Saturday, June 22, 2019

Brain-to-brain synchrony in the classroom

Dikker et al., 2017, Brain-to-Brain Synchrony Tracks Real-World Dynamic Group Interactions in the Classroom, Current Biology 27, 1375–1380May 8, 2017
Highlights
  • We report a real-world group EEG study, in a school, during normal class activities
  • EEG was recorded from 12 students simultaneously, repeated over 11 sessions
  • Students’ brain-to-brain group synchrony predicts classroom engagement
  • Students’ brain-to-brain group synchrony predicts classroom social dynamics
Summary

The human brain has evolved for group living [1 ]. Yet we know so little about how it supports dynamic group interactions that the study of real-world social exchanges has been dubbed the “dark matter of social neuroscience” [2 ]. Recently, various studies have begun to approach this question by comparing brain responses of multiple individuals during a variety of (semi-naturalistic) tasks [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 ]. These experiments reveal how stimulus properties [13 ], individual differences [14 ], and contextual factors [15 ] may underpin similarities and differences in neural activity across people. However, most studies to date suffer from various limitations: they often lack direct face-to-face interaction between participants, are typically limited to dyads, do not investigate social dynamics across time, and, crucially, they rarely study social behavior under naturalistic circumstances. Here we extend such experimentation drastically, beyond dyads and beyond laboratory walls, to identify neural markers of group engagement during dynamic real-world group interactions. We used portable electroencephalogram (EEG) to simultaneously record brain activity from a class of 12 high school students over the course of a semester (11 classes) during regular classroom activities (Figures 1A–1C; Supplemental Experimental Procedures, section S1). A novel analysis technique to assess group-based neural coherence demonstrates that the extent to which brain activity is synchronized across students predicts both student class engagement and social dynamics. This suggests that brain-to-brain synchrony is a possible neural marker for dynamic social interactions, likely driven by shared attention mechanisms. This study validates a promising new method to investigate the neuroscience of group interactions in ecologically natural settings.

17 Versions of "Summertime"


A Rare African Flower, Saved

Here's another post about Rider Haggard, also from The Valve, from 28 May 2009. Like She (1986) it too centers on a exotic white race at the heart of Africa (though this post is not about that aspect of the story).
When flowers are not being flowers, they are sometimes put to use as symbols. I’m interested in one such usage, in Rider Haggard’s Allan Quatermain, though I don’t think it’s quite symbolic. Or rather, yes, it is easy to read it as symbolic, but to say so would be to paper over the fact that I don’t really understand how this usage works.

Regardless of exactly how the flower imagery works, it is being recruited to sexual service as suggested by the word “deflower,” but the potential victim is a 10-year old girl. While the girl escapes unharmed, Haggard has her in jeopardy for three chapters, three chapters where the reader doesn’t know what has happened or what might happen to her. Why does Haggard put the reader through this?

First I tell this girl’s story absent almost all of the flower imagery. Then I go back and present that imagery, not to analyze it in detail, but just to lay it out, to show how much of it there is and how specifically it is connected to the girl and her plight. Finally, I confront the question: Why?

Flossie Saved from the Masai

Allan Quatermain (1887) is a sequel to King Solomon’s Mines (1885), with the same three men – Allan Quatermain, Capt. John Good, and Sir Henry Curtis – traveling to a lost world deep inside Africa. The story opens in England three years after the trio had returned from the mines with a small pouch of diamonds and a large stash of adventuresome memories. They’re bored with civilization and itching for adventure. As Quatermain told himself:
And so in my trouble, as I walked up and down the oak-paneled vestibule of my house there in Yorkshire, I longed once more to throw myself into the arms of Nature. Not the Nature which you know, the Nature that waves in well-kept woods and smiles out in corn-fields, but Nature as she was in the age when creation was complete, undefiled as yet by any human sinks of sweltering humanity. I would go again where the wild game was, back to the land whereof none know the history, back to the savages, whom I love, although some of them are almost as merciless as Political Economy.
And so, acting on a vague tale about a lost white race, the trio returns to East Africa, heading toward Mt. Kenya by way of the Tana River. Their immediate goal is a mission station run by a Scotsman, Mr. Mackenzie, whom they believe may have more specific information about this lost race.

They arrive at the mission after the usual dangers, which included a bunch of Masai warriors who had been set upon them to settle a score. They escape the Masai – which means that the score has not been settled. The Masai will return.

Local exotic [sun]

Friday, June 21, 2019

Emotion, the final frontier of AI?

Meredith Somers, Emotion AI, explained, March 8, 2019.
Emotion AI is a subset of artificial intelligence (the broad term for machines replicating the way humans think) that measures, understands, simulates, and reacts to human emotions. It’s also known as affective computing, or artificial emotional intelligence. The field dates back to at least 1995, when MIT Media lab professor Rosalind Picard published “Affective Computing.”

Javier Hernandez, a research scientist with the Affective Computing Group at the MIT Media Lab, explains emotion AI as a tool that allows for a much more natural interaction between humans and machines.“Think of the way you interact with other human beings; you look at their faces, you look at their body, and you change your interaction accordingly,” Hernandez said. “How can [a machine] effectively communicate information if it doesn’t know your emotional state, if it doesn’t know how you’re feeling, it doesn’t know how you’re going to respond to specific content?”

While humans might currently have the upper hand on reading emotions, machines are gaining ground using their own strengths. Machines are very good at analyzing large amounts of data, explained MIT Sloan professor Erik Brynjolfsson. They can listen to voice inflections and start to recognize when those inflections correlate with stress or anger. Machines can analyze images and pick up subtleties in micro-expressions on humans’ faces that might happen even too fast for a person to recognize.
Interesting. I'm pretty sure, though, that this tech wouldn't make Commander Data jealous. This isn't about computers having emotion; it's about computers being able to recognize human affective states.

H/t 3QD.

I wonder if companion robots can read the affective states of their humans?

Is Rider Haggard’s She taught in university, either at the undergraduate or graduate level?

It certainly wouldn’t be taught under a rubric based on the premise that that students must study the (very) best narratives. That justification may have reigned up to the middle of the 20th century, but it has since been supplemented by an interest in popular culture. And in THAT context She seems unavoidable. According to the Wikipedia article on She, it’s been enormously popular and influential, having sold 83 million copies. It has influenced Rudyard Kipling, Henry Miller, Graham Greene, J.R.R. Tolkien, and Margaret Atwood and sold 83 million copies. Moreover it’s been adapted into at least 11 films. And it seems to have some purchase in the scholarly literature. It may not be a great novel, but it's a culturally important one.

All of which is well and good. But is the text taught to undergraduates, or graduate students? I can’t see it being taught in a course on the !9th century British novel, thought that is what it is. But a course on fantasy, or adventure? What about a course that includes one or more of the Indiana Jones films?

If so, under what circumstances? If not, why not?

The politics of order in informal markets: Evidence from Lagos

A paper by Shelley Grossman, June 18, 2019, forthcoming at World Politics.
Abstract

Property rights are important for economic exchange, but in much of the world they are not publicly guaranteed. Private market associations can fill this gap by providing an institutional structure to enforce agreements, but with this power comes the ability to extort from group members. Under what circumstances do private associations provide a stable environment for economic activity? Using survey data collected from 1,179 randomly sampled traders across 199 markets in Lagos, I find that markets maintain institutions to support trade not in the absence of government, but rather in response to active government interference. I argue that associations develop pro-trade institutions when threatened by politicians they perceive to be predatory, and when the organization can respond with threats of its own; the latter is easier when traders are not competing with each other. In order to maintain this balance of power, the association will not extort because it needs trader support to maintain the credibility of its threats to mobilize against predatory politicians.

The meanderings of the Mississippi


Friday Fotos: More flowers





Thursday, June 20, 2019

Let's Have an Adventure! – King Soloman's Mines

Bumping this to the top of the queue because, I've been thinking about it in relation to Heart of Darkness. I'm also thinking about She, and expect to post about it in a day or three.
* * * * * 
Another reprint from The Valve, this one from May of 2009. I've taken the liberty of appending a comment by Adam Roberts, and my reply to that comment.
Taking a bet from his brother that he couldn’t write a book as good as Treasure Island, H. Rider Haggard wrote and published King Solomon’s Mines in 1885. Such a strange book it was that publisher after publisher rejected it. It became a smash hit. 

As for that strangeness, King Solomon's Mines is of a genre that is strange no more, an adventure into a Lost World. 

The story follows three Brits as they trek deep into East African in search of the legendary diamond mines of King Solomon. The journey is initiated by Sir Henry Curtis, who is accompanied by Capt. John Good, recently retired from the Royal Navy. Sir Henry is looking for his younger brother, George, who had disappeared while searching for the mines. While on a steamer from Cape Town to Durban Curtis and Good meet Allan Quartermain, a well-known big-game hunter. Upon learning of their mission, Quartermain reveals that he has an old hand-drawn map to the mines that he’d acquired years ago from a Portuguese “at a place called Sitanda’s Kraal, and a miserable place it was, for one could get nothing to eat there, and there was but little game about.” This man, José Silvestre, told a story about an ancestor’s struggle and misfortune in a search for Solomon’s fabulous wealth. That ancestor made the map that Silvestre gave to Quartermain just before he expired. 

That is the map, or rather a copy of it, that Quartermain used to guide Curtis and Good deep into the African interior. But not before a bargain had been struck. Curtis agreed 1) to an up-front fee of £500, 2)to pay all expedition expenses and 3) that “any ivory or other valuables” they got would be split between Good and Quartermain. He further agreed (4) to provide for Quartermain’s son, Henry, should Quartermain die or be disabled. Having struck the bargain, Quartermain arranged an expedition, and off they went adventuring deep into the heart of the African continent.

The details of those adventures – an elephant hunt, desert treks, mountain climbing, a big battle, underground scrambling – are remarkable enough. But that’s not what I’m writing about. For one thing adventures lose all their fun and vigor in summary. More particularly, the adventures are a setting for something else.

What is that something else? Social relations. I want to focus on the relations among the central trio of characters and between those characters and the Kukuana, a fictional people who inhabit the region where Solomon’s mines are located.

Wednesday, June 19, 2019

Illumination

Has the computer metaphor for the mind run out of steam?

In May of this year John Brockman hosted one of those high-class gab fests he loves so much. This one was one the theme of Possible Minds (from this book). Here's a talk by Rodney Brooks, with comments by various distinguished others, on the theme "The Cul-de-Sac of the Computational Metaphor". Brooks opens:
I’m worried that the crack cocaine of Moore’s law, which has given us more and more computation, has lulled us into thinking that that’s all there is. When you look at Claus Pias’s introduction to the Macy Conferences book, he writes, "The common precondition of the three foundational concepts of cybernetics—switching (Boolean) algebra, information theory and feedback—is digitality." They go straight into digitality in this conference. He says, "We considered Turing’s universal machine as a 'model' for brains, employing Pitts' and McCulloch’s calculus for activity in neural nets." Anyone who has looked at the Pitts and McCulloch papers knows it's a very primitive view of what is happening in neurons. But they adopted Turing’s universal machine.

How did Turing come up with Turing computation? In his 1936 paper, he talks about a human computer. Interestingly, he uses the male pronoun, whereas most of them were women. A human computer had a piece of paper, wrote things down, and followed rules—that was his model of computation, which we have come to accept.
[Note that Turing came up with his concept of computational process by abstracting over what he observed humans do while calculating. It's an abstracted imitation of a human activity.– B.B.]
We’re talking about cybernetics, but in AI, in John McCarthy’s 1955 proposal for the 1956 AI Workshop at Dartmouth, the very first sentence is, "We propose a study of artificial intelligence." He never defines artificial intelligence beyond that first sentence. That’s the first place it’s ever been used. But the second sentence is, "The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it." As a materialist reductionist, I agree with that.

The second paragraph is, "If a machine can do a job, then an automatic calculator can be programmed to simulate the machine." That’s a jump from any sort of machine to an automatic calculator. And that’s in the air, that’s what we all think. Neuroscience uses computation as a metaphor, and I question whether that’s the right set of metaphors. We know computation is not enough for everything. Classical computation cannot handle quantum information processing.
Note the opposition/distinction between classical computing and quantum information processing: classical|quantum, computing|information processing. Of course quantum computing is all the rage in some quarters as it promises enormous through-put.

Various people interrupt with observations about those initial remarks. Note this one from Stephen Wolfram: "The formalism of quantum mechanics, like the formalism of current classical mechanics, is about real numbers and is not similar to the way computation works."

What's computation? Brooks notes:
Who is familiar with Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments in Metaphors We Live By? They talk about how we think in metaphors, which are based in the physical world in which we operate. That’s how we think and reason. In Turing’s computation, we use metaphors of place, and state, and change of state at place, and that’s the way we think about computation. We think of it as these little places where we put stuff and we move it around. That’s our vision of computation.
One example where, Brooks claims, the computer metaphor doesn't work very well:
Here’s another example: Where did neurons come from? If you go back to very primitive creatures, there was electrical transmission across surfaces of cells, and then some things managed to transmit internally in the axons. If you look at jellyfish, sometimes they have totally separate neural networks of different neurons and completely separate networks for different behaviors.

For instance, one of the things that neurons work out well for jellyfish is how to synchronize their swimming. They have a central clock generator, the signal gets distributed on the neurons, but there are different transmission times from the central clock to the different parts of the creature. So, how do they handle that? Well, different species handle it in different ways. Some use amazingly fast propagation. Others, because the spikes attenuate as they go a certain distance, there is a latency, which is inversely proportional to the signal strength. So, the weaker the signal strength, the quicker you operate, and that’s how the whole thing synchronizes.

Is information processing the right metaphor there? Or are control theory and resonance and synchronization the right metaphor? We need different metaphors at different times, rather than just computation. Physical intuition that we probably have as we think about computation has served physicists well, until you get to the quantum world. When you get to the quantum world, that physical intuition about stuff and place gets in the way.
A bit later Brooks notes: "A lot of what we do in computation and in physics and in neuroscience is getting stuck in these metaphors."

A bit later Brooks notes:
I pointed out in the note to John [Brockman] about a recent paper titled "Could a Neuroscientist Understand a Microprocessor?" I talked about this many years ago. I speculated that if you applied the ways neuroscientists work on brains, with probes, and look at correlations between signals and applied that to a microprocessor without a model of the microprocessor and how it works, it would be very hard to figure out how it works.

There’s a great paper in PLOS last year where they took a 6502 microprocessor that was running Donkey Kong and a few other games and did lesion studies on it, they put probes in. They found the Donkey Kong transistors, which if you lesioned out 98 of the 4,000 transistors, Donkey Kong failed, whereas different games didn’t fail with those same transistors. So, that was localizing Donkey Kong-ness in the 6502.

They ran many experiments, similar to those run in neuroscience. Without an underlying model of what was going on internally, it came up with pretty much garbage stuff that no computer scientist thinks relevant to anything. It’s breaking abstraction. That’s why I’m wondering about where we can find new abstractions, not necessarily as different as quantum mechanics or relativity is from normal physics, but are there different ways of thinking that are not extremely mind-breaking that will enable us to do new things in the way that computation and calculus enables us to do new things?

Tuesday, June 18, 2019

How about some more irises?

David Chalmers tells us how computers will eclispe is in the future – aka where do these people get this stuff? Philosophy as fan servce.

Prashnath Ramakrishna interviews David Chalmers for the NYTimes:
D.C.: Deep learning is great for things we do perceptually as human beings — image recognition, speech recognition and so on. But when it comes to anything requiring autonomy, reasoning, decisions, creativity and so on, A.I. is only good in limited domains. It’s pretty good at playing games like Go. The moment you get to the real world, though, things get complicated. There are a lot of mountains we need to climb before we get to human-level A.G.I. That said, I think it’s going to be possible eventually, say in the 40-to-100-year time frame.

Once we have a human-level artificial intelligence, there’s just no doubt that it will change the world. A.G.I.s are going to be beings with powers initially equivalent to our own and before long much greater than our own. [...]

I value human history and selfishly would like it to be continuous with the future. How much does it matter that our future is biological? At some point I think we must face the fact that there are going to be many faster substrates for running intelligence than our own. If we want to stick to our biological brains, then we are in danger of being left behind in a world with superfast, superintelligent computers. Ultimately, we’d have to upgrade.

The other way it could go is that new artificial intelligences take over the world and there’s no place for humanity. Maybe we’re relegated to some virtual world or some designated part of the physical world. But you’re right, it would be a second-class existence. At the very least maybe they keep us around as pets or for entertainment or for history’s sake. That would be a depressing outcome. Maybe they’d put us in virtual worlds, we’d never know, and we’d forget all this stuff. Maybe it’s already happened and we’re living in one of those virtual worlds now. Hey, it’s not so bad.
I suppose he really believes this. But why? This is just an interview. No doubt he's run over this ground in greater rigor in some of his publications, as have many others. But how much rigor is possible with this kind of material. Not much, not much at all. It's mostly fantasy. And he's mostly playing to his fans.

And then there's the idea that we're all living in a simulation:
D.C.: This goes back a long way in the history of philosophy. René Descartes said, “How do you know you’re not being fooled by an evil demon right now into thinking this is real when none of it’s real?” Descartes’ evil-demon question is kind of like the question of a virtual reality. The modern version of it is, “How do you know you’re not in the matrix? How do you know you’re not in a computer simulation where all this seems real but none of it is real?” It’s easy for even a movie like “The Matrix” to pump the intuition in you that “this is evil. This isn’t real. No, this is all fake.”

The view that virtual reality isn’t real stems from an outmoded view of reality. In the Garden of Eden, we thought that there was a primitively red apple embedded in a primitive space and everything is just as it seems to be. We’ve learned from modern science that the world isn’t really like that. A color is just a bunch of wavelengths arising from the physical reflectance properties of objects that produce a certain kind of experience in us. Solidity? Nothing is truly solid out there in the world. Things are mostly empty space, but they have the causal powers to produce in us the experience of solidity. Even space and time are gradually being dissolved by physics, or at least being boiled down to something simpler.

Physical reality is coming to look a lot like virtual reality right now. You could take the attitude, “So much the worse for physical reality. It’s not real.” But I think, no. It turns out we just take all that on board and say, “Fine, things are not the way we thought, but they’re still real.” That should be the right attitude toward virtual reality as well. Code and silicon circuitry form just another underlying substrate for reality. Is it so much worse to be in a computer-generated reality than what contemporary physics tells us? Quantum wave functions with indeterminate values? That seems as ethereal and unsubstantial as virtual reality. But hey! We’re used to it.

P.R.: I’m wondering whether it’s useful to say that virtual reality isn’t simply an alternate reality but is rather a sub-reality of the one we normally occupy.

D.C.: That I think is fair. It’s kind of a multiverse. None of this is saying there’s no objective reality. Maybe there’s an objective cosmos encompassing everything that exists. But maybe there’s a level-one cosmos and people create simulations and virtual realities within it. Maybe sometimes there are simulations within simulations. Who knows how many levels there are?

I once speculated that we’re at level 42. Remember that in “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” they programmed a computer to find the answer to the ultimate question of life, the universe, everything. Then, after years, the computer said, “The answer is 42.” What question could possibly be important enough that this could be the ultimate question and the answer could be a simple number? Well, maybe the question was “What level of reality are we at?”
More fan service.

Neual criticality, between order and chaos


Charlie Wood, Do Brains Operate at a Tipping Point? New Clues and Complications, Quanta Magazine, June 10, 2019.
A team of Brazilian physicists analyzing the brains of rats and other animals has found the strongest evidence yet that the brain balances at the brink between two modes of operation, in a precarious yet versatile state known as criticality. At the same time, the findings challenge some of the original assumptions of this controversial “critical brain” hypothesis. [...]

In the 1990s, the physicist Per Bak hypothesized that the brain derives its bag of tricks from criticality. The concept originates in the world of statistical mechanics, where it describes a system of many parts teetering between stability and mayhem. Consider a snowy slope in winter. Early-season snow slides are small, while blizzards late in the season may set off avalanches. Somewhere between these phases of order and catastrophe lies a particular snowpack where anything goes: The next disturbance could set off a trickle, an avalanche or something in between. These events don’t happen with equal likelihood; rather, small cascades occur exponentially more often than larger cascades, which occur exponentially more often than those larger still, and so on. But at the “critical point,” as physicists call the configuration, the sizes and frequencies of events have a simple exponential relationship. Bak argued that tuning to just such a sweet spot would make the brain a capable and flexible information processor.
A bit later:
When the team looked in detail at where the critical point fell, however, they found that the rat brains weren’t balanced between phases of low and high neuronal activity, as predicted by the original critical brain hypothesis; rather, the critical point separated a phase in which neurons fired synchronously and a phase characterized by largely incoherent firing of neurons. This distinction may explain the hit-or-miss nature of past criticality searches. “The fact that we have reconciled the data from earlier research really points to something more general,” said Pedro Carelli, Copelli’s colleague and a coauthor of the research, which appeared in Physical Review Letters in late May.

But an anesthetized brain is not natural, so the scientists repeated their analysis on public data describing neural activity in free-roaming mice. They again found evidence that the animals’ brains sometimes experienced criticality satisfying the new gold standard from 2017. However, unlike with the anesthetized rats, neurons in the mice brains spent most of their time firing asynchronously — away from the alleged critical point of semi-synchronicity.

Copelli and Carelli acknowledge that this observation poses a challenge to the notion that the brain prefers to be in the vicinity of the critical point. But they also stress that without running the awake-animal experiment themselves (which is prohibitively expensive), they can’t conclusively interpret the mouse data. Poor sleep during the experiment, for instance, could have biased the animals’ brains away from criticality, Copelli said.

They and their colleagues also analyzed public data on monkeys and turtles. Although the data sets were too limited to confirm criticality with the full three-exponent relationship, the team calculated the ratio between two different power-law exponents indicating the distributions of avalanche sizes and durations. This ratio — which represents how quickly avalanches spread out — was always the same, regardless of species and whether the animal was under anesthesia. “To a physicist, this suggests some kind of universal mechanism,” Copelli said.