Sunday, July 10, 2016

DH and Critique (DHpoco), with a Nod to Latour (via Felski)

I just now came across this three-year old conversation, Open Thread: The Digital Humanities as a Historical “Refuge” From Race/Class/Gender/Sexuality/Disability? It’s a long and very interesting conversation, with 166 comments between May 10, 2013 and May 14. I am reading the conversation in the general context of the May 1 LARB critique by Daniel Allington, Sarah Brouille, and David Golumbia, Neoliberal Tools (and Archives): A Political History of Digital Humanities. This not-so-old conversation is distinguished by the variety and number of participants and it’s overall civility.

My purpose, however, is not to attempt either a summary or analysis of the conversation, but to highlight two voices I find particularly resonant. First I look at Chuck Rybak, who speaks up for “poetics/form/rhetoric.” Then Rafael Alvarado suggests that DH should not subordinate itself to the Ministry of Cultural Studies.

The Work Itself

Chuck Rybak, from the third day:
This is an amazingly varied and interesting discussion thread–thank you Roopika and Adeline.

When I look at the opening quote, I immediately wanted to paste in the entirety of Marjorie Perloff’s essay “Crisis in the Humanities.” Instead of the entire piece, I’ll settle for this paragraph:

“It is, I would argue, the contemporary fear and subordination of the pleasures of representation and recognition –the pleasures of the fictive, the what might happen to the what has happened–the historical/cultural– that has trivialized the status of literary study in the academy today. If, for an aesthete like Walter Pater, art was always approaching the condition of music, in our current scheme of things, art is always–and monotonously– approaching the condition of “culture.” Indeed, the neoPuritan notion that literature and the other arts must be somehow “useful,” and only useful, that the Ciceronian triad —docere, movere, delectare– should renounce its third element (“delight”) and even the original meaning of its second element, so that to move means only to move readers to some kind of virtuous action, has produced a climate in which it has become increasingly difficult to justify the study of English or Comparative Literature.”

Since I’m a creative writer and lit prof who teaches a lot of poetry, Perloff means a lot to me as a critic. My sense is that Perloff would reject the word “refuge” and replace it with something like “return.” But a return to what? Simply, a focus on poetics/form/rhetoric. When I first started dabbling in DH work, I was immediately struck by how text-centered the enterprise is, and that has proven very useful pedagogically, especially when working with an undergraduate population who often prefer to flee the text as quickly as possible and get right to ideas in the abstract. In short, I’m sympathetic to Perloff here because I think it approaches this question in terms of embracing an interest rather than primarily rejecting something else. Perloff, in that essay, gives respect to cultural readings of works like Ulysses and Heart of Darkness, especially as they relate to empire, etc. Still, what Martha Smith might describe as a refuge (or seemingly so), I hear someone like Perloff saying what’s needed is a return to poetics. Perloff wasn’t writing about DH, but I imagine one thing Perloff would respect about some DH tools are their ability to hone in on language/aesthetics and treat a poem as a unique rhetoric, stylistic artifact, etc. I’m learning so much from reading this thread, but I chafe a little bit against the notion of a “refuge” from a specific set of concerns, largely because it might attribute an act of will where someone might just be pursuing their particular interests.

And having written this, I can also hear the response: “Perloff, as you demonstrate, is exactly someone who would see this as a refuge.” I’m not sure I could completely rebut that. PoCo is not my area of study/specialization, so I really am offering this very generally.
I note that there was no response to this comment despite the fact that, as Rybak noted at the end, he was using Perloff to advance the kind of position that was brought into question by the thread. Perhaps, because it was late in the conversation, people were tired.

Now, consider a passage by Derek Attridge, which is from a dialog he had with Henry Staten, “Reading for the Obvious: A Conversation,” World Picture 2, Autumn 2008. It has nothing to do with DH, but it speaks to Rybak/Perloff in the face of the demand for critique:
As you know, I’ve been trying for a while to articulate an understanding of the literary critic’s task which rests on a notion of responsibility, derived in large part from Derrida and Levinas, or, more accurately, Derrida’s recasting of Levinas’s thought, one aspect of which is an emphasis on the importance of what I’ve called variously a “literal” or “weak” reading. That is to say, I’ve become increasingly troubled by the effects of the enormous power inherent in the techniques of literary criticism at our disposal today […] The result of this rich set of critical resources is that any literary work, whether or not it is a significant achievement in the history of literature, and whether or not it evokes a strong response in the critic, can be accorded a lengthy commentary claiming importance for it. What is worse, the most basic norms of careful reading are sometimes ignored in the rush to say what is ingenious or different. (The model of the critical institution whereby the critic feels obliged to claim that his or her interpretation trumps all previous interpretations is clearly part of the problem here, and beyond this the institutional pressure to accumulate publications or move up the ladder.) We may be teaching our students to write clever interpretations without teaching them how to read...
Attridge and Staten went on devote a book to the practice of weak reading: Derek Attridge and Henry Staten, The Craft of Poetry: Dialogues on Minimal Interpretation, Routledge 2015. Each chapter takes the form of back and forth conversation (via email) about a poem or maybe two. Their object is to find agreement as much as possible, and to clearly articulate disagreement where necessary [1]. They note that they are not trying to replace or displace critique, but to lay a foundation from which other forms of criticism can advance.

Shadow Play

20151024-_IGP6446-2

Saturday, July 9, 2016

Should digital humanists know how to code?

From Alverado Rafael Alvarado, The Code Problem:
The first is to learn for the rea­son that Tim Berners-Lee exhorts jour­nal­ists to learn–you need to know how to use tools to manip­u­late data because knowl­edge is increas­ingly pro­duced as data, that is, in more or less struc­tured forms all over the web. This is because the future of the human­i­ties “lies with jour­nal­ists human­ists who know their CSV from their RDF, can throw together some quick MySQL queries for a PHP or Python out­put … and dis­cover the story lurk­ing in datasets released by gov­ern­ments, local author­i­ties, agen­cies, dig­i­tal archives, online libraries, aca­d­e­mic cen­ters, or any com­bi­na­tion of them – even across national bor­ders.” [...]

The sec­ond rea­son to learn to code is philo­soph­i­cal. You should be able to write code–not nec­es­sar­ily pro­gram or, God for­bid, “develop”–so that you can under­stand how machines think. Play with sim­ple algo­rithms, parse texts and cre­ate word lists, gen­er­ate silly pat­terns a la 10 PRINT. Get a feel for what these so-called com­puter lan­guages do. Get a feel for the propo­si­tion, to which I mostly assent, that text is a kind of code and code a kind of text (but with really impor­tant dif­fer­ences that you won’t dis­cover or under­stand until you play around with code). This level of knowl­edge does not require any great mas­tery of a lan­guage in my view. It only requires a will­ing­ness to get one’s hand dirty, make mis­takes, and accept the lim­i­ta­tions of beginner’s knowl­edge. I per­son­ally believe that this sec­ond rea­son is as or more impor­tant than the first.
OK. Moreover:
To get to this place with code, to be able write sim­ple scripts that are use­ful or inter­est­ing or both, you don’t need to do many of the things your cod­ing brethren think you should do. First and fore­most, you don’t need to learn a spe­cific lan­guage unless there is a com­pelling local rea­son to do so, such as being in a class or on a project that uses the lan­guage. [...]

Sec­ond, you don’t need to be involved in writ­ing a full-blown appli­ca­tion to do DH-worthy cod­ing. Appli­ca­tions are fine, and being on a col­lab­o­ra­tive project has huge ben­e­fits of its own, but know that appli­ca­tion devel­op­ment is a huge time-suck and that appli­ca­tions are like restaurants–fun to set up but most likely to fail in the real world. Lots of DH cod­ing projects in my expe­ri­ence are jour­neys, not des­ti­na­tions. [...]

Third, there is no rea­son ever to be forced into using a spe­cific edi­tor or cod­ing envi­ron­ment, espe­cially if it is a dif­fi­cult one that “real” coders use. [...]

Beyond these spe­cific prob­lems, though, there is a more fun­da­men­tal issue about the cul­ture of code that con­tributes to the con­di­tion that Miriam [Posner] and oth­ers con­front: in spite of the well-meaning desire by many coders to bring every­one into the cod­ing fold, there is a coun­ter­vail­ing force the pre­vents this from hap­pen­ing and which emanates from these same coders. This is the force of mys­ti­fi­ca­tion. Mys­ti­fi­ca­tion appears in many forms, includ­ing some of the things I just described–insisting on a dif­fi­cult edi­tor, diss­ing cer­tain languages–but it more gen­er­ally comes from treat­ing code com­pe­tence as a source of iden­tity, whether it be per­sonal or dis­ci­pli­nary. As long as dig­i­tal human­ists regard cod­ing as a marker of prestige–and soft­ware as a token in the aca­d­e­mic economy–and not as a means to other forms of pres­tige (such mak­ing dis­cov­er­ies or writ­ing books), then knowl­edge of cod­ing will always be hedged in by taboos and rites of pas­sage that will have the effect of push­ing away newcomers.
Addendum (7.11.16): From an interview with Pamela Fletcher in the Los Angeles Review of Books:
No, I don’t think you necessarily need to know how to code to do meaningful digital humanities work, not least because collaboration is a central part of DH work and the idea of people bringing different skill sets — and research problems — together is one of its core strengths. Yes, because as a humanist I am deeply committed to the idea that in order to communicate with other people you need to speak their language, and coding is the language of computation. In our new Digital and Computational Studies curriculum at Bowdoin we are starting from the premise that every student who goes through our program needs to understand at least the underlying logic of how computers work and the many layers of abstraction and representation that lie between binary code and what you see on the screen. This is partially about communication: you need to understand what computers are (and aren’t) good at in order to come up with intelligent computational problems and solutions. But it is also because each stage of computational abstraction involves decisions that are essentially acts of interpretation, and you can’t do meaningful work if you don’t understand that. This is equally true, of course, of anyone who uses technology, which is most of us. So I’d say ideally we should be educating all our students to be computationally literate, which is not the same as being expert programmers.

Friday, July 8, 2016

Color the Subject

I've just been reading through this post and its many comments, which is about digital humanities and cultural criticism, more or less. One topic under discussion: Is digital technology "transparent"? Thinking about that makes my head ache; after all, "digital technology" covers a lot of bases. Photography, whether analog or digital, is ofter treated as "transparent" in the sense that photographs register what is really and truly there, without bias. Any reasonably serious photographer knows that this is not true, at least not in the most obvious meaning. This old post discusses color, which is deeply problematic for any serious photographer. While I frame the discussion as being about subjectivity, it is equally about the technology. 
* * * * * 
It's time for another post from The Valve. This one's rather different from my current run of posts. It's about color, subjectivity, and digital cameras. I'm posting it here as a complement to a recent post by John Wilkins. It generated a fair amount of discussion over there, which I recommend to you. I've appended two short comments below. I've got two other posts that are related to this: this one looks at mid-town Manhattan from Hoboken, NJ, and this one looks at a pair of railroad signals in Jersey City.

This post is about color and subjectivity. It's not that I am deeply interested in the phenomenon of color; I'm not. Nor, in some sense, am I interested in subjectivity. But I am interested in literary meaning and beauty and so have to deal with subjectivity in that context. Meaning and beauty are subjective.

The purpose of this post is to think about a certain notion of subjectivity. All too often we identify subjectivity with the idea of unaccountable and-or idiosyncratic differences in the way people experience the world in general, or works of art in particular. I think such difference, though apparently quite common in human populations, is incidental to subjectivity. Things are subjective in that they can be apprehended only by subjects.

I take it that the color of objects is subjective in this sense. There is, for example, no direct relationship between the wavelengths of light reflected from a surface and the perceived color of that surface. Oddly enough, it is because the relationship between reflected wavelengths and perceived color is indirect that perceived color can be relatively constant under a wide variety of circumstances. It is also the case that, different subjects have different visual perceptual systems, they will perceive color differently-that's what color blindness is about.

Whatever literary experience is, however it works, it can happen only in subjects. Whereas the difference among subjects with respect to color perception is relatively small, though real, the difference among subjects with respect to literary taste is relatively large. But, so what? I do note, however, that taste can and does change.
I want to think about color because it seems to be much simpler than the meaning of literary texts. So simple in fact that some aspects of color phenomena can be externalized in cameras and computers. When a digital camera “measures” or “samples” the wave front of light incident upon its sensor, it is interacting with the external world in a relatively simple way. Relative, that is, to what happens in the interaction between wave fronts and the retinal membranes of, say, reptilian or mammalian perceptual systems.

With that in mind, let's look at a photograph.

On the morning of 25 November 2006 I walked to the shore of the Hudson River to take pictures of the sunrise over the south end of Manhattan Island. I used a Pentax K100D and, for the most part, let the camera set the parameters for each shot. I shot the pictures in so-called RAW format and then processed them on my computer.

Here's one of those photographs before I did anything to adjust the color:

sun-tree-raw.jpg

Figure 1: Image without color adjustment

Wednesday, July 6, 2016

The Seinfeld Influence on Bill Gates

This is a link to a post at Bill Gate's blog. The post is about his relationship with Warren Buffett. On that page there's a video titled "Philanthropists in Golf Carts Eating Dilly Bars." Though the video has little in common with Seinfeld's "Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee," the name is certainly modeled on the name of Seinfeld's program.

From the post:
In 1991, when my mother called me to come out to our vacation home on Hood Canal to meet a group of friends, including Warren, I didn’t want to go. I told her I was too busy at work. Warren would be interesting, my mother insisted. But I wasn’t convinced. “Look, he just buys and sells pieces of paper. That’s not real value added. I don’t think we’d have much in common,” I told her. Eventually, she persuaded me to go. I agreed to stay for no more than two hours before getting back to work at Microsoft.

Then I met Warren. He started asking me some questions about the software business and why a small company like Microsoft could expect to compete with IBM and what were the skillsets and the pricing. These were amazingly good questions that nobody had ever asked. We were suddenly lost in conversation and hours and hours slipped by. He didn’t come across as a bigshot investor. He had this modest way of talking about what he does. He was funny, but what impressed me most was how clearly he thought about the world. It was a deep friendship from our very first conversation.

It’s not a question of manpower, a brief remark on computational criticism

One reason that has been given for computational criticism (aka ‘distant reading’) is that it is the only way we are going to examine books beyond the canon and that, until we do so, our understanding of literary history and partial and biased. Yes, it is likely true that this will be the only way we examine all those books that are no longer read, or even readily available. But this justification is misleading to the extent that it implies that the problem is one of manpower, as though we wouldn’t bother with computational criticism if the critical community had the time to read all those books. I submit that, on the contrary, even if we had the manpower, we’d still undertake computational analysis of 1000s of volumes at a time.

I have no idea of how many volumes would be in the complete corpus of English literature, does anyone? But for the sake of argument let’s pick a number, say 100,000, which is low even if we confine ourselves to work published before the 20th century. Imagine that we have a thousand critics available for reading, which implies that each of them will read 100 volumes. Assuming no other intellectual duties, they could do that reading in a year. Now, how do they make sense of their 10,000 books? As you think about that recall what a much larger number of critics has done for a much smaller number of volumes over the course of the last century.

What do we want from these critics? Well, topic analysis is a popular form of computational criticism, so why not do a manual version with all the (imaginary) critical manpower we’ve got available? Imagine that you are one of the 1000 critics. How will you undertake a topic analysis of your 100 volumes?

For that matter, how will you do it for the first volume? I suppose that you start reading and note down each topic as you come to it. When a topic recurs, you give it another check mark. How do you name the topics? How do you indicate what’s in them? You could list words, as is done in computational topic analysis. You could also use phrases and sentences. What happens as you continue reading? Perhaps what you thought was a horses topic at the beginning turns out to be, say, horse racing instead. So you’ve got to revise your topic list. I would imagine that maintaining coherence and consistency would be a problem as you read through your 100 volumes. Just think of all the scraps of paper and the computer files you’ll be working with. This is going to take a lot of time beyond that required for simply reading the books.

But it’s not just you. There are 1000 critics, each reading and analyzing 100 volumes. How do they maintain consistency among themselves? The mind boggles.

My point is that conducting a topic analysis of a corpus gives us a view of that corpus that we could not get with manual methods, with comparison and distillation of ‘close’ readings of 1000s of books by 1000s of readers. Topic analysis gives us something new. Whether this something is valuable, that’s a different question. But it’s not just a poor substitute for close readings that we’re never going to do.

The fact is, even if we had 1000 critics analyzing 100 volumes each, we’d probably conduct a topic analysis, and more, as a means of bringing some consistency to all those ‘manual’ analyses.

Topic analysis, of course, is not the only form of computational criticism. But the argument I’ve made using it as an example will apply across the board. We are doing something fundamentally new.

Tuesday, July 5, 2016

Coke can on a stick

20151017-_IGP6340 adj

A comparison HERE.

A modest take on AI

What’s stopping AI from being put to productive use in thousands of businesses around the world isn’t some new learning algorithm. It’s not the need for more programmers fluent in the mathematics of stochastic gradient descent and back propagation. It’s not even the need for more accessible software libraries. What’s needed for AI’s wide adoption is an understanding of how to build interfaces that put the power of these systems in the hands of their human users. What’s needed is a new hybrid design discipline, one whose practitioners understand AI systems well enough to know what affordances they offer for interaction and understand humans well enough to know how they might use, misuse, and abuse these affordances.
The conclusion:
When imagining a future shaped by AI, it’s easy to fall back on cultural tropes from sci-fi movies and literature, to think of The Terminator or 2001 or Her. But these visions reflect our anxieties about technology, gender, or the nature of humanity far more than the concrete realities of machine learning systems as we’re actually building them.

Instead of seeing Deep Learning’s revolutionary recent results as incremental steps towards these always receding sci-fi fantasies, imagine them as the powerful new engines of a thousand projects like ReGroup and CueFlik, projects that give us unprecedented abilities to understand and control our world. Machine learning has the potential to be a powerful tool for human empowerment, touching everything from how we shop to how we diagnose disease to how we communicate. To build these next thousand projects in a way that capitalizes on this potential we need to learn not just how to teach the machines to learn but how to put the results of that learning into the hands of people.
Both ReGroup and CueFllik are discussed in the article.

Biologist Jerry Coyne on Scientific Method (Description)

Clyne sets up his response to a NYTimes philosophy piece (“There is no scientific method”) in this way:
the classic presentation of “The Scientific Method” in the classroom is misleading. That presentation usually goes like this: concoct hypothesis—> test hypothesis —>support or reject hypothesis based on test.

But not all science is done like that. For example, facts usually precede hypotheses, at least in biology (Darwin often used that method to concoct his theories). And much good science can be done without any hypotheses at all. An example would be describing all the species in an area like a patch of Amazonian rain forest. Those facts may be useful some day (e.g., for conservation or for finding new drugs from plants), and also can turn up fascinating nuggets of information about natural history—knowledge. The only thing in common among all “scientific methods” is that they use empirical tools and rationality to find out the nature of reality, and produce conclusions that can be empirically checked by others. In the case of theoretical work, that usually involves producing results that either are testable or might someday be testable by empirical methods.
Yes! Clyne goes on to critique the NYTimes piece, but, given my interest in description, that's the paragraph that sticks in my mind. I just wish philosophers of science would devote more attention to description, a lot more.

July 4, 2016, Jupiter Day in the Solar System

Nasa has a habit of scheduling high-stakes maneuvers to coincide with patriotic holidays. On July 4, 1997, at lunchtime, the Mars Pathfinder mission successfully landed Sojourner, the first Martian rover. Eleven years ago, on the same date, the Deep Impact probe successfully collided with the comet Tempel 1, an achievement that the astronomer Iwan Williams described as being “like a mosquito hitting a 747.” And on Monday, at just before 9 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, after a thirty-five-minute engine burn, nasa’s Juno spacecraft successfully reached the end of its five-year journey and began circling Jupiter. For the engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, in Pasadena, California, it was not only Independence Day but also Orbital Insertion Day. As the operations team confirmed that the burn had gone to plan, all of mission control rose to its feet. To a standing ovation, a visibly relieved Scott Bolton, the mission’s principal investigator, said, “We just did the hardest thing nasa’s ever done.”

“This was a one-shot deal,” Bolton had said earlier. Not only was Juno moving faster than any human-made object ever has when its engine fired—more than a hundred and sixty-five thousand miles per hour—but its onboard electronics were operating in what J.P.L.’s Heidi Becker described as “a spray of radiation bullets”: charged electrons spiralling up and down the lines of Jupiter’s magnetic field at almost the speed of light. It was the mission’s riskiest moment since launch.
The mission's most challenging scientific objective is to map Jupiter's magnetic field:
The gas giant’s magnetosphere is nearly twenty thousand times more powerful than Earth’s, resulting in spectacular polar auroras larger than our entire planet. And its magnetic field extends so far into space that, if it glowed in visible light, Jupiter would appear to be twice the size of the full moon in our night sky. While Galileo captured stunning surface images of swirling ammoniac storms, Juno’s mission is to peek beneath the gaseous veil to see inside Jupiter. Scientists believe that the planet’s intense magnetism is generated by the churning of a deep interior ocean of hydrogen, under such intense pressure that the element becomes a shimmery liquid. (“Like a mirror, it reflects light, so if you were immersed in it, you wouldn’t be able to see anything,” Caltech’s David Stevenson explained in 2011, on the one-year anniversary of Juno’s launch.) A detailed map of the resulting field would offer researchers the clues they need to understand this hidden ocean’s depth and currents.
Citizen science:
By this point, nasa is aware that a lofty goal, without visual imagery to accompany it, will not engage the public’s imagination. The agency’s solution is JunoCam, a device adapted from previous Mars missions. Freed from the burden of scientific responsibility, amateurs and enthusiasts will be able to vote online to determine where JunoCam points and which features it captures. “It will provide the very first views of Jupiter’s poles, and the most incredible closeup views of the planet ever seen,” Bolton said. “I expect we will probably discover some new moons, too. But it’s really a public camera.” Already, JunoCam’s discussion boards are alight: six-year-old Bee wants more photos of the Red Spot, while Hogarth-11 is voting for a closer look at greenish dots near Jupiter’s equator.

Sunday, July 3, 2016

The Myth of Regeneration Through Violence

“Star Wars” managed a remarkable trick. Two years after the fall of Saigon and America’s withdrawal in defeat from a dishonorable war, Mr. Lucas’s Wagnerian space opera recast for Americans the mythic story so central to our sense of ourselves as a nation.

In this story, war is a terrible thing we do only because we have to. In this story, the violence of war has a power that unifies and enlightens. In this story, war is how we show ourselves that we’re heroes. Whom we’re fighting against or why doesn’t matter as much as the violence itself, our stoic willingness to shed blood, the promise that it might renew the body politic.

The literary historian Richard Slotkin called this story “the myth of regeneration through violence,” and he traces it from the earliest Indian captivity narratives through the golden age of the western, and it’s the same story we often tell ourselves today. It’s a story about how violence makes us American. It’s a story about how violence makes us good.

Looking out over Baghdad on the Fourth of July, I saw the truth that story obscured and inverted: I was the faceless storm trooper, and the scrappy rebels were the Iraqis.
There is no redemption in violence:
The truth is, most Americans understand what our soldiers do very well: They understand that American troops are sent overseas to defend American political and economic interests, wreak vengeance on those who have wronged us, and hunt down our enemies and kill them. There is no gap there. The American military has a job, and most of us, on some level, understand exactly what that job is. The American soldier or Marine is an agent of American state power.

The real gap is between the fantasy of American heroism and the reality of what the American military does, between the myth of violence and the truth of war. The real gap is between our subconscious belief that righteous violence can redeem us, even ennoble us, and the chastening truth that violence debases and corrupts.
Honor dissent:
There is another version of America beyond the noise our fireworks make: not military strength, but the deliberate commitment to collective self-determination. Perhaps this Fourth of July we could commemorate that. Instead of celebrating American violence, we might celebrate our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, and the ideals those documents invoke of an educated citizenry deciding its fate not through war but through civil disagreement. Instead of honoring our troops, whose chief virtues are obedience and aggressiveness, we could honor our great dissenters and conscientious objectors. And instead of blowing things up, maybe we could try building something.

It’s our choice. We make our myths.

Friday, July 1, 2016

Software Mysteries: Roll over Beethoven, let Satchmo come over!

Think of this as a companion piece to Cultural Style: Software, Jamming & #DH. That was prompted by Miriam Posner, What’s Next: The Radical, Unrealized Potential of Digital Humanities, and that, in turn, shuttled me off to an interview in which Tara McPherson argues, "early developments in digital computing were also intertwined with shifting racial codes in the U.S. and beyond." This is another take on race and software.

* * * * * 

I spent a fair amount of time in the last decade of the previous century working in the software industry (see this post for example) and reading popular prescriptions for improving America’s management style, many of those inspired by Japan. Somewhere along the line I got the idea that these new organizational ideas were more like an improvising jazz quintet and basketball than like the classical symphony and football. That is to say, that, stylistically, high-tech owes a debt to African-America even if African-Americans are not widely employed in the high tech world.

That’s what my current piece in 3 Quarks Daily is about: Cultural Styles in the 21st Century, or the High Tech Debt to Africa. This is the kind of issue I’ve looked at elsewhere as well. Here’s a passage from Cultural Evolution: A Vehicle for Cooperative Interaction Between the Sciences and the Humanities:
During the 1960s the late Alan Lomax (1968) decided to investigate folk song styles against the background of cultural complexity. Lomax and his colleagues prepared a sample of over 3000 songs, representing 233 cultures from 5 continents plus the Pacific islands, and had judges code the songs on features of style — nature of the performing group, relationship between vocal part and instrumental parts, melodic style, rhythmic style, wordiness, tone quality, tempo, and so on. They correlated style traits with measures of social complexity and found that the simpler the society, the simpler its song lyrics. The simplest societies used a great deal of repetition and nonsense syllables. Similarly, the precision of enunciation varies with social complexity; the more complex the society, the more precise the enunciation. The prevalence of solo singers was also associated with complexity. In the simplest societies, everyone sang; no one was given or took a solo role. It is only in more complex societies, with permanent leaders and social stratification, that we see ensembles divided into a soloist and accompanists.

This is an empirical finding. And, while it may seem intuitively obvious that complex cultures create a collective ambiance that favors expressive forms that are different from those of less complex cultures, one would like an explanation for this “fit.” I would expect a robust account of cultural evolution to provide such an explanation.

In a similar vein, John Roberts, Brian Sutton-Smith, and Adam Kendon (1963) were interested in the relationship between child-rearing practices, community size, types of games, and folk tales. In particular, they were interested in what they have called the strategic mode. Strategy plays minor role in games of physical skill, but a dominant role in games such as chess and poker, which also has strong elements of chance. In folk tales, we can examine how the outcome is achieved, whether through physical skill, chance (guessing, casting lots, magic), or strategy (e.g. evaluating a situation, deception, out-witting an opponent). They discovered that games of strategy are likely to co-occur with folktales having a strong strategic element and that both are more likely in politically complex societies (chiefdoms and above).
The general point is simple: Expressive culture, how and what we sing, dance, and tell stories, is not just about entertainment. It pervades our society and all that we do. The cultural requirements of high tech industries are quite different from those of ‘classical’ industrial revolution. The fact that high tech culture evolved in a society pervaded by jazz, rock and roll, and hip-hop is not incidental. It is foundational.

Memory in collective cognition

Mnemonic convergence in social networks: The emergent properties of cognition at a collective level
Alin Comana, Ida Momennejada, Rae D. Drachc, and Andra Geanaa

PNAS Early Edition www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1525569113
Significance

Human memory is highly malleable. Because of this malleability, jointly remembering the past along with another individual often results in increased similarity between the conversational partners’ memories. We propose an approach that examines the conversation between a pair of participants as part of a larger network of social interactions that has the potential to reveal how human communities form collective memories. Empirical evidence indicating that dyadic-level conversational alignment processes give rise to community-wide shared memories is presented. We find that individual-level memory updating phenomena and social network structure are two fundamental factors that contribute to the emergence of collective memories.

Abstract

The development of shared memories, beliefs, and norms is a fundamental characteristic of human communities. These emergent outcomes are thought to occur owing to a dynamic system of information sharing and memory updating, which fundamentally depends on communication. Here we report results on the formation of collective memories in laboratory-created communities. We manipulated conversational network structure in a series of real-time, computer-mediated interactions in fourteen 10-member communities. The results show that mnemonic convergence, measured as the degree of overlap among community members’ memories, is influenced by both individual-level information-processing phenomena and by the conversational social network structure created during conversational recall. By studying laboratory-created social networks, we show how large-scale social phenomena (i.e., collective memory) can emerge out of microlevel local dynamics (i.e., mnemonic reinforcement and suppression effects). The social-interactionist approach proposed herein points to optimal strategies for spreading information in social networks and provides a framework for measuring and forging collective memories in communities of individuals.