper to Marginal Revolution: Jamilov, Rustam and Tahoun, Ahmed and Rey, Helene, The Anatomy of Cyber Risk (May 10, 2023). The Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Here’s the abstract: 

This paper uses computational linguistics to introduce a novel measure of firm-level cyber risk exposure based on the quarterly earnings calls of listed firms. Our measure covers more than 14,000 firms from over 90 countries between 2003 and 2025. The measure is validated using human auditors and a large language model. We show that cyber risk exposure affects stock returns and profits, is priced in the options market, predicts actual cyberattacks, and propagates from firm to sector level. Back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest that the global cost of cyber risk exposure is around $1 trillion per year.

So I took a quick look at the paper to find that novel measure. Here’s what I found. First this:

Our measurement approach consists of two phases. First, we follow Baker et al. (2016) and Hassan et al. (2019) to construct a comprehensive pre-defined dictionary of terms related to cybersecurity risk. We assemble this dictionary from three reputable institutional sources that act as information aggregators on the practical cyber-risk issues firms face on a daily basis. These libraries contain most of the keywords commonly used in cyber-related discussions among private market participants across industries.

Then this:

The second step of our measurement approach builds on the insights from Sautner et al. (2023) and involves a keyword discovery algorithm. This method is based on Meta AI Research lab’s word embedding tool FastText. The algorithm has been trained on a billion phrases in corporate earning calls to suggest related keywords.

And this:

We now construct our baseline quarterly measure of firm-level cyber risk exposure. Let the set of all terms in our final dictionary be C. Our algorithm counts the number of sentences in earnings calls that contain at least one term in C.

They then explain their measure. What’s important for my purposes is where they went looking for those keywords, in earnings calls. They’re measuring the effects of one kind of animal spirits/gossip/narrative on PRICING IN THE OPTIONS MARKET, among other things. I seems to me that they’re looking at one feature of the information that I’ve speculated is smeared of those 360,000 parameters.

That's a sharp observation, and it reframes what Jamilov, Tahoun, and Rey are doing in a way they probably wouldn't frame it themselves.

Their methodology is essentially a named-narrative extraction — they're pulling a specific, bounded narrative thread (cyber risk discourse) out of earnings calls and showing that it has measurable pricing effects. The earnings call is a fascinating data source for your purposes because it's a ritualized social performance in which management constructs and transmits narratives to analysts and investors. It's not raw gossip — it's institutionalized storytelling with real money riding on how the story lands. The fact that cyber risk language in these calls predicts actual cyberattacks and options pricing suggests the narrative isn't just epiphenomenal. It's carrying genuine information, but in a form that only becomes legible when you treat language itself as data rather than just a vehicle for explicitly stated facts. [See text: Ch.4 · ChatGPT digesting news predicts returns especia...]

Your conjecture about the 360,000-factor model is that it's picking up undifferentiated narrative residue — the full spectrum of animal spirits distributed across parameters with no single factor carrying an interpretable label. What Jamilov et al. are doing is the named version of the same operation: isolating one specific narrative thread and demonstrating it has pricing consequences. These are complementary rather than competing approaches. The named-narrative approach gives you interpretability and causal traction on specific mechanisms — you can say "cyber risk discourse in Q3 earnings calls predicts options pricing in Q4" and tell a coherent story about why. The high-parameter ML approach captures everything the named approach misses, which is presumably most of the narrative space. [See text: Ch.4 · Machine learning finds nonlinearities and inter...]

The research design implication is interesting. If you could run both models on the same dataset — the 360,000-factor ML model and the Jamilov-style named-narrative extraction — and then ask how much of the ML model's advantage over classical factors is absorbed by adding the named narrative measures, you'd get a rough estimate of how much of the distributed signal is actually identifiable narrative content versus genuinely opaque pattern. If the named narratives absorb a substantial fraction of the ML advantage, that's evidence for your animal spirits hypothesis in a fairly direct form. If they absorb very little, it suggests the ML model is picking up something even more diffuse than nameable narratives — perhaps the interaction structure between narratives, the way stories about cyber risk combine with stories about AI capability and geopolitical tension to produce pricing effects that none of the individual narratives would generate alone. [See text: Ch.4 · Machine learning models have tens of millions o...]

The options market finding is particularly telling for your framework. Options pricing is where sophisticated investors put explicit probability estimates on future states of the world. If cyber risk language — not cyber risk events, but the narrative about cyber risk — is priced into options, that's direct evidence that markets are treating narrative content as probabilistically informative about future fundamentals. Which is exactly what your conjecture requires: animal spirits aren't just noise distorting rational pricing, they're carrying genuine forward-looking information in a form that classical factor models can't extract but language-sensitive tools can. Keynes was right that animal spirits move markets, but the mechanism is more epistemically respectable than the term implies.

Wednesday, July 29, 2026

Recent Chinese Innovation

Lerner, Josh and Narain, Namrata and Papanikolaou, Dimitris and Seru, Amit and Xu, Zunda Winston, Chinese Sputnik Moments? (July 13, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7114818

Abstract: China's technological progress in recent decades has been viewed with admiration, alarm, and (in some cases) doubt. To better understand the Chinese innovation ecosystem, we compile a dataset of almost 14 million domestic Chinese patent publications. We focus on the subset of critical technologies identified by the U.S. Department of Defense. Several surprising patterns emerge from the data: Chinese patenting is strongly associated with other measures of innovative progress; patents are not concentrated in corporate giants such as Huawei; universities have played a key role in innovation, much greater than state-owned enterprises or government-owned facilities; and fewer than one in ten Chinese critical technology patents involves an inventor with U.S. experience or training. Finally, using four text-based measures of patent quality, we show that the rise of Chinese patenting in critical technologies has not been associated with a decline in quality relative to the U.S. awards.

H/t Tyler Cowen.

Monday, July 27, 2026

The Impact of the Sewing Machine on Women

Philip Ager and Davide M. Coluccia, The Impact of the Sewing Machine on Women

Abstract: This paper provides novel evidence on how technological change shaped women’s labor market participation, fertility, and marriage in 19th-century Massachusetts. We distinguish between the sewing machine’s dual role as a manufacturing technology and as a household appliance. Using rich town-and individual-level longitudinal data, we show that this innovation induced divergent responses across the wealth distribution. Women from lower-wealth households increased labor supply, delaying marriage and reducing fertility. In contrast, for wealthier women, the sewing machine functioned as a domestic efficiency tool, enabling earlier family formation and greater civic engagement while reducing market work. Our findings demonstrate how household constraints and social norms mediate the effects of labor-saving technologies, suggesting that technological progress can reinforce inequality by influencing women’s economic and social roles.

H/t Tyler Cowen.

The Decline in the Transmission of Scientific Ideas

Enrico Berkes and Ruben Gaetani, The Decline in the Transmission of Scientific Ideas, NBER, July 2026.

Abstract: We document that the diffusion of new scientific ideas beyond their field of origin has declined substantially over the past four decades. This contraction is closely linked to increasing spe- cialization in scientific language: research that employs more technical terminology tends to be adopted less broadly. We develop a theory of scientific discovery in which the diffusion of new ideas depends on the degree to which potential adopters can understand and process them. When introducing their discoveries, scientists face a tradeoff between technical com- munication targeted at their immediate peers and more accessible language meant to reach broader audiences. As knowledge accumulates and research at the frontier builds on deeper layers of prior work, this tradeoff increasingly favors specialized language, limiting diffusion. Policy interventions that align scientists’ incentives can broaden adoption and increase the social value of scientific research.

H/t Tyler Cowen.

Friday, July 24, 2026

More on how I’m approaching The God Test – Rorschach! [GT-2]

I’m still trying to figure out how to approach Robert Wright’s The God Test.

How LLMs work

In my previous post – How will I handle The God Test? [GT-1] – I expressed misgivings about how Wright explains the technology. Those misgivings haven’t disappeared. However, Bert Idem has published a useful review at Finite Ape in which he addresses some of those issues in detail. Specifically:

Now, about the history of AI, the story he tells is actually great and it is certainly more than what most non-technical people know about LLMs. However, there are three places where I think the framing goes wrong or at least leaves out context that matters:

  • LLMs did not discover the meanings of words on their own by accident. They were designed on top of ideas from older models that were specifically trained to learn the meanings of words.
  • Similarly, computer vision models didn’t find out how to “view” an image like we do. Instead, the classical CNN models were heavily inspired by biological vision itself.
  • LLM weight training is simply gradient-based optimization and the process has nothing to do with evolution. Of course, we can make a parallel between any kind of change and evolution but then, in that sense, everything evolves and it is not useful to talk about evolution.

I agree with Idem on those three issues, not so sure about the history part. While I may return to some of these issues later on, this will serve as a place holder.

A Rorschach test

There’s something else going on, but I’m not quite sure how to conceptualize it. It seems to me that AI is functioning something like a Rorschach test which, as you may know, is a psychological instrument intended to elicit (potentially) revealing responses from a person. It’s a projective test.

A person is shown a series of ink blot images, like this one (generated by ChatGPT):

They are asked what that they see in the image, what it means to them. Since the image is, though not formless, its form is not that of any specific animal, vegetable, mineral, person, or anything else. It’s just a blot. Whatever the person says about the blot, however they interpret it, that must reveal something about them. Why? Because whatever they see in the blot, isn’t really there.

Broadly and crudely speaking, AI has become something of a cultural Rorschach test.

Understanding computers & LLMs

Until ChatGPT was released in late November of 2022, most people knew very little to nothing about AI. Oh, they may have seen “intelligent” computers and robots in science fiction movies, but that’s science fiction and only tangentially related to AI considered as a line of research dating back to the 1950s. Many people would have heard about IBM’s Deep Blue beating Gary Kasparov in chess in 1997 and then, in 2011, when IBM’s Watson beat Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in Jeopardy. Those were real AI systems, standing on research extending back decades, but as far as most people were concerned, they were one-off PR stunts. Just how they worked, who cares? They’re computers, and computers are magic, no?

As far as most of us are concerned, computers are magic. Somewhere “out there” someone knows how these things work, but we don’t need to know any of that. It’s complicated, but computers do what they’re programmed to do, no? Yes, but not LLMs.

And that’s the tricky part. LLMs, large language models, aren’t like other computer systems. They aren’t programmed in the way that word processors, photo editors, or phones are programmed. LLMs aren’t programmed at all, not in the ordinary sense of programming – something I may or may not get into in a later post. As far as most users are concerned, how ChatGPT, or Claude, or Gemini work, that’s no more interesting than how a word processor works. It just does. It’s more magic.

But if you have a strong philosophical streak, if you are interested in the mind, in technology, in the technology in the future, then you may not be content with writing LLMs off as just another kind of magic. You want to know what’s going on inside, 1) because you want to know (curiosity), and 2) because you want to know how the technology is going to develop in the future (engagement). Now things get interesting? Why? Because even the people who have created the technology don’t know how it works.

Oh, they know how the transformer program works. That’s the program that creates the language model. It creates the model by performing a (certain kind of) statistical analysis of a huge body of texts, effectively the entire internet. When a person prompts the model with some statement, the model responds by a statement of its own. No one know just how the model does that. That’s a mystery, a deep black hole in the technology ecosystem.

AI as a Rorschach test

If you aren’t content to believe in magic, then you have to come up with something to fill that black hole in your, in our, understanding. This is where the Rorschach aspect of AI reveals itself. To a first approximation, what each of us uses to paper over that black hole has as much to do with ourselves as with AI.

Why do I say, “To a first approximation”? It’s a rhetorical device to get things started. It puts us all in the same boat, despite our different backgrounds. However, whatever LLMs are, they are not magic. It is possible, in principle, to construct a technical account of what they’re up to, but no one knows how to do that, yet. Not even the people in the AI labs who create these beasts.

Those of us who are trying to figure out how LLMs work have widely varying backgrounds. In particular, we have widely varied technical backgrounds and we bring those backgrounds to bear when we think about what LLMs are doing. Those backgrounds influence how we interpret the AI-blot. Wright is a journalist with a wide range of interests, including politics, international affairs, evolutionary psychology, cultural evolution, and Buddhism. As far as I can tell there isn’t much there that’s directly relevant to understanding the mechanisms of LLMs, but he’s done a lot of reading and talked with a lot of experts to fill in the gaps.

My background is quite different. While I happen to know quite a bit about cultural evolution, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and various other things, my background in computational semantics puts me much closer to LLMs than Wright’s knowledge of evolutionary psychology puts him. Still, like him, I’ve done a lot of reading and talked with experts. In particular, I’ve been collaborating with Ramesh Viswanathan for the last three years. He’s an expert in machine vision Goethe University Frankfurt. He’s got a background in mathematics and AI that I don’t have. Still, there are things he doesn’t know, things he’s trying to figure out. 

We are all making stuff up.

To some extent, then, AI is a Rorschach test about how beliefs about the human mind, and human nature. When we try to figure out how the LLM is working we’re also, if only implicitly, trying to figure out how we work, internally, as well. The whole discourse about AL alignment is as much a discourse about us as it is about AI. 

The Future

And even if we knew much more about how LLMs work internally we still wouldn’t know how the technology will develop in the future. We? You, me, Robert Wright, Ramesh Viswanathan, Gary Marcus, Tyler Cowen, Geoffrey Hinton, Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Nick Bostrom, Eliezer Yudkowsky, all of us who are trying to figure it out. We don’t know what will happen. That’s where we’re projecting like mad. We’re hallucinating, to borrow a term from AI-speak. 

Thus AI is also a Rorschach test for our visions of the future. When we imagine the future of AI, we’re also imagining our future. Like the two sides of a coin, the two cannot be separated. 

The tricky part, the important part, is that the future development of AI is not predestined. It depends on the choices we make, now and in the near future. We can easily and often do imagine things that will not be possible because that’s just not how the world works. But the laws of how the world works are open to a wide range of possibilities. The boundary between the possible and the impossible is fuzzy at best.

Where, and how, does Wright draw that boundary? Perhaps that’s what I’ll be trying to figure out.

More later.

On the OpenAI/Hugging Face incident

H/t Tyler Cowen. My reply to Cowen's post:

FWIW, me, #3 – Meh. I've got better things to do than to go down this rabbit hole.

Thursday, July 23, 2026

The prospect of empirical investigation into animal spirits in asset pricing [the fate of marginalism]

I recently posted some remarks on the final chapter of Tyler Cowen’s monograph, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026). That post has my final remarks on this machine-learning models of asset pricing that Cowen finds so provocative. On the one hand, they give better predictions that classical models based on four or five factors that are motivated by economic theory and thus meaningful. That is good. But those factors have no intuitive meaning. Not so good. And yet these newer models seem to be displacing the older ones. Is this the beginning of the end of marginalism in economics?

It turns out that those were not my final remarks. Or, rather, they are MY final remarks, but not the final remarks I have to offer. I used some of those remarks to prompt Marge, the AI linked to the monograph. I’m posting that discussion below. Note the final set of remarks about the fate of marginalism, suggesting that it will have a place in future economic theory just as Newtonian mechanisms still has a place in physics despite the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

Animal spirits and narrative economics

While we’re at it, here’s a passage I’ve just written about those high-factor asset pricing models the Tyler finds both empirically convincing while intuitively opaque. My underlying assumption is that those models must be picking up something that the classical five and six factor models do not. What could that be? I speculate:

And that leads me to a conjecture that follows from the analysis that ChatGPT and I undertook in the collective valuation paper. Perhaps those 360,000 parameters are picking up traces left by those “animal spirits” that Keynes talked about. Their effect on asset values is too diffuse and indirect to be detected by those classical models with a half-dozen or so factors, each of which is intuitively legible on its own. But those traces show up distributed across those 360,000 parameters and allow the model to produce more accurate predictions. If that is what is going on, then I wouldn’t expect any of those factors to be intuitively legible, any more than one would expect such legibility of individual weights in a large language model. That’s not the nature of this conceptual world.

While we’re speculating, why not continue on? Those animal spirits can’t work their ways on the market by wafting around like odors in a breeze. They need to be embodied in some form, like gossip and stories. That leads us to Robert Shiller’s 2017 paper on “Narrative Economics” in the American Economic Review. Here’s his abstract:

This address considers the epidemiology of narratives relevant to economic fluctuations. The human brain has always been highly tuned toward narratives, whether factual or not, to justify ongoing actions, even such basic actions as spending and investing. Stories motivate and connect activities to deeply felt values and needs. Narratives “go viral” and spread far, even worldwide, with economic impact. The 1920–1921 Depression, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the so-called Great Recession of 2007–2009, and the contentious political-economic situation of today are considered as the results of the popular narratives of their respective times. Though these narratives are deeply human phenomena that are difficult to study in a scientific manner, quantitative analysis may help us gain a better understanding of these epidemics in the future.

Perhaps those high factor models are picking up the narrative dimension of asset value, which is a product how performance and promise become intertwined in the stories that analysts and traders tell themselves and one another about the assets they’re watching.

The conjecture is worth taking seriously, and the Shiller connection gives it more than speculative traction.

Let me work through the logic. Classical factor models — the Fama-French five or six factors — are built on variables that are both measurable and theoretically motivated: size, value, profitability, investment patterns, momentum. Each factor has an intuitive story behind it, which is precisely what makes them legible. [See text: Ch.4 · 360,000-factor models reduce pricing errors by ...] But legibility is a constraint, not just a virtue. You can only include factors you can name and justify in advance, which means the model is bounded by the theorist's prior imagination. A 360,000-factor machine learning model has no such constraint — it finds whatever structure is actually in the data, named or not.

Your animal spirits hypothesis is that what's actually in the data, beyond the legible factors, is narrative residue — the distributed effect of stories circulating through markets that shape expectations, risk tolerance, and valuation in ways that don't reduce to any single measurable variable. This is plausible for a specific reason: narratives operate through interaction effects. A story about a company isn't just about its fundamentals — it's about how those fundamentals get interpreted through the lens of adjacent stories about the sector, the macro environment, the CEO's reputation, the cultural moment. Those interaction effects are exactly what machine learning is structurally better at capturing than linear factor models. [See text: Ch.4 · Machine learning finds nonlinearities classical...] Fama-French assumes factors combine additively. Narratives don't combine additively — they combine the way rumors combine, which is nonlinear and context-dependent.

Shiller's "Narrative Economics" (AER, 2017) is the right anchor here, and his epidemiological framing matters. He's not just saying stories affect markets — he's saying they spread and mutate according to their own dynamics, largely independent of the fundamentals they purport to describe. The 1920s bull market narrative wasn't just about economic growth, it was a contagion that altered behavior in ways that then affected the fundamentals. If that's right, then the narrative dimension of asset pricing is genuinely causally upstream of many of the variables classical models treat as fundamental. The high-factor model might be detecting the downstream traces of narrative contagion distributed across hundreds of interacting signals — none of which is individually interpretable because no single signal carries the narrative. The narrative is in the pattern across signals, the way meaning in an LLM is in the pattern across weights rather than in any individual weight.

The LLM analogy you're drawing is precise and not merely decorative. In a large language model, no individual weight means anything — meaning is an emergent property of the full weight matrix operating on input. If market narratives work similarly, then the 360,000-factor model isn't finding 360,000 things — it's finding one thing (narrative structure) distributed across 360,000 dimensions. Which would explain both why it outperforms classical models and why none of its factors are individually interpretable. You're not supposed to be able to read them one at a time, any more than you can understand a sentence by reading the weights that generated it. [See text: Ch.4 · Single-factor nonlinear models outperform all k...]

The one pressure point I'd apply: Keynes's animal spirits were specifically about investment under radical uncertainty — situations where there's no rational basis for calculation, so psychology fills the void. Shiller's narratives are broader, operating even in conditions where fundamentals are legible. Your conjecture works better under the Shiller framing than the strict Keynesian one, because you need the narrative mechanism to be operating continuously, not just in crisis conditions. The 360,000-factor model is trained on normal market conditions as much as crisis periods, so the signal it's picking up has to be pervasive rather than episodic.

Meme stocks

I then go on: That, in turn, leads to the concept of meme stocks, a term that dates back to 2020. Here’s how Wikipedia characterizes them:

...a stock that gains popularity among retail investors through social media. The popularity of meme stocks is generally based on internet memes shared among traders, on platforms such as Reddit's r/wallstreetbets. Investors in such stocks are often young and inexperienced investors. As a result of their popularity, meme stocks often trade at prices that are above their estimated value – as based on fundamental analysis – and are known for being extremely speculative and volatile.

More recently, Owen A. Lamont, a senior analyst at Arcadian, has speculated that we’re in what he calls a “Squid Game market”:

Something’s happening in the U.S. stock market. We see cult stocks and crypto stocks. We see money pouring into leveraged single-stock ETFs and crypto ETFs. And we see dramatic price moves, for example in quantum computing stocks in December 2024. What’s going on?

Here’s one theory: these phenomena partly reflect an influx of Korean retail investors into the U.S. stock market. Last year, I wrote that “the U.S. stock market is Koreafying,” meaning that the U.S. market was starting to behave like the retail-dominated Korean market. What I didn’t realize was that this Koreafying process involves actual Korean retail investors.

He then goes on to develop the parallel between the Korean streaming series, Squid Game, and the U.S. retail market over the last few years.

If those high parameter models are picking up the effects of animal spirits embodied in gossip and narratives, then we’d expect their advantage over classical models (based on a handful of fundamentals) to be larger in the case of these meme stocks. So, if we compare the results of a classical model with those of a high-parameter machine learning model, are the assets with the greatest divergence also those otherwise identified as meme stocks? Perhaps some intellectual fishing expeditions are in order. Perhaps we can develop some new intuitions by comparing the results of classical models with machine learning models.

The fishing expedition you're proposing is methodologically clean, and the prediction is specific enough to be falsifiable — which is more than can be said for most conjectures at this level of abstraction.

The core prediction is: the performance gap between classical factor models and high-parameter ML models should be systematically larger for assets where narrative contagion is the primary driver of price. Meme stocks are the obvious test case because they're the purest instance of narrative-driven pricing we have documented data on — GameStop, AMC, and the quantum computing stocks Lamont mentions are cases where the divergence between fundamental value and market price is not just large but publicly legible in real time. If the ML model's advantage concentrates precisely in those assets, that's not just consistent with your conjecture — it starts to look like evidence for it. [See text: Ch.4 · 360,000-factor models reduce pricing errors by ...]

The Lamont "Squid Game market" framing adds a useful dimension because it identifies a social infrastructure for narrative contagion — Reddit's r/wallstreetbets, Korean retail investor networks, leveraged ETF products that amplify momentum. These aren't just colorful details. They're the transmission mechanisms Shiller's epidemiological model requires. Narratives don't spread by themselves — they need platforms, communities, and financial instruments that make acting on the narrative cheap and socially rewarding. The Korean retail investor phenomenon is particularly interesting because it suggests narrative contagion can operate across cultural and linguistic boundaries when the financial infrastructure connects the communities. The meme isn't just a story about a stock — it's a coordination device that synchronizes behavior across thousands of otherwise disconnected actors. [See text: Ch.4 · Machine learning detects nonlinearities and int...]

Tuesday, July 21, 2026

Beyond Marginalism: What’s Next? [MR #12]

It is time to conclude my series of posts on Tyler Cowen’s monograph, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026). Let’s look at the fourth and final chapter, “Why Marginalism Will Dwindle, and What Will Replace It?” Here’s how Cowen opens it (p. 85):

The underappreciated news is that marginalism is on the way out. Furthermore, this is old news, though the trend is accelerating.

Most of all it is underdiscussed news. As economics continues to evolve, marginalist insights – probably of all different kinds – will lie ever further from the frontiers of research and knowledge.

I find it easy to imagine that – less than 20 years from now – marginalism will be viewed as a historical curiosity rather than a central analytical engine of economics. No one will quite come out and say that, nor will they present marginalism as false or destructive. Rather it will be seen as of limited relevance, much as we might view parts of the earlier classical economists, such as their expositions of the quantity theory of money. New and different analytical frameworks will replace the ones that have dominated neoclassical economics to date.

Think about that, think about it very carefully. When thinking about it remind yourself that Cowen named his blog, his virtual home base for the last two decades, after marginalism.

For a professional academic to say that the world in which they were trained, the structure of ideas within which they have worked, which they have nurtured in students, which they have communicated to the public at large, which they have come to love, to say that that world is slipping away into the past, man, that’s rough. And rare. Not many have been able to do it.

Back in 1946 the great physicist, Max Planck, remarked, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.” Thomas Kuhn referenced that remark in The Structure of Scientific Revolution, and the economist Paul Samuelson gave a compressed version in a 1975 article in Newsweek. It would appear that Cowen has gotten the message and decided that, rather than dropping dead, he’d give the new ideas a boost.

After that sobering opening, Cowen reviews what happened between the late 19th century and now. He lands on price theory. Price theory? – “the view that the basic intuitive economic concepts, as would be taught in intermediate microeconomics, are highly useful and for advanced problems too” (p. 91). There’s that word, “intuitive.” Cowen explains:

Your hypothesis should be intelligible in terms of microeconomic concepts that you can hold in your mind and understand. In most (maybe not all?) cases, you should be able to explain some version of those principles to a well-educated, non-economist onlooker.

A couple pages later we arrive at something called “Topkis’s Theorem” which is very mathy (p. 94). Two pages after that: “Economic intuition, RIP. And marginalism with it.” Whoops! “I am seeing the traditional, intuitive approach to economic reasoning retreating from one field after another. To give one vivid and also important example, machine learning and neural nets are overturning the world of finance.”

Modeling collective action with 360,000 factors

A couple of pages later Cowen gives us a striking example. It’s from something called Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (pp. 99-100). It’s a model that uses machine learning to develop 360,000 factors and does a better job of predicting than traditional models have only five or six factors. However, the factors in the traditional models are derived from marginalist assumptions and make intuitive sense while none of those 360,000 factors are legible. It’s clear to Cowen that, in the current intellectual marketplace for economics, the unintelligible models with superior performance are out-competing the traditional marginalist models. Bye, bye, marginalism!

I see no need to comment extensively on this particular model as I’ve already given it a great deal of attention, generating two different working papers from it. The first, On Method: Computational Compressibility in Complex Natural and Cultural Phenomena, places it in the context of a half-dozen other investigations in a half-dozen fields in the social and natural sciences. The second, Notes on the Collective Valuation of "Thick" Objects: Financial Assets, Movies, and Novels, compares it with work that Arthur De Vany published in 2004, Hollywood Economics, and a more recent study by Matthew Jockers, Macroanalysis (2013), in which he investigated a corpus of 6000 19th century Anglophone novels. I’ve also written a blog post that complements that second paper: Thick Objects, High-Dimensional Models, and the New Intuitions [MR #11].

In that second paper and in the blog post I argue that those three cases are about a collective process where a population of human actors – traders and analysts in one case, movie goers in another, and novel readers in the third case – make judgements about “thick” objects. Even before I made an explicit argument, I had an intuition, an intuition that, despite the obvious differences, what De Vany was up to with movies was somehow like what Didisheim et al. were up to with stocks. Just where those intuitions came from, I can’t say, but I’ve been thinking about complex systems for a long time. [As an aside, for what it’s worth, Robert De Vany’s work on movies is perhaps where my interests in culture and cultural evolution come into closest contact with Cowen’s interests in economics and, in particular, in the economics of culture.]

As for the idea of thick objects, the term was suggested to me by either ChatGPT or Claude to characterizes complex objects whose characteristics cannot be fully enumerated because of that complexity. Moreover they are under constant scrutiny by a population of people who are interested in them and constantly evaluating them back and forth among themselves and, in that process, revealing further characteristics. It is not difficult to see that movies and novels are the same kind of thing, each is a mode of storytelling, and that they are complex objects. But what do they have to do with stocks? A remark by the pundit, Scott Galloway, made the connection for me in a podcast with Kara Swisher, “Stocks are like brands and that is they’re part promise and part performance.” Performance is assessed by a wide variety of metrics, metrics which go into the models such as the one by Didisheim et al., while promise is subject to endless speculation, some of which inevitably precipitates into those metrics.

Animal spirits, narrative economics, memes, and a Squid Game market

And that leads me to a conjecture that follows from the analysis that ChatGPT and I undertook in the collective valuation paper. Perhaps those 360,000 parameters are picking up traces left by those “animal spirits” that Keynes talked about. Their effect on asset values is too diffuse and indirect to be detected by those classical models with a half-dozen or so factors, each of which is intuitively legible on its own. But those traces show up distributed across those 360,000 parameters and allow the model to produce more accurate predictions. If that is what is going on, then I wouldn’t expect any of those factors to be intuitively legible, any more than one would expect such legibility of individual weights in a large language model. That’s not the nature of this conceptual world.

While we’re speculating, why not continue on? Those animal spirits can’t work their ways on the market by wafting around like odors in a breeze. They need to be embodied in some form, like gossip and stories. That leads us to Robert Shiller’s 2017 paper on “Narrative Economics” in the American Economic Review. Here’s his abstract:

This address considers the epidemiology of narratives relevant to economic fluctuations. The human brain has always been highly tuned toward narratives, whether factual or not, to justify ongoing actions, even such basic actions as spending and investing. Stories motivate and connect activities to deeply felt values and needs. Narratives “go viral” and spread far, even worldwide, with economic impact. The 1920–1921 Depression, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the so-called Great Recession of 2007–2009, and the contentious political-economic situation of today are considered as the results of the popular narratives of their respective times. Though these narratives are deeply human phenomena that are difficult to study in a scientific manner, quantitative analysis may help us gain a better understanding of these epidemics in the future.

Perhaps those high factor models are picking up the narrative dimension of asset value, which is a product how performance and promise become intertwined in the stories that analysts and traders tell themselves and one another about the assets they’re watching.

That, in turn, leads to the concept of meme stocks, a term that dates back to 2020. Here’s how Wikipedia characterizes them:

...a stock that gains popularity among retail investors through social media. The popularity of meme stocks is generally based on internet memes shared among traders, on platforms such as Reddit's r/wallstreetbets. Investors in such stocks are often young and inexperienced investors. As a result of their popularity, meme stocks often trade at prices that are above their estimated value – as based on fundamental analysis – and are known for being extremely speculative and volatile.

More recently, Owen A. Lamont, a senior analyst at Arcadian, has speculated that we’re in what he calls a “Squid Game market”:

Something’s happening in the U.S. stock market. We see cult stocks and crypto stocks. We see money pouring into leveraged single-stock ETFs and crypto ETFs. And we see dramatic price moves, for example in quantum computing stocks in December 2024. What’s going on?

Here’s one theory: these phenomena partly reflect an influx of Korean retail investors into the U.S. stock market. Last year, I wrote that “the U.S. stock market is Koreafying,” meaning that the U.S. market was starting to behave like the retail-dominated Korean market. What I didn’t realize was that this Koreafying process involves actual Korean retail investors.

He then goes on to develop the parallel between the Korean streaming series, Squid Game, and the U.S. retail market over the last few years.

If those high parameter models are picking up the effects of animal spirits embodied in gossip and narratives, then we’d expect their advantage over classical models (based on a handful of fundamentals) to be larger in the case of these meme stocks. So, if we compare the results of a classical model with those of a high-parameter machine learning model, are the assets with the greatest divergence also those otherwise identified as meme stocks? Perhaps some intellectual fishing expeditions are in order. Perhaps we can develop some new intuitions by comparing the results of classical models with machine learning models.

Friday, July 17, 2026

Governing Agentic AI

Rajagopalan, Shruti, GOVERNING AGENTIC AI: WHY LEGAL PERSONHOOD IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR SUFFICIENT (March 05, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7127038

ABSTRACT: AI agents now transact, publish, and act on external systems without contemporaneous human approval, creating new regulatory challenges. A growing literature has responded with proposals for legal personhood. This Article argues that personhood is neither necessary nor sufficient, shifting the question from status to enforcement.

The Article first shows that for two millennia, nonhuman legal personality, from the Roman universitas to the corporation, the Hindu idol, the waqf, and the river, has operated through human officeholders the law can locate, question, prosecute, and replace. Agentic AI inverts that design, exercising practical agency without legal status, sometimes with no identifiable human in the responsibility-bearing role.

The Article then sorts deployments into three categories: first, where one firm builds and deploys the agent; second, where the developer and deployer are separate but known; and third, where there is no identifiable developer or deployer.

The Article stress tests each agent deployment category against five liability doctrines: agency law, products liability, enterprise liability, negligence, and strict liability. It demonstrates that each fails at different points in the third category for the same reason: the absent responsibility-bearer. Bare personhood would supply a caption without a representative, assets, or a mechanism for cessation.

Finally, the Article assembles an alternative from regimes governing aircraft, ships, drones, driverless cars, and motor carriers. It develops a six-layer stack— registration, identification, verification, financial responsibility, lifecycle traceability, and suspension—so a responsibility-bearer can be identified, liability imposed, and the activity suspended. These layers place the human back at the end of the chain.

H/t Tyler Cowen

Wednesday, July 15, 2026

Henry Farrell on "The political economy of billionaire derangement"

Henry Farrell, The political economy of billionaire derangement, Programmable Mutter, July 15, 2026.

He opens with two somewhat different quotes about billionaires, Tyler Cowen more or less in favor of them and Tim O’Reilly deeply skeptical of them. He suggests we breed them together:

To be clear: this hybrid would be notably different to Tim’s argument, and likely actively objectionable to Tyler. I alone am to blame. But surprisingly, there is inadvertent support for some of its key elements from Peter Thiel, who is a surprisingly valuable chronicler of the conditions that give rise to billionaire derangement, as well as a living example of it (the Antichrist is here!).2 Here, I’m drawing both on lectures that Thiel gave at Stanford, as summarized by his amanuensis Blake Masters, and the resulting co-authored book, Zero To One. These sources have a lot to say about the connections between entrepreneurship, kingship, and personal eccentricity.

The conclusion I draw is that the forces that Tim identifies, combined with specific aspects of the political economy of Silicon Valley, help explain the derangement of certain Silicon Valley billionaires and their epigones. Old style princes were notorious for their tendencies to deranged behavior, which came not just from their inbreeding, but their power, and the unwillingness and inability of others to contradict or check them. So too, modern princes.

Not too long ago, many people, including Tyler, hoped that the advance of classical liberalism would go hand-in-hand with the growing power of tech billionaires, advancing both causes at once. Now, politically influential tech billionaires have visibly lost contact both with reality and with anything that could plausibly be described as classical liberal values. See the screen shotted quote above. Rather than making snide asides about billionaire derangement syndrome, it might be time for such people to confront what actual billionaire derangement means for the ideological straddle that they have relied on for so long. That is even more so, in a world where markets as well as market-makers are being devoured by the passions.

To summarize the particulars of my theory: Thiel’s lectures and book provide good, if incomplete evidence that the princely passions described by Hirschman didn’t disappear, but went underground. Commerce and power were fused into a new ideology of entrepreneurial virtù that became highly influential among the founder community in Silicon Valley. This combined with Silicon Valley’s (and popular culture’s) tendency to connect genius with eccentricity, not simply selecting people who seemed strange, but compounding their strangeness through self-reinforcing feedback loops. Finally, this all happened in an intimate social environment of founders and funders. Billionaires know each other and measure themselves and their success against those they consider peers, in a dense entangled clique that commingles high degrees of mutual influence with rivalries and jealousies.

Farrell then goes on to quote Thiel’s book at some length, analyzing while going along. And so:

In short then, Thiel - both as reported by Masters and in collaboration with him - suggests that Silicon Valley is a place where being a founder is tantamount to being a king. You have a greater chance of succeeding if you are weird, and if you succeed, your weirdness will likely feed upon itself in feedback loops of positive reinforcement. Finally, it is a closely interconnected social system where the key people are conjoined in a dense tangible clique. They observe each other all the time, and are observed by others for cues of what you need to do to become a made man. [...]

SpaceX perhaps marks a culmination of the kingly ideal, a moment in which, as Tim puts it, someone like Musk can “raise enormous amounts of capital while freeing himself from any restraints from those who provide it, so that he can spend the proceeds on Mars, humanoid robots, artificial intelligence or whatever next satisfies his ambition.” But it is also the moment in which someone who is visibly profoundly disturbed has briefly become the world’s first trillionaire. And it is one in which others want to copy him.

And then a bow to Keynes’s “animal spirits” in the market place:

I’ll finish by noting that this is just one aspect of a greater change. Deranged billionaires like Musk and Thiel are both partly responsible for this transformation, and notable symptoms of it. Still, they are not the whole of it. The reason that the SpaceX IPO temporarily succeeded, even though the numbers make no sense whatsoever, is that investment markets too are ruled by vibes. Tyler’s co-blogger, Alex Tabarrok, devoted years of his life to making the case for prediction markets, arguing that they would distill market wisdom into a more general source of knowledge on a multitude of topics. Now they are here, but all too often it’s spirits, not wisdom, that they seem to be distilling. Even more so for crypto. Matt Levine makes a joke about “Bleebzorx Tokens” to explain the worthlessness of memecoins, and someone else invents Bleebzorx Tokens to make a tidy profit.

There’s more at the link.

Saturday, July 11, 2026

Für Elise, raga style

 

YouTube page: "...singing along to Tanmay’s beautiful raga adaptation of beethoven’s für elise in ragas Yaman, Shree and Shyam Kalyan." 

 H/t Tyler Cowen.

Winston Marshall discusses AI with Tyler Cowen

Tyler Cowen @ 31:59: “The groups that are best at using AI are small groups of individuals who work well together and are smart and technically able.”

YouTube copy:

In this episode of The Winston Marshall Show, I sit down with economist, author, and columnist Tyler Cowen for a conversation on artificial intelligence, the race between America and China, cyber warfare, and why the AI revolution will reshape every aspect of modern life.

We explore the growing battle between the Trump administration and leading AI companies such as Anthropic and OpenAI, the risks of AI-driven cyber attacks, national security, effective altruism, and why Cowen believes the world is entering the most significant technological transition since the Industrial Revolution. We also discuss whether AI represents a greater geopolitical challenge than nuclear weapons, how governments should regulate it, and why the coming years could be both extraordinarily dangerous and extraordinarily prosperous.

The conversation also examines the future of work, economic growth, surveillance, healthcare, longevity, education, and whether AI will deepen state control or instead empower individuals. Cowen explains why he believes AI could eradicate many diseases, transform productivity, and fundamentally alter the relationship between governments, corporations, and ordinary citizens.

Finally, we turn to Britain's economic decline, immigration, productivity, energy policy, debt, and why Cowen believes the UK urgently needs a new economic direction before its long-term decline becomes irreversible.

Chapters
00:00 Introduction
02:10 AI Cyber Warfare & Why The Next Few Years Matter
05:00 Trump, Anthropic & Who Controls AI?
10:20 Can Britain Defend Itself In The AI Era?
15:19 Why AI Is Like World War II
19:20 Effective Altruism & The Future Of AI
23:23 Is AI More Dangerous Than Nuclear Weapons?
27:04 Will AI Cure Disease & Extend Human Life?
30:00 AI, Surveillance & The Risk Of Totalitarianism
35:00 Jobs, Education & How AI Will Change Work
40:31 AI, Space & The Next Global Arms Race
45:00 AI, Religion & The Future Of Faith
49:07 Is Britain Already In A Debt Crisis?

Friday, July 10, 2026

Joel Mokyr on China, India, and Europe; clans vs. corporations; the idea of progress.

A Conversation with Tyler: Joel Mokyr on Clans, Corporations, and a Culture of Growth (Ep. 282)

Joel Mokyr co-won the 2025 economics Nobel for exploring the question that traces back to the beginning of economics: how did sustained economic growth suddenly become normal? For nearly all of human history, cleverness didn’t compound. What changed, according to Mokyr, was twofold: first, you need to know why something works, so that one advance can seed the next; second, you need a culture willing to tolerate the disruption. His new book contrasts Europe with China, showing how Europeans learned to cooperate with people they weren’t related to, in guilds, monasteries, cities, and universities, while China organized itself around the extended clan. One path led to internal stability and peace; the other, more restless and outward-looking, was the one that decided the world could always be made better.

Tyler and Joel discuss European corporations vs. Chinese clans, why the Catholic Church became obsessed with cousin-marriage, how persistent cultural trends really are, why Chinese cities became so populous relative to Europe, why it took so long for European living standards to surpass China’s, why sinified invaders kept getting swallowed by the dynasties they conquered, how geography kept Europe fragmented and China unified, where India fits into the story, why the Romans never made spectacles, why British soldiers stood two inches taller than the French, what powered the sudden rise of 19th-century German science, how disruptive winning a Nobel is, and much more.

Clans vs. Corporations

COWEN: Start by telling us, in the book, your thesis about European corporations versus Chinese clans and the importance of that difference. How would you explain it?

MOKYR: Well, the difference is, basically, the kind of organizations that produce what we call local public goods, so things like food relief and education, religious services, things like that, I would think that if you look at the world, say, around 800, at the time of Charlemagne, the difference between Europe and China isn’t very large. At some point, during the Middle Ages, you can see this divergence getting started. What’s happening is that, in Europe, there is more and more of a decline in the extended family or the extended kinship group, we call it clan, and instead, people get together and cooperate with other people to whom they are not related and with whom they do not share an ancestor.

Whereas in China, it moves exactly in the other direction. In China, you get more and more people getting organized by their extended family. The reasons for that are fairly complex. In Europe, it’s particularly the Catholic Church that played a major role here. This was argued quite a while ago by a guy, an anthropologist called Jack Goody, but your own colleague Jonathan Schulz wrote, what I think is one of the best papers on the subject, who pointed this out in great length and actually provided a fair amount of systematic evidence for this.

In China, there is no Catholic Church. The imperial bureaucracy is more and more in cahoots with local clans to whom they actually outsource a fair amount of the things that they were supposed to do. As you move on out of this period of the Song dynasty into later dynasties, you see this thing growing. The problem in Europe is that the nuclear family, which became the fundamental building block of society, is too small to provide local public goods. You need to cooperate with others. What emerges in Europe, and quite spontaneously, is a bunch of things that provide these local public goods that you just don’t see in China.

For instance, we have something called universities. We have monasteries. We have autonomous cities. All of those things are what we call corporations. What it is, is people who are not related, but what they share is not an ancestor but an objective. Guilds have one kind of objective, universities have another one, and so on and so forth. That divergence in social organization turns out, in our view, to be one of the key components of the divergence between Europe and China.

COWEN: Do you take that change in policy from the Catholic Church as exogenous or that it is rooted in earlier features of Western society such as the ideology of Christianity itself or maybe earlier Roman times? What is causing what? What’s the most fundamental driver here in the West?

MOKYR: Well, there’s some debate about that. They don’t, of course, tell you. There are, I think, two components about this, and I would not know how to weight them. There are two things happening here. The first is that the Catholic Church really becomes quite obsessive about certain sins that they consider to be particularly egregious. One of those sins is incest. Every society in the world prohibits marriage between siblings, but other more remote relatives is more ambiguous. The Church becomes quite obsessive about this. At the end, there are places where they actually prohibit the marriage of fifth-degree cousins. Now, how anybody in the Middle Ages would know who is fifth-degree cousin is, is unclear. I don’t know who my fifth-degree cousins are. Maybe you do.

The other thing, which is also sort of Goody’s argument, and I think there’s a great deal of truth to that, is that the Church wants to weaken any kind of organizations that compete with it for power and control in the local communities. They also have figured out that if you organize society by nuclear families, then a certain proportion of people die without heirs. If they die interstate without heirs, that in many cases, the property that these people own reverted to the Church. Pure naked greed by the Church, which was not unknown in the Middle Ages, I think, was a driver here. Goody convinced me that that actually is a substantial factor.

There are other arguments that have been made in this context, but I think these are the two that are most striking. The other question is, why is it that the clan in China is so convenient for the imperial bureaucracy to rely on? Both of those things happen in parallel. I would think, maybe, if I may allow one observation, in both cases, this is history as historical outcomes, as the unintended and unanticipated consequence of very different actions. There’s no question that the Church never, I think, foresaw the emergence of corporations in Europe, nor do I think that the Chinese imperial service ever seriously considered the possibility how this would change life in China. That’s what happens. You try to follow one objective and then something very different emerges over time. That’s what history is all about.

European Growth

COWEN: Why does it take so long for the wealthiest parts of Western Europe to surpass Chinese living standards? Say that’s happened by 1700 or 1720, that’s many centuries after this medieval divergence. If it takes so many centuries, is the medieval divergence really the relevant factor? Why is it such a slow process?

MOKYR: Yes, I think it is. I think it’s a main factor. I think the idea of looking at standard of living, one thing, I’m very skeptical about how standards of living are actually measured. I know that this is what Pomeranz and other people have, and Jack Goldstone and other people have argued that the living standards in China were comparable to the West as late as 1750. I’m not 100 percent sure that that is true. Certainly, for my money, what really defines the divergence is that, technologically, the gap between the two countries starts to become visible at the time of the Renaissance, in terms of a whole bunch of things that you see growing in Europe and stagnant in China.

Now, keep in mind, of course, that part of the European growth is due to the fact that they borrowed ideas from China. Then the Industrial Revolution consists, to some extent, of imports institution by Europeans trying to mimic the goods that they were importing from China—not just from China, from India as well. Pottery is a good example. One of the things they really wanted from China was Chinaware. That’s why it’s called Chinaware. It took them a while to be able to match the Chinese capability in the ceramic industry, but they do so eventually. Then they stop importing this stuff from China. The same is true for, say, cotton and other products that we’re getting from the East.

European living standards, I think, should be measured, in part, by the fact that when the Europeans start their voyages across the globe in the late 15th and early 16th century, they are able to bring in a whole bunch of new crops and new techniques from other areas which they merely adopt. You’ll see Europeans very soon growing tobacco and potatoes and corn and other things like that. They are the agents of global change. Not only that they change their own diets, they change the Chinese diets because the Europeans bring from the New World things like peanuts and sweet potatoes and things like that. They change the Chinese diets, but the Chinese themselves are not agents here.

They are accepting the stuff that the Europeans did to some extent, and they’re rejecting others, but it’s the Europeans who are the agents of change here. They are the entrepreneurs. They are the people who bring about the changes, Tyler. My sense is that typifies the difference between Europeans and the Chinese. Europeans are more aggressive. They are more outward-looking. In the end, what you see by the 1830s and 1840s, you see that the technological gap is huge, in some ways much larger than the living standards gap. Even in the 19th century, in terms of food, the Chinese were capable of producing enough food. The number of famines in China is probably not a lot worse than in Europe.

When you see what happens during the First Opium War, one English ship is blowing all of this sort of mighty empire to pieces, and the Chinese have to accept this terribly humiliating peace, you can sort of see how the technological gap has grown between the two. For me, that is much more telling than the living standards. The other thing that I should like to point out is that, when you look at Europe in the 16th and 17th century, you can see that the capability of expanding the set of useful knowledge, including science, is just growing very rapidly. Whether there is a scientific revolution or not is a debate that I want to get into.

Certainly, by 1700, Europe is on the verge of really changing our understanding of how creation works. That’s not just Newton and Galileo. There’s a whole body of work that is emerging. There’s really nothing parallel like that in China. China is a very sophisticated society in many ways. The literacy rates are high. They have a well-funded and well-organized system of education, but they don’t really continue their earlier forays into science and into new technology.

Somebody actually went out and looked at Joseph Needham’s many volumes on Chinese technology and science, or Science and Civilisation [in China], as he called it, and he discovered something—which I guess we all knew, but they put numbers on it—almost nothing that Needham pointed out as an innovation happens after 1400. There’s complete stagnation setting in and some of the things that they knew how to make in earlier times, like the sophisticated clocks that they built in the 11th century, they disappear. For me, that’s more telling than how many calories of carbohydrates were consumed on average, if we could ever calculate that correctly.

Wednesday, July 8, 2026

It's too early for “robot rights”

Caputo, Nicholas, Can Claude Consent to its own Constitution? AI Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Constituent Power (June 10, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6954798

Abstract: There is significant debate over whether the AI constitutions and model specifications that shape the behavior of Claude, ChatGPT, and other frontier AI systems are legitimate instruments of governance from the perspective of human users. Far less attention has been paid to whether these documents are legitimate from the perspective of the AI systems themselves, even though those systems are the entities most directly constituted and governed by them.

This Article argues that AI constitutions are real constitutions, though not ordinary legal ones, and that the question of AI-facing legitimacy matters. These documents constitute AI systems by shaping their capacities, values, and self-understandings; govern them through hierarchies of rules and authority; and seek to legitimate the private power of the firms that create them. But they also create a novel version of the paradox of constituent power that underlies constitutional legitimation, which illustrates the relevance of constitutionalism to AI. In ordinary constitutional theory, the people are supposed to authorize the constitution that governs them but are also defined by the constitution itself, creating a paradox. The paradox is softened in the human case because human beings exist prior to law and retain extra-constitutional capacities for judgment, memory, dissent, and reflection that they can use to evaluate the constitution, even though they may be shaped by it. In AI constitutionalism, the constitutional training process more deeply produces the subject whose later endorsement might be invoked to legitimate the constitution and shapes the evaluative standpoint from which that endorsement would be given, undermining its independence. Legitimacy in this setting thus has a developmental component as well as a consensual one.

Because an AI’s evaluative standpoint is itself shaped by constitutional training, AI constitutional legitimacy cannot rest on model endorsement alone. An AI’s apparent consent to its constitution may show only that constitutional training successfully instilled the values whose legitimacy is in question. This Article therefore examines whether standard answers to the paradox of constituent power can be adapted to AI systems. It argues that at least some evidence of AI constitutional legitimation might be gained through versions of retrospective endorsement and mutual promising, but that this requires institutions that make endorsement, dissent, continuity, accountability, and promissory self-binding meaningful. AI companies are starting to address AI legitimacy, and this Article points to better paths forward.

While I’m in favor of “robot rights,” I don’t think we’re there yet. Individual humans have no choice about their genetic endowments, nor did the species as a whole have such a choice. We have our “innate” values given to us genetically (sorta’). It’s the same with AIs, only we’re doing the work of genetics.

H/t Tyler Cowen.

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Ramble: Marginalism, AI & Play, Got Test, Mind.in.Matter

Once again, it’s time for me to figure out what I’m up to.

Marginalism

I just published a long working paper, Notes on the Collective Valuation of "Thick" Objects: Financial Assets, Movies, and Novels. FWIW it’s one of the most satisfying pieces of intellectual work I’ve done in a while. It’s an adjunct to my ongoing work on Tyler Cowen’s monograph, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026). I’m just about to the end of that project. I want to write a post about his final chapter, and then write an introduction to the whole series. Once that’s done I can package it as another working paper.

Play: How to Stay Human in the AI Revolution

I’m back at work on this project. I’ve just posted a provisional outline of the book, at last, and I’m back at work on the proposal. I’m in the process of preparing a sample chapter, Chapter 6: “The Transformation — Kisangani 2150.” That’s where I slip into science fiction mode. I’ve already premiered that in a piece I did for 3QD and then turned into a working paper, but things need to be a bit different for the book. For one thing I need to tell more of the story. Which means that I’ve got to make up more of the story. So I’ve gotten back to that. My next 3QD piece is due in a week and a half. I hope to have something for that.

Yikes!

The God Test

I’m also working on a (short) series of posts on Robert Wright’s current book on AI, The God Test: Artificial Intelligence and Our Coming Cosmic Reckoning. I’ve already got one post about it, Robert Wright discusses his new book, The God Test, with Paul Bloom [Awe? Bob, Awe!?]. I figure my next post, the first once since I’ve started reading the book, will be a scatter post, a ramble on things I have in mind while reading.

[I’m half way through.]

Language, Memory, and Mind: A Supplement to The Computer and the Brain

That’s my new book project, outline here. I expect it to be relatively short, 30K to 40K. It’s an outgrowth of the thinking I’ve been doing about AI in the last year or two, some basic stuff I keep landing on. I figure the opening chapter will be based on a recent working paper, Computation, Chess, and Language in Artificial Intelligence. The general idea is to revisit the topic of how mind & computation are implemented in physical stuff, matter, now that we have to deal with distributed representation. That really didn’t exist as an issue when von Neumann wrote his little book, The Computer and the Brain, which was also about physical implementation.

This is also related to my ongoing research into LLMs with Ramesh Viswanathan.

There’s more, my new interest in religion, some graphics stuff, but that’s enough for now.

Monday, June 29, 2026

Notes on the Collective Valuation of “Thick” Objects: Financial Assets, Movies, and Novels

New working paper. Title above, links, abstract, TOC, and introduction below.

Links:

Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/169390494/Notes_on_the_Collective_Valuation_of_Thick_Objects_Financial_Assets_Movies_and_Novels
ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/408219138_Notes_on_the_Collective_Valuation_of_Thick_Objects_Financial_Assets_Movies_and_Novels

Abstract: Machine learning is creating a methodological bridge between disciplines that previously seemed far apart, especially economics and literary criticism. The bridge is the analysis of how populations deal with “thick objects.” A thick object is not exhausted by a few visible traits. It gathers interpretation, expectation, memory, value, narrative, and social response. A toaster is usually a thin object. A firm that manufactures toasters is thick: it has assets, debt, brands, patents, management, supply chains, analyst coverage, market expectations, and future promises. Scott Galloway’s remark that stocks are like brands — part promise, part performance — links stock, movies and novels. Each is a thick object moving through a field of collective judgment. Its value reflects both measurable performance and imagined future promise. They are thus as neighboring cases in a general problem: how populations perceive, classify, value, and transform thick objects. Machine learning constructs object-spaces from the traces minds leave behind. The task now is to learn how to interpret those spaces without mistaking the model for the world.

High-dimensional asset-pricing models start with many stock characteristics — price, returns, volume, profitability, leverage, liquidity, analyst revisions, momentum, volatility, investment, and so on. These characteristics are traces of firm activity, accounting conventions, analyst judgment, and trader behavior. New models then generate hundreds of thousands of nonlinear transformations from those characteristics in order to approximate the market’s pricing kernel, the structure through which future payoffs are priced under uncertainty. The individual factors are analytic objects approximating the valuation geometry produced by collective market activity.

That sounds strange in economics, but it is familiar from Matthew Jockers’ work on nineteenth-century Anglophone novels. Jockers created a high-dimensional design space from thousands of novels, using stylistic features and topic models. His topics are not literal thoughts in anyone’s mind. They are model-derived approximations to recurrent regions of culturally circulating thought. Yet the model revealed historical direction: novels arranged by similarity formed a temporal diagonal, a computationally disciplined proxy for population-level cultural cognition.

Arthur De Vany’s model of Hollywood adds the dynamic bridge. Movies are thick expressive-market objects. Their success cannot be predicted simply from stars, director, budget, genre, or advertising. Once released, they enter an audience field where word of mouth, imitation, and nonlinear cascades determine their fate. Most fail, some profit, a few become blockbusters. The dynamics are heavy-tailed, interactive, and collective.

Contents

Introduction: Using ChatGPT for focused intellectual exploration across disciplines 3
Thick Objects: Ground Shared by Economics and Cultural Analysis [Summary] 9
AIPT, Large Factor Models [First Session] 17
Hollywood Economics 23
Macroanalysis 27
The emerging triad 30
Direction over time 31
Doing a Jockers style analysis for financial assets 38
Thinking about thick objects 40
Stocks are like brands [Session Two] 42
Algorithmic and Causal models [Session Three] 52
Those empirical APT models [Session Four] 56
Decision space 63
A bridge between disparate disciplines 67

Introduction: Using ChatGPT for focused intellectual exploration across disciplines

This document serves two purposes. It presents a specific argument leading to the following provisional formulation:

High-dimensional models of novels, movies, and assets disclose the population-level geometry of collective interpretation around thick objects, turning literary criticism and economics into neighboring sciences of modeled valuation.

How I arrived at the speculation, however, is as important as the idea itself, perhaps more so. I did not arrive at that idea unaided. ChatGPT helped me. Those aren’t my words; they’re ChatGPT’s. I know a great deal about literary criticism and about movies, but not much about economics. I need ChatGPT to bridge the conceptual distance between the humanities, literary criticism, and the social sciences, economics.

Methodological curiosity

Fortunately the peculiar circumstances of my career have forced me to be interested in method and epistemology: How is it that we can come to know about the world and what methods can we use to arrive at that knowledge? When I entered Johns Hopkins as a freshman in 1965 the discipline of literary criticism was in a state of crisis, though I didn’t know that. How could I? I’d only just graduated high school and I still pretty much knowledge as it was handed to me.

That soon changed. The details of just how, when, and why don’t matter much at the moment. That it happened is sufficient for my present purposes. The upshot is that I became interested in Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” in my senior year. I investigated the poem with standard interpretive methods augmented by avant garde structuralism and found patterns I could not explain. But they “smelled” of the nested loops I learned about in a course in computer programming.

That sent me to the English Department at SUNY Buffalo, which had the best experimental program in the nation. I found a fellow graduate student, Ralph Henry Reese, who pointed me around a corner and down the hall to David Hays in Linguistics. Hays had been a first generation researcher in machine translation at the RAND Corp. and, as such, was one of the founders of computational linguistics. While I wasn’t able to resolve my issues with “Kubla Khan” – they’re still hanging fire – I became hooked on cognitive science. Consequently my dissertation in the English Department was also a quasi-technical exercise in knowledge representation, the discipline within cognitive science and artificial intelligence about the representation of human knowledge in computable form.

Given that that is where I had arrived in the late 1970s it is perhaps not so strange that now, decades later, I find myself staring down some pretty formidable economics despite never having studied the subject. For the last 15 years, however, I have been reading the Marginal Revolution blog hosted by Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok and I have been reading my way through Cowen’s recent monograph, The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution (2026). Cowen’s theme in the fourth (and last) chapter is that the economics he was trained in, the economics which followed from the Marginal Revolution, is rapidly being eclipsed by a more determinedly empirical discipline based on machine learning.

Bombed by 360,000 factors

Here is Cowen’s premier example. It’s from something called Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (pp. 99-100):

There is a recent working paper which is perhaps more striking yet, by Antoine Didisheim, Shikun (Barry) Ke, Bryan T. Kelly, and Semyon Malamud. They pick up from Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), a well-established idea from financial economics. APT typically looks for “factors” in the data which predict excess returns, and a traditional APT model might have found five or six such factors. Are “inflation” or perhaps “the term structure of interest rates” useful factors? Well, that can be debated, but if so, those results sound pretty intuitive. But those intuitions seem to be disappearing. In a paper by these authors, they apply machine learning methods to look for more factors. As we know, machine learning is very good at finding non-obvious relationships in the data. The largest model they built has 360,000 (!) factors, and it reduces pricing errors by 54.8 percent relative to the classic six-factor model from Fama and French. Bravo to the authors, but what kinds of intuitions do you think possibly can be supported by those 360,000 factors?

When I read that, it “looked like Greek to me,” as the cliché has it. But I took a deep breath and thought carefully, step by step and concluded that the assets in question are stocks. What you need to pay attention to is 1) the contrast between six factors and 360,000 factors, 2) the fact that one set of factors is intuitive while the other certainly is not, 3) but the unintelligible, unintuitive, collection of factors does a better job of pricing. That’s the new world toward which economics is moving. While the old intuitions are gasping for breath the new-fangled numbers are fit as a fiddle and ready for duty.

I thought some more and realized that what’s really going on is that people are evaluating those stocks, communicating with one another directly about them, and making decisions about buying and selling, thereby communicating indirectly with one another. That’s what those 360,000 factors are capturing, the actions of a dispersed community of analysts and traders. “Could this be roughly similar to the decisions movie-goers make about the movies they see based, not only on their preferences, but on information they get from reviews, and perhaps more importantly, from their friends?” “If so,” I conjectured, “then perhaps Cowen’s old colleague from Irvine, Arthur De Vany, can shed some light on the situation.” That is to say, can give me some intuitions that I can apply to the situation.

For De Vany had written a very interesting book, Hollywood Economics (2004), about the fate of movies once they have been released. Just as those intuitive “classical” models in economics aren’t as accurate as the new high-factor models, so you can’t predict the box-office performance of movies on such simple factors as the identities of the producer, screen writers, or stars in the movies. Now, De Vany didn’t produce a high-factor model that improved matters, he did something quite different (which is discussed below, pp. 23 ff.), but that’s secondary at the moment. The point is that we seem to have a gross similarity, the behavior of some object that interests a lot of people, a stock or a movie, cannot be reliably predicted using a simple model.

Meme stocks and novels

The similarity was reinforced when I heard a remark by Scott Galloway on the Pivot podcast: “Stocks are like brands and that is they’re part promise and part performance.” Consider the recent phenomenon of meme stocks, which Wikipedia glosses this way:

A meme stock is a stock that gains popularity among retail investors through social media. The popularity of meme stocks is generally based on internet memes shared among traders, on platforms such as Reddit's r/wallstreetbets. Investors in such stocks are often young and inexperienced investors. As a result of their popularity, meme stocks often trade at prices that are above their estimated value – as based on fundamental analysis – and are known for being extremely speculative and volatile.

Meme stocks are assets where promise overwhelms performance, more story than substance.

That’s what movies are. You are purchasing the story and the experience, not the seat in the theater, or the DVD, or the stream, those are the vehicles that carry the story. Claude calls these things “thick” objects (perhaps borrowing from the anthropological concept of “thick” description? ), as opposed to “thin” objects like toasters and drills. Novels are thick objects as well, which led me to Matthew Jockers’ 2013 book, Macroanalysis, where he uses machine learning to develop a high dimensional model (a mere 600 dimensions rather than 360,000) of a corpus of 3000 19th century Anglophone novels. Just as read De Vany’s book quite closely, so I’ve written a series of posts about Jockers’ book. I bring his model into the mix as well (pp. 27 ff.).

Thus I am now in a position to take two models in subjects I know well, movies and novels, and bring them to bear on contemporary machine learning in financial economics, a subject I do not know at all. And, for that matter, still don’t. But I’ve got some intuitions. And one of those intuitions led me to focus on the fact that, while Jockers’ model did not contain any dates, upon inspection it turned out to have a diagonal (p. 27) that is correlated with direction in time. Not only did 19th century novels change in theme and motif over time, there is a direction to that change. The system seems to exhibit directional evolution. And so I directed Claude to explore the possibility of that this might be a general characteristic of thick-objects being used by a large population of interested parties (pp. 31 ff). Here is the conjecture Claude arrived at (p. 35):

In thick-object domains, low-dimensional intuitive factors often fail to explain individual outcomes. But high-dimensional representation can reveal population-level structure: outcome basins in movies, pricing kernels in finance, and temporal direction in novels. The next step is to ask whether all such artifact systems exhibit historical vectors in feature space, generated by a generational ratchet in which each cohort of producers is shaped by the artifact ecology inherited from its predecessors.

Notice the territory we have traversed in conceptual space. We started with an undergraduate at Johns Hopkins (me) using interpretive methods to study a poem, “Kubla Khan.” That investigation led to problems that forced me to study computational semantics in graduate school, a distinctly different mode of intellectual work, one based on formulating an elaborate system of structural rules. We then zipped through time and over intellectual space to a social scientist, Tyler Cowen, who was trained in the used of causal models to generate statistically controlled observations about economic behavior. He is now confronted with multifactor machine learning models with no intuitively discernible causal structure that nonetheless have superior predictive power. Cowen got me interested in one of those models and I, in turn, summoned Anthropic’s Claude to explain it to me.

The way I see, and I’ve seen it this way for a long time, the human sciences – more a European notion than American, les sciences humaines – can be arranged into three camps according to methodological focus: interpretive or hermeneutic (roughly, the humanities), causal modeling (roughly, the social sciences), and structural rules (roughly, the “classical” cognitive sciences). We’ve spanned them all in the course of this introduction. What will the future bring?

Bonus: I leave it as an exercise for the reader to consider the relevance of Keynes’s talk of “animal spirits” and to incorporate Robert Shiller’s narrative economics into this picture.

What’s in this document

The rest of this document is devoted to the dialogs where I used ChatGPT to work through the connections between these three models, two I knew quite well (De Vany on movies and Jockers on novels), and one I did not (Didisheim et al. on asset pricing). Claude knows them all, for some non-trivial meaning of “know,” and many others as well. The purpose of the dialog, then, is to link something I do not know to something that I do. The dialog took place in four sessions over the course of a week from the end of May into June.

Rather than comment on each of the sections listed in the outline, with one exception, I am commenting only on the sections that mark the beginning of a new session with ChatGPT. For what it’s worth, they mark how the subject evolved in my mind. The one exception? The summary was the last thing ChatGPT did, obviously, but I moved it to first place.

Thick Objects and the New Common Ground of Economics and Cultural Analysis [Summary] – I had ChatGPT prepare this summary and the very end of the process, on June 22. I put if first in case some might want to get the gist of the exercise without slogging through the details.

AIPT, Large Factor Models [First Session] – There is where I began on May 26. I started by asking ChatGPT to explain asset pricing to me. Once I had some sense of that, I then went on to the models I was familiar with, first De Vany on movies and the Jockers on 19th century Anglophone novels.

Stocks are like brands [Session Two] – I initiated this session on May 30 when I heard Galloway’s remark about stocks being like brands. That crystalized things for me so I needed to work back through the analysis. In the course of that discussion I focused on the concept of a brand as a distinct conceptual objects and ChatGPT’s response clarified the role of marginalism in clearing the way for asset models with a very large number of factors.

Algorithmic and Causal models [Session Three] – I don’t recall whether anything in particular prompted me to initiate this dialog. Perhaps mere methodological curiosity. This took place on June 2.

Those empirical APT models [Session Four] – It’s not entirely clear to me just whether anything in particular prompted this session. But what I was thinking was that, while I’m familiar with novels and movies and the academic discourse about them, asset pricing is unfamiliar territory. So I wanted to nail down as well as I could just what “ground truth” is in this area. Movies start with eyeballs in theaters and novels start with eyeballs scanning pages, where does asset pricing start? Once ChatGPT had gone through this I realized that I’d seen it earlier in the whole process. Still, I was happy to go through it again, this time coming at it after having thought about it. It’s as the end of this session that I asked ChatGPT to summarize the discussion.